

American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism

By *Thomas S. Kidd*

Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009, 224 pp., ISBN 9780691133492.

Spiritual conflict with Islam has a long lineage in Christian thought. Bernard Lewis, the dean of Western scholars of Islam, points out that the two faiths have so much in common that they are natural opponents. Each conceives of itself as exclusively bearing God's final message to the rest of mankind, correcting or completing prior beliefs. In addition, many adherents on both sides believe that the world is in the last stage of a millennial struggle. These parallels inevitably lead to hostility, says Lewis, and that is the real clash of civilizations.

This is an ancient enmity. It persisted through the Crusades, the fall of Byzantium, and the Reconquista of Spain in 1492. Islam is the only religion that has ever imperiled Christianity's very existence. For almost a thousand years, it threatened to conquer Christian Europe, through invasion as well as conversion and assimilation. For centuries, Islam, variously represented by Saladin, the "Grand Turk," or the Ottoman Empire, was associated with the forces of darkness. In medieval folk eschatology, Mohammad and Islam were identified with the Antichrist or Gog.

In *American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism*, Thomas S. Kidd, an associate professor of History at Baylor University, has performed the enormous service of providing a much-needed, comprehensive, and reliable study of

American Protestants' attitudes toward Islam. In an admirably clear exposition, Kidd demonstrates that from Cotton Mather to the Christian Zionists of the present time, conservative Christians' views of Islam have been intertwined with geopolitics, and have often been colored by fear. Many American Christians have seen Muslims as presenting posing a global threat, and they have responded with both denunciation and a desire to convert them.

Kidd begins his survey with the Barbary pirates, who began to seize, enslave, and ransom Christian sailors in the early sixteenth century. The accounts of these events (which reverberate with recent news stories coming out of Somalia) took the particular form of the captivity narrative, which helped shape and reinforce Western stereotypes of Muslims and Islam. These narratives affirmed the superiority of Christianity and associated Muslims with Satan. That accusation became typical. Cotton Mather, who had some knowledge of the Qur'an, called Mohammad an imposter and referred to the pirates as "Mohametan Turks and Moors, and Devils."

As Kidd shows, the tone was now set for later denunciations. Jonathan Edwards spoke of Muslims, Roman Catholics, and heathens as the three constituents of Satan's earthly kingdom. By the mid-nineteenth century, a branch of evangelical theology known as dispensationalism emerged and

developed this pattern by regarding Muslims as the inevitable enemy of God's plan to restore the Jews to their ancestral home in the Holy Land.

Nineteenth-century missionaries sought to "redeem" Muslims by bringing them to Christ, but had little success. Kidd follows these efforts into the twentieth century, noting the very interesting fact that in 1932 a commission sponsored by John D. Rockefeller called for a new focus on collaboration, education, and service, not proselytizing and conversion. That controversial proposed change in direction fractured the Protestant missionary community.

Among the most interesting foci of the book, and one of the most relevant for our own time, is Kidd's discussion of Christian Zionism. He follows the enthusiastic responses to Britain's capture of Jerusalem from the Turks in 1917, which many biblical literalists took to be a step toward the fulfillment of Jesus' prophecy that the times of Gentile control over the Holy City would come to an end (Luke 21:24). Some dispensationalists believed that God had fought on the side of the British in order to set the stage for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine. Many conservative Christians saw the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a crucial realization of God's plan, and they regarded the Arabs' hostility to the Jewish settlers as a futile expression of anti-Semitism at the end of times. As Kidd notes, many Bible-believing Christians consider the Arabs to be the descendants of the biblical Ishmael. They believe that Arab antagonism toward Israel is a survival of Ishmael's enmity toward Isaac.

One of the strengths in Kidd's book is its nuance. He notes, for example, that

Southern Baptist writers expressed some sympathy for the plight of Palestinians and, by one account, most missionaries in the mid-twentieth century were pro-Arab. *Christianity Today*, the main publication of modern evangelicals, sponsored debates on the Israeli-Arab conflict that included rejections of dispensationalism and support for Palestinians. Evangelicalism is far from a monolith. In fact, it is radically individual, and many born-again American Christians today are critical of Israeli policy and sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. This is something that Kidd might have developed further, along with recent mainline Protestant movements demanding that certain companies cease doing business with Israel.

Christian Zionism today remains true to its roots in biblical promise and prophecy. Dispensationalists, in particular, expect the Muslim world to ally with Russia at the end of times and be defeated in an attack against Israel. This was expressed in detail by Hal Lindsey in *The Late Great Planet Earth*, the best-selling non-fiction book of the 1970s. Kidd's final section deals with the anti-Muslim comments by Pat Robertson et al. after 9/11, tracing the source of such views to Muslims who have converted to evangelicalism.

Kidd concludes this excellent book with a welcome call for Christians to take Muslims seriously, to minimize or eliminate offensive language, and to highlight cultural similarities. He asks them in particular to reject sensationalistic stories about the ostensible evil and demonic character of Islam.

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Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia

By *Kathleen Collins*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 376, ISBN 9780521114660.

This book examines the role of clans in Central Asia from the 19th century up to 2004. Most studies of regime transition focus on formal institutions. However, Collins claims that modern clans, defined as networks of individuals linked through kinship and fictive kin identities (p. 17), function as informal political actors which has initiated or undermined political change in Central Asia. Moreover, clan membership frequently determines career prospects, especially in the public sector, influences social status, and functions as a defense mechanism against outside competitors.

To begin with, the author does a very good job of providing a theoretical framework to understand clan politics (p. 24-53). From her point of view, understanding clans requires the comprehension of both rational and cultural elements. In addition, she adequately explains why and how clans survived during the Soviet period, despite efforts to eradicate them and impose new national identities among Central Asia's indigenous population (pp. 62-134).

From chapter 5 to chapter 8, Collins examines the impact of clans on regime consolidation and durability, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Clan competition in Tajikistan led to a fierce civil war in the early 1990s. The Rahmonov regime was supported by the Kulyab clan and to a certain extent the Sughd clan. The opposition parties received support from clans (e.g., the Garm and the Gorno Badakhshan) that were generally under-

represented in government and politics during the Soviet era. During the same period, a clan-brokered pact with Akayev initiated a process of democratization, albeit problematic, in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. While former President Akayev publicly denounced clan politics, he found himself increasingly relying on clan support to maintain his grip on power. Akayev was often accused of supporting northern clans, especially his wife's clan from the western Tallas region; as a result, funds and key positions in central and local government were allocated among his clan supporters. In Uzbekistan, clan cooperation created a new autocracy in the early 1990s. The lion's share of important state appointments has gone to the Samarkand and Tashkent clans in Uzbekistan since the late 1980s. Thankful appointees in their turn initiated a cult of personality for Islam Karimov. The three countries follow different regime trajectories in the initial post-Soviet period, but toward the mid-1990s they converged to authoritarianism.

In chapter 9, Collins briefly outlines the role of clans in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Somalia. She rightly concludes that the late development of the states, capitalism and national identities (pp. 335-336) can explain the persistence of clans in these countries and regions. Her, rather ambitious, aim is to formulate a general theory of clan politics since there are still clan-based societies in other regions of the world.

Collins's book is a significant contribution to a growing literature on the role of clans in Central Asia.¹ She is to be commended for conducting three years of fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; one should not underestimate the difficulties a Western researcher may have to overcome in order to conduct research in Central Asia. Although her study is important, Collins clearly exaggerates the influence of clans in the post-Soviet societies of Central Asia. There is no solid evidence that clans always act as a monolithic rational actor; it appears that most clans are loosely linked and often suffer from internal disputes. Besides, Collins underestimates the role of Islam in bridging clan cleavages. Although politically divided, the Muslim world still forms a large and interconnected religious-cultural system. It was natural, as Central Asian states became integrated into the international community, for Muslims to adopt a new trans-clan identity, centered on the *ummah*.

More importantly, Collins does not provide a detailed description of what a clan looks like and how it is organized internally. In particular, the author needs to provide more evidence about her claim that each clan comprises 2,000 to 20,000 members (p. 18). Although it is not easy to gain information about such sensitive

issues, Collins could have provided a mapping of Central Asian clans. A typology of clans could have been useful too, given the plurality of clans in the three countries under study. Some of her conclusions are incorrect; for example, Collins states that "in Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan, there is little evidence to date of a proliferation of weapons" (p. 342). Yet following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Central Asia is awash with arms. The retreat of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 through Uzbekistan and the arming of the different factions in the Tajik civil war from 1992 to 1997 mean that rifles and pistols are easily obtainable on the black market.² This notwithstanding, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of clan politics in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and is a good starting point for further research.

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Endnotes

1. Edgar A., *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), Roy O., *The New Central Asia* (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Schatz E., *Modern Clan Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004).

2. MacFarlane N. and Torjesen S, *Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Asia?* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004).

The Religions of the Book: Christian Perceptions, 1400-1660

Edited by *Matthew Dimmock* and *Andrew Hadfield*

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 213 pp., ISBN 9780230020047.

Religions of the Book adds to a growing body of scholarship on Christian percep-

tions of Muslims and Jews. The collection is somewhat uneven, but several strong

articles make this volume well worth reading.

Raphael Hallett's article on Luther and the Jews is polished and persuasive. This careful examination of Luther's writings challenges the view that the reformer radically changed his stance on the Jews toward the end of his life; instead, Hallett deftly argues, both Luther's early and later writings on the Jews exhibit a consistent anxiety about the group as a threat to Protestant identity. Colin Imber's "Crusade of Varna, 1443-1445" does a fine job unraveling the complex strands that formed the campaign in which Sultan Murad II defeated the Christian host led by King Vladislav of Poland and Hungary. Most Christian goals, he explains, were local and political, but papal involvement provided the glue that made it a crusade. This essay is best read as a companion to Imber's excellent *Crusade of Varna* (Ashgate, 2006) as it reveals how he interprets the texts he has edited and translated.

Palmira Brummett's article on Christian iconography c. 1550-1689 offers a sophisticated analysis of how Europeans used maps and rhetoric to show Ottomans and Europeans as polar opposites, and to situate the Europeans in a more favorable light. For example, European maps of Hungary and the Balkans where the Ottoman state was well established often misleadingly depicted Ottoman control as a temporary encampment. Eliane Glaser's article explores debates in England during the civil war period over religious toleration of the Jews, and the separation of church and state. Calls for tolerance have been interpreted as unmitigated support for the Jews, but as Glaser argues, the Jews were generally

invoked as an extreme example: i.e. England should be so tolerant of all faiths that *even* the Jews should have freedom of conscience. The real goal, however, was tolerance of Christian sects, not non-Christians. Finally, Anthony Bale presents an intriguing discussion of different ways of "reading" Jews in late medieval England, which often extended beyond texts. The essay includes an edifying focus on Margery Kempe and the 'virtual' Jew in her visions of the Passion, despite the absence of Jews in England for over a century following their exile in 1290.

Other essays in the volume are less satisfying. Gerald MacLean's essay on Milton and the Muslims is a fascinating, but frustrating, read. MacLean unearths subtle references to Islam and contemporary Muslim empires, even noting lacunae in geographical descriptions that may reveal Milton's unease with the extent of the Ottoman Empire. But the references are oblique – depending heavily, for example, on adjectives often used in the English discourse of Islam, without directly mentioning anything patently Islamic. There is simply not enough clear evidence to support MacLean's view of Milton as significantly influenced by Islam. Nonetheless, it is a well written and provocative essay. The remaining essays are harder to comprehend, bearing the mark of conference papers in need of revision or fleshing out. Matthew Birchwood's essay has interesting points about the ways in which tumultuous English religious debates and politics may have stimulated an interest in the Polyglot Bible, heresy, and Islam. Unfortunately, the essay lacks organization and a clear central argument. More disappointing is the

article by one of the book's editors, Matthew Dimmock, on early Christian perceptions of Muhammad and Islam. Dimmock makes some useful observations, but there is no clear thesis or narrative to the essay, nor does he ever define what he means by "early Christian." His approach is also critically superficial and flat, citing multiple texts in succession without any discussion of the author, audience, or circumstances of composition.

Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield's editors' introduction to the book provides some useful historical and textual background by introducing several moments and works that shaped Christian perceptions of Jews and Muslims. The introduction succeeds in its goal of demonstrating the sense of a shared tradition between the three faiths, but more attention could be given to the antagonism between the faiths, particularly the rash of exiles and pogroms suffered by the Jews on the continent. Also missing is an articulation by the editors of what distinguishes the early modern period from others. Continuities and differences from the Middle Ages deserve to be highlighted to help the reader make better sense of the period as a whole and appreciate the larger importance of the volume to studies of the three faiths.

More problematic is the editors' contention that the self-other binary model is "naïve and reductive" (15). This suggests that scholars who employ the self-other dichotomy do so uncritically and without nuance, and that the approach in these essays is ground breaking. Yet one struggles to think of recent scholarship on perceptions and relations between the faiths that ignores the limits of the self and other model or fails

to probe the gray areas between the poles. One also struggles to find studies that do not use the self-other binary as a starting or a central point. It is still a valid model that speaks to scholars who regularly encounter more hostile than tolerant rhetoric about the other in their sources. Indeed, every essay in *Religions of the Book* cites multiple sources that affirm the self-other model, even as they strive to show moments of cooperation, respect, or exchange. If the editors have found an alternative to a self and other model, whether nuanced or naïve, it is not apparent in the introduction or the essays.

The afterword by Jerry Brotton notes the scholarly work that remains to be done on a range of sources from all three traditions. Indeed, no single scholar or essay collection can hope to capture the panorama and complexity of perceptions, let alone interactions of the three faiths. Brotton also wisely cautions readers about the dangers of oversimplifying moments of seeming tolerance and openness, not the least of which is a tendency among British and American scholars to celebrate all things Ottoman in the Renaissance while ignoring the harsher realities of government by imperial theocracy. One shortcoming of this afterword is the peremptory discussion of recent scholarship, but Brotton succeeds in closing the work with some very good questions for further study.

Despite some of its shortcomings, this is a welcome collection of essays on a diverse range of subjects. The editors are to be congratulated for bringing them all together in this thought provoking publication.

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Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives

Edited By *Peter J. Katzenstein*

London and New York: Routledge, 2009, 248 pp., ISBN 9780415777117.

The quest to incorporate non-material factors into international relations has continued apace into the twenty-first century. After religion, culture and identity, now 'civilization' seems to be attracting a great deal of attention from international relations (IR) scholars. *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives*, which is the result of a roundtable and a panel organized at the 2007 and 2008 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, investigates the potentiality of the concept of civilizations in order to better explain world politics. The book consists of six case studies of civilizations (American European, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Islamic) in six chapters, bookended by an introduction and a conclusion by Peter J. Katzenstein and Patrick T. Jackson respectively.

All six case studies revolve around particular questions about how to conceptualize civilizations in contemporary world politics: should civilizations be conceived as having a persistent essence (dispositional approach) or as existing only in politicians' rhetoric and discourse in such a way as to warrant examination of political discourses? Do plural civilizations exist within one "civilization of modernity" while keeping their own unique and distinctive practices?

In his introduction to the book, while acknowledging at the outset the plurality and pluralistic nature of civilizations, Katzenstein notes that civilizations "coexist

with each other within one civilization of modernity" (p.1), which means "...a multiplicity of different cultural programs and institutions of modernity that derive from the interaction between West European modernity and the various civilizations of the Axial Age" (p.17), or what we often call today a global world" (p.1). Katzenstein's claim provides a launch point for the rich discussions that follow. Indeed, Emanuel Adler raises an explicit objection to Katzenstein's argument in chapter three. According to Adler, European civilization, now in its second phase with the EU being the normative power, is rather a post-modern "community of practice." Adler notes the EU's embrace of the approach of 'power to' instead of 'power over,' exemplified by practices such as the elimination of borders, the enlargement process, CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] practices, and the like.

On the question of the proper approach to the study of civilizations, most of the case studies favor a discursive approach to accommodate the use of the concept of civilizations in discussions of world politics. In the closing chapter of the book, Patrick Jackson suggests a post-essentialist approach to studying civilizations. What he has in mind is the study of the invocation of civilizational essences. This way, he argues, civilizations can be incorporated into the IR field. While it is not civilizations that act in world politics, he notes, but rather other political units such as nation-states, these

might bear a *civilizational identity* that could be assessed and taken into account. David Kang also favors a discursive approach to the study of civilizations. He argues in his chapter on Chinese civilization that despite all the talk and its roots in the distant past, China “has no more civilizational influence than does modern Greece” today (p.113). Kang interestingly sheds light on the widely explored issue of identity-building over a demonized ‘other,’ an issue social constructivists deal with most, through the concept of “civilizational identity.” He insightfully argues that nomads such as Monghols, Uighurs and Khitans constituted the ‘others’ to Chinese civilizational identity partly because they resisted Chinese values.

Bruce Lawrence, in his study of Islamic civilization, concurs with the rest of the authors that civilizations exist more in peoples’ minds, attitudes and discourses than in specific territories today. His conclusion that we should focus more on what people think about their civilization is a good reminder that nation-states still dominate thinking about international relations.

In their chapters on Japanese and Indian civilizations respectively, David Leheny and Susan Rudolph substantiate the discursive approach. Leheny asserts that despite the fact that the notion of the essence and distinctiveness of Japanese civilization has been persistent and common among the Japanese, civilizations or civilizational states cannot be employed in an experimental framework in world politics. Rudolph demonstrates the role politicians deliberately play in creating conceptions of civilizations as she analyzes the existence of four variants of Indian civilization within 250 years (mid-18th until 21st century):

orientalist, anglicist, Indian, and Hindu nationalist. Adler is the author of the only chapter to try to advance a dispositional approach as he takes the European civilization as a community of practice with dispositional properties.

Here we have a book very rich in content and so timely in discussing its subject that it will surely broaden the conceptual tools available to international relations scholars, particularly to social constructivists, with its introduction of the concept of civilizational identity. The authors of the case studies problematize the concept of ‘civilizations’ and provide the reader with new insights about them while making a strong case for adopting a discursive approach. Nonetheless, the book is not free of some weaknesses. To begin with, the argument that multiple civilizations exist within one civilization of modernity is not as clear-cut as it might seem at first glance. Even though it is true that plural civilizations exist,¹ the idea that civilizations co-exist under one civilization of modernity should not distract us from noting that various civilizations are not left as free to enact different programs of modernity to bring about multiple modernities as Katzenstein would want us to assume. As Davutoglu has pointed out, the dominant Western civilization does not readily allow other civilizations the essential living space they need to cherish their unique social relations of production and particular forms of spiritual consciousness,² features which Cox pinpointed as factors that “may differentiate civilizations that coexist.”³ One would have to be overtly naïve to assume the coexistence of plural civilizations within one civilization of modernity unless pluralism means “different presentations of the same supreme civilization,”⁴ not the sur-

vival of the authentic parameters of other civilizations.

James Kurth states in his chapter that humanity lives in a secular modern global civilization today, but one cannot help but ask how global that civilization is, especially when he acknowledges that Chinese, Indian and Persian civilizations still have their own civilizational states (p. 65) and that “this conception of global civilization has made America the principal adversary or target of particular repositories and remnants of the old Axial age civilizations such as China, India and Iran and Shiite Islam and Sunni Islam and its transnational networks” (p. 41). Besides, described as “those civilizations that crystallized during the half-millennium from 500 B.C. to the first century of the Christian era”⁵ by Eisenstadt and as confirmed by Lawrence in this book (p.158), contra Kurth, Islam would be a ‘post-Axial age civilization’ not an ‘Axial one.’

Last but not least, those who are familiar with the depiction of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West by foreign observers as well as Turkish politicians could be easily disturbed by Lawrence’s constant description of Islamic civilization as a bridge (p. 164-165, 166, 172). It is not clear if Lawrence is using the ‘bridge’ metaphor in the Huntingtonian sense, in which it would mean “... an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but part of neither,”⁶ or, as seems more likely, something that connects two entities and carries one side to another, but is not perceived as an actor with an independent existence.⁷ Perhaps, it would have been a better idea for Lawrence to adopt the ‘emic’ perspective Jackson raised in his chapter, and try to “explicate how participants in that culture make sense of their own activities” (p.185). If that had been

done, it is highly likely that Lawrence would have found that the participants of the Islamic civilization did not perceive their civilization a ‘bridge civilization.’

Overall, these reservations notwithstanding, *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* not only stands as a valuable and insightful introduction to the study of civilizations and civilizational identities in 21st century world politics, but as an important terminological contribution that might help save a revered concept from such arbitrary usages as “market civilization.”⁸

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Endnotes

1. Richard Falk, “Geopolitical Turmoil and Civilizational Pluralism”, *Civilizations and World Orders*, Istanbul May 12-14, 2006 (Divan Ilmi Araştırmalar, Vol 12. Number 23 (2007/2); Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” *The Nation*, October 4, 2001.

2. Ahmet Davutoglu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*. (Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994); Ahmet Davutoglu, “Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki” [Self-Perception of Civilizations], *Divan Ilmi Araştırmalar*, Volume 1 (1997).

3. Robert Cox, “Civilizations and the Twenty-First Century: Some Theoretical Considerations,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 1, (2001), p. 113.

4. Ahmet Davutoglu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*. (Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994), p. 74.

5. Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities Part I*, (Leiden & Boston: Brill Publications, 2003), p. 36.

6. Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 138-139.

7. Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkiye Merkez Ulke Olmali” [Turkey Should be a Pivotal Country], *Radikal*, February 26, 2004.

8. Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” *International Security*, 27 (3), (Winter 2002-2003), pp. 5-29.

Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management

Edited By *Daniel Moran* and *James A. Russell*

New York: Routledge, 2009, 252 pp. ISBN 9780415776387.

An increase in world's energy needs coupled with a decrease in available resources has created a trend that will lead to the militarization of energy resources in the future. This could cause a *realpolitik* style international conflict and power struggle, and it is this issue that is addressed in this work. This book consists of 11 articles that look at energy security policy in world politics and the militarization of resource management. In this context, this work focuses upon the changing parameters in the energy sector, such as oil dependency, resource mercantilism, and the relationship between energy security and international security from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia and the United States to China in global energy politics.

In the introduction, which is called the militarization of energy security, the three editors argue that states place energy security at the heart of their national security and consider energy security a national security issue. In other words, states identify energy security with securitization, which is embedded within their national security discourse. In this way, the securitization of energy security policies has introduced a new military-defense doctrine based upon the control of energy resources – the militarization of resource management. Such developments in the energy field increase the risks of strategic miscalculations. However, the increasing tendency to directly control energy sources through military

means, the vagueness of armed conflicts in the offshore areas of state sovereignty (for instance, the Arctic, Antarctic, and Southeast Asia) can be considered risks. In addition, puppet states that were established to indirectly control strategic energy source (in this regard the US's occupation of Iraq and the regime change may be assessed), the active military control of transport routes for energy sources (it gives NATO a new mission such as in the Gulf of Aden to combat pirates), and military units being transported to energy resources as problems arise create even further risks. Another striking point is that the militarization of energy resources is breaking away from globalization. Thus, states, as the dominant powers, are increasing their power at the expense of multinational companies in the energy sector.

In the first section, the relationship between energy security, war and international trade, and strategic action is analyzed and the interaction of these variables with each other is defined. Michael T. Klare argues that developments such as the lack of oil and the competition focused on oil resources has led military powers to ensure energy security. In this sense, energy security has been militarized due to petroleum anxiety. Furthermore, Duane Chapman examines the question of the US's role in the Persian Gulf. According to the author, international security and stability are dependent on Gulf oil. An American-centric

security system is in force in the region for today but is based upon the military and such unilateralism is not sustainable.

Chapman also indicates that the security guarantor status of the US is valid only as long as it is able to control the Gulf countries, but his analysis is incomplete and inadequate owing to his overlooking the rising powers in the region. In addition, Saad Rahim continues and reinforces the previous author's argument with his thesis that global energy security is dependent on the stability of the Gulf countries. In the context of energy security and Russia, Soligo and Jaffe also deal with the Putin administration's foreign policy of economization and energization as a remarkable phenomenon. Furthermore, Russia's use of energy as a weapon in foreign policy brings instability in global energy markets. Thomas Johnson also analyzes the axes of energy and security in Central Asia in connection with Russia. The author alleges that there is a Faustian bargain between Russia and the Central Asian countries which leads to mutual dependence or an interdependence relationship whereas China has emerged as a balance to Russia as well as to the US. China is faring well in the region because it doesn't concern with the authoritarian regimes unlike the US and the Western countries. The US and Western countries are promoting democracy but on the other hand China has no democratic credentials and do not want to promote democracy. Boucek continues the analysis of Central Asian energy politics and asserts that Russia is dependent upon cheap Turkmen natural gas to prolong its dominance and monopolistic energy policy in Eurasian energy politics. What's more, with the in-

crease in the critical role of Turkmenistan in Eurasian energy policy thanks to administration changes in December 2006, Russian dominance has become slippery and risky.

Trinkunas examines energy security in the case of Venezuela and highlights the relationship between Chavez coming to power and the radical changes in Latin American-US relations. The Chavez administration has defined the US as a threat and as a result has militarized its oil policy, which has led to a freezing of US influence in Latin America. However, Chavez's policy is based on its own contradictions. The US, which is defined as the greatest threat, is in fact Venezuela's largest customer. For that reason, Chavez's oil-fueled foreign policy, which hinges upon American opposition, is restricted. On the other hand, in the section on Chinese energy policy, Newyer argues that its energy policy will determine the country's future. He has projected scenarios on China's possible energy policies based on continued economic growth and that to be strong it is likely to follow a defensive and market-oriented energy policy. Nevertheless, China's regime and its developing relationships with neighbors could also shape its energy policy. In the last section, the future of US supremacy in the Gulf with the engagement of rising powers is discussed in the context of resource mercantilism and the militarization of energy resource management. The author claims that the rising powers' developing relationships with Gulf countries has challenged US interests in the region. Consequently, these developments will probably occupy the agenda of US foreign and defense policy. Moreover, the increasing engagement of

the rising powers in the Gulf will introduce competition and will eventually end the US hegemony in the region.

In conclusion, the energy policies that have been on the agenda of international politics since 1973 will emerge as one of the most fundamental factors to reshape the world in the near future and these energy politics include the potential for conflicts

in many cases. Although the essays in this book are US centric in approach not taking the Central Asian perspectives into account and takes the securitization of energy policy as a fundamental level of analysis it should be read in order to more properly understand the present and future of global transformations in energy.

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Redeploying the State: Corporatism, Neoliberalism, and Coalition Politics

By *Hishaam D. Aidi*

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 260 pp., ISBN 9780230611597.

Redeploying the State is a book about statehood, which can also be called state strength, capacity, or effectiveness. In order to address this topic, it takes as its subject a comparative study of Egypt and Mexico, particularly in the arenas of privatization and labor disputes. Hishaam Aidi asks why the Egyptian state was much less effective than the Mexican state in economic reforms, especially in regard to Mexico's ability to overcome the labor movement's opposition, despite the fact that Egypt was much more authoritarian and therefore had a more repressed labor movement than Mexico. While explaining this puzzle, Aidi implicitly refutes essentialism, which refers to certain "essences" of Islam, while explaining Muslim socio-political life. By comparing Muslim-majority Egypt with Catholic-majority Mexico, he rejects the so-called Muslim or Middle Eastern exceptionalism.

Aidi's critique of the rentier state model is much more explicit. According to the

rentier state perspective, a country that receives substantial external revenue does not extract extensive amounts of money from its own society through taxation. The lower ratio of taxation prevents a healthy state-society relationship and hinders democracy in such a country. For Aidi, this theory does not explain the higher level of authoritarianism and lower level of state effectiveness in Egypt in comparison to Mexico, because both states depend on external revenue and have low levels of taxation.

Instead of meta-theories, Aidi urges scholars to focus on each state's own historical experiences, noting that these experiences create path dependencies in state-labor relations. In Egypt, since the Nasser period, the state has not allowed the emergence of independent political parties or labor unions. But the absence of these intermediary institutions has not empowered the state. On the contrary, the Egyptian state has remained unable to contain soci-

etal discontent, as was seen in the case of labor opposition to privatization. The state in Egypt has had to maintain patronage toward the workers and other social groups. The Egyptian state rulers have thus been concerned that without the constant allocation of public funding, jobs, and services to the citizens, the state would have failed to legitimize the political system and to prevent social unrest. In Mexico, in contrast, the existence of independent parties and labor unions have helped the state control the masses, including the workers, within the legitimate boundaries of the political system.

Some political scientists may criticize this insightful book for lacking a generalizable theoretical result, and providing only case-specific explanations. Although the book does not provide us with a generally applicable theory of causal relations, it includes several comparative insights with relevance beyond the two cases, insights about the political economies of authoritar-

ian versus democratizing states, and their complex relations with social forces.

My main reservation is that *Redeploying the State* lacks a sufficient longitudinal analysis of the variations within the two cases. It portrays the two countries as if their state-society relations had remained unchanged for decades. That can be justified, however, by the book's theoretical framework based on path-dependence and its emphasis on the historical continuity of two types of corporatism. Aidi argues that the state's incorporation of labor movements into its bureaucracy during the state-building period made the Egyptian state less successful at political and economic reforms, whereas the attachment of labor movements to the ruling party in the founding of Mexico led to a more effective state. *Redeploying the State* is an important cross-continental analysis that is recommended to scholars of both the Middle East and Latin America.

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Veil: Mirror of Identity

By *Christian Joppke*

Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, 162 pages, ISBN9780745643526.

Christian Joppke's study is an ambitious project that tries to examine the different ways in which European countries respond to the increased visibility of veiled women in the public sphere. The book paints a picture of a scene in which Muslim women become more and more assertive about their rights as citizens in a Europe that is increasingly unsure about its own iden-

tity. Joppke's book is testimony to the fact that discussions about the veil provide a framework within which one can ask fundamental questions concerning the nature, responsibilities and limits of modern European states. Joppke's account of the recent history of "veil controversies" poses, at various points, very pertinent questions about what constitutes the divide between the

public and the private, the political and the theological. In his introduction he defines Britain's and France's attitudes towards the veil and the "integration" of Muslim citizens as being at the two opposite ends of the liberal spectrum and brands Germany's stance a "Christian-Occidental" one — a stance which, on the very last page, he condemns as the "worst practice" of liberalism one can observe in Europe.

The reader will find Joppke's history and comparison of legal cases concerning various forms of veiling in Europe very rewarding indeed if he/she can digest the first chapter which is full of misreadings of theorists who have already written extensively about the headscarf and what it means to the wearer. Joppke consistently misquotes Fadwa el Guindi, Lila Abu-Lughod and Saba Mahmood, who have all done anthropological work in the Middle East, to suggest that veiled women have no agency what so ever. Criticizing the Stasi report — the book is full of serendipitous nomenclature like this — Joppke says that the report that investigated the impact of the headscarf in France interviewed only one woman who was actually wearing the headscarf. This is almost a meta-moment, leaving the reader wishing that Joppke himself had now and then resorted to the views of women who choose to wear the headscarf — a choice which he refers to a number of times as the "autonomous veil", followed with comments to the effect that such a thing can be nothing other than false consciousness.

Once the initial hurdle of reading a catalogue of received truths concerning how the headscarf is an affront to liberal values, how Islam is an unchanging practice, and the gross generalizations that he repeats

from Ayan Hirsi Ali, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington is over, Joppke enters the field of experience he is more familiar with, and the book becomes instantly more readable. He starts with the veil controversy in France, defining it as a republican liberal policy — another one of these quaint moments of nomenclature — that seeks to instate secularism not as a method but as a system, an overarching value that unites French citizens. Joppke points out that France considers the success of its "citizen constituting project" dependent on making French Muslims say that they are French first, Muslim second. Equally, for women, giving up the headscarf in public places is considered an indicator of their patriotic alliances. Joppke's research uncovers very interesting moments from the debates concerning the Foulard Ffair, such as people comparing the symbolic potency of the veil with that of the swastika. Also, various interesting statistical data emerges: the reader learns that the French government has been tagging female students with headscarves. Joppke says that as a result of the anti-headscarf rhetoric and the bans put in place "the counted cases of headscarved students" dropped from 1,256 to 12 in the space of two years, which, as Joppke points out, was considered by the French to indicate "the depth of integration" of Muslims in France. Joppke's book is full of such gems of information that brings a whole new perspective on the efforts of liberal European countries to respond to the headscarf and on what kind of policing methods could work.

Joppke then tackles the *bete noire* of his narrative, Germany, a country that allows no space for the assimilation of Muslims, a country where the Turks — the majority

of the Muslims — happily state that they are “*auslaender*”, without the claim of being of the same “nationality” of the “host society” they live in. Joppke states that the German way of defining the state in Christian-Occidental terms is a mistake for the ideal liberal space that Europe wants to advertise itself as. However, what comes out of the discussions concerning the veil cases that Germany has had to deal with is that because Germany has no immediate desire to make fully fledged “German citizens” (in Joppke’s definition “Christian-Occidental”) out of these self-proclaimed *auslaender*, the state has fewer expectations from Muslim women, and it does not expect them to show their allegiance by throwing away their veils *à la Française*. This, in turn, indeed gets reflected in the number and nature of “veil controversies” that come about in Germany and the incidents stay limited to teachers who are thought to be in a position to influence younger people.

Lastly the British case is described by the adjective “extreme”, no doubt with reference to the incidents of violence in Britain that Joppke speaks about in passing to remind the reader what “toleration liberalism” may lead to. Britain’s way of treating the

different communities is described as some kind of liberation without a cause, with an emphasis on the private over the public. Indeed when pressed to define Britain’s values Gordon Brown is quoted to have included “putting civil society before the state” as a principle, rather than the correctionist and the emancipatory mission that France, at the other end of the liberal spectrum as defined by Joppke, assumes. Various British cases of the “veil problem” are recorded, in which the courts almost always favor the hijabi’s right to wear the veil, the problem raising its expected head only in the case of the niqab which, as the courts argue, makes the identification of the wearer impossible.

Joppke’s conclusion is a little more of the same as the introduction, with a call to further examine the ways in which each state may be getting it wrong or right. He suggests that time will tell which position will remain tenable in the future, and in homage to the possibly misguided French attempts to create a uniform republican subject, refers to the French ban as the “swan song” of French republicanism, that very institution which gave Europe its form of the nation state.

Nagihan Haliloğlu

Secular Cycles

By *Peter Turchin and A. Nefedov*

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 349 pp., ISBN 9780691136967.

Peter Turchin and Sergey Nefedov’s book focusing on recent theoretical analysis of economic and sociological history, is a text of limitless ambition. In its scope and

certitude, this ambition itself is anachronistic, more characteristic of an earlier era of social science in which grand-unified, universal models of history, economy, society

and culture were the order of the day. Both the appeal and the fundamental difficulties of *Secular Cycles* stem from this outdated aspiration to a trans-historical and trans-societal model of social, political and economic change. In an intellectual and scholastic context in which the subject of the researcher herself is far too often a more interesting object of theorization than phenomena in the social world, *Secular Cycles* evinces a refreshing willingness to cross both disciplinary boundaries and historical eras. Unfortunately, however, this daringness is not complimented by an acute, reflexive awareness of the very critiques of social science that have made such universal arguments largely passé.

Turchin and Nefedov's primary analytical contribution is the category of the 'secular cycle,' an ideal type in the Weberian lineage that both describes and explains long-term socioeconomic change. The authors' unit of analysis is the agrarian society over a period of several centuries; the 'secular cycle' designates the demographic, economic and political process of waxing and waning that, Turchin and Nefedov argue, such societies experience on a relatively predictable basis. As an ideal type, the secular cycle traces a pendulum from growth to decline (in the authors' terms, 'integration' and 'disintegration'), which consists of four distinct phases: expansion, stagflation, crisis, and depression. (p. 33) The cycle itself pivots at the nadir of any depression, which can equally be identified as a moment of nascent expansion. Particular demographic, economic, political, and socio-cultural trends characterize and define any given phase of a secular cycle. For instance, during a period of initial expansion, land

cultivation increases, rent is low, and the strength of the state achieves consolidation. Conversely, during a crisis phase, cultivation and population begin to decline, and the state typically collapses.

Secular Cycles' four case studies—medieval and early modern England, medieval and early modern France, republican and early imperial ancient Rome, and imperial Russia—demonstrate the analytic power and principles of the secular cycle lucidly and persuasively. For a non-specialist, these specific contexts hold little inherent interest, but their relationship to Turchin and Nefedov's theoretical intervention is clear. Moreover, the authors' precise, faultlessly disinterested presentation of their data avoids both the Scylla of Malthusian demographic pessimism and the Charybdis of Marxian teleological utopianism—an aspiration that they forward in their introduction. Both their method and their object of inquiry are reminiscent of Ferdinand Braudel's famous study of the "longue durée," although their more immediate inspiration and interlocutor is the American historical sociologist Jack Goldstone. And while *Secular Cycles'* material and argument is decidedly Eurocentric, there are moments of unique interest for the student of Middle Eastern and Islamic history—most notably, the authors' fascinating discussion of "Ibn Khaldun Cycles" and their assertion that Muslim polygyny necessarily affects socioeconomic cycles by providing an ineluctable encouragement to "elite population growth." (p. 23)

Methodologically, *Secular Cycles* rests on rather weak, problematic ground. Most distressingly, Turchin and Nefedov's four principal categories of analysis—popula-

tion, elite dynamics, the state, and sociopolitical instability—which define the trajectory of a secular cycle, are each different in kind and require distinct types of abstraction from historical data. For instance, while the demographic data that determine population change may not necessitate significant hermeneutic acrobatics, this easy movement from data to analysis does not apply to the other three categories. In other words, concepts such as ‘the state,’ ‘the elite,’ and ‘instability’ are not mere historical givens—they demand interpretive interventions and decisions on the part of the historian herself. Thus, when Turchin and Nefedov propose that “the simplest method for quantifying sociopolitical instability is to plot the number (per unit of time) of ‘instability events,’ such as peasant uprisings, regional rebellions, coups d’état and civil wars,” (p. 307) their model smuggles in an unacknowledged hermeneutic regimentation of the definition of ‘instability,’ masked as an objective, quantifiable ‘datum.’ This is not to say that uprisings and rebellions are not indices of instability, of course; it is merely to question the principle by which some overt markers of instability achieve visibility and effectiveness within Turchin and Nefedov’s model, while other less explicit forms of ‘instability’ are excluded. One could make similar observations about the concepts of the state and the elite that—and this is the key point—the authors present as historically-given objectivities. Beyond this conceptual critique, *Secular Cycles* also struggles with vast variation in the quality and quantity of the data itself, a difficulty that, to their credit, Turchin and Nefedov expressly acknowledge.

What, then, should the reader make of *Secular Cycles*’ ultimate goal to resurrect, through rigorous comparison and careful sifting of data, the unfashionable aspiration to nomothetic history? Turchin and Nefedov mince no words in evaluating the import of their study—boldly, the final line of the book reads, “We are optimistic about the future prospects of history as science.” (p. 314) I must confess a deep skepticism here. Although I am inclined to agree with the authors’ assertion that there is “some sort of general regularities of the historical process,” their theory and method for demonstrating these regularities entirely fails to address the hermeneutic dialectic of historian and history. Turchin and Nefedov’s ginger avoidance of an extension of their analysis into the industrial revolution and political modernity hints at an intuition of this problem on their own part, but they are ultimately incapable of reckoning with the constructed nature of their own cardinal categories. Concomitantly, the reader is left to wonder how a historian of a different inclination, with a keen eye toward the difficulties in transposing modern social and political concepts, such as the state across vastly different historical epochs, might interpret Turchin and Nefedov’s data. As it stands, the concept of the secular cycle seems both too abstract to render the texture of sociopolitical change in any given historical period, and too timid to confront the radical transformations of modernity. In as much as these transformations ultimately yielded the differentiated categories of state, society and economy that inform Turchin and Nefedov’s arguments, they deserve the authors’ attentions. But on the rare occasions that Turchin and Nefe-

dov peer over this conceptual abyss, they quickly scurry backward into the language of quasi-objective certitude. Unfortunately, *Secular Cycles*' disavowals make it excep-

tionally difficult for the reader to share this certitude with them.

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A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: With "On My Religion"

By *John Rawls*, edited by *Thomas Nagel*

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, 275 pp., ISBN 978 0 674 033313.

American political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) became world-famous when his *A Theory of Justice* (1971) was published and soon translated into several languages. His other main treatises, *Political Liberalism* (1993) and *The Law of Peoples* (1999), have also inspired plenty of discussion. To put it briefly, the mature Rawls's chief goal was to construct fair terms for peaceful coexistence among the citizens of a liberal democratic society, religious and non-religious alike, as well as among liberal and decent peoples.

Rawls was able to analyze theological ideas skillfully—as can be seen for example in his *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (2000) and *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy* (2007). Nevertheless, this James Bryant Conant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University since 1979 was reluctant to unveil much of his own religious beliefs to the public. Now, the posthumous publication of *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith*, Rawls's master's thesis submitted to Princeton University in 1942, sheds light on an intensively religious period in Rawls's youth. His brief work "On My Religion" from the year 1997 complements our picture.

There probably existed only two copies of *A Brief Inquiry*—the originals from December 1942—until Princeton professor Eric Gregory turned his attention to it some time after Rawls's death. In their introduction to *A Brief Inquiry*, Joshua Cohen and Thomas Nagel (2009) explain that it was a delicate decision to publish this thesis because most likely Rawls would not have encouraged such an enterprise. Many of Rawls's former students, however, had already started to circulate the thesis, which made the decision a bit easier.

John Bordley Rawls was born in Baltimore into a wealthy and politically active family (his mother defended voting rights for women). He was educated at an Episcopal school, but he did not become deeply concerned with religious issues until he approached his twenties.

Neo-orthodox Christianity, inspired by Karl Barth, was making progress at that time. Robert Merrihew Adams, in his discussion of Rawls's *A Brief Inquiry* in the volume at hand (p. 29), reports that Emil Brunner's term at Princeton as a celebrity visiting professor during the academic year 1938-39 also had its impact. Indeed, Rawls expresses particular appreciation

for Brunner's theology in the preface of his thesis.

Rawls announces that his master's thesis aims to "enter a strong protest against... naturalism" (p. 107) and to "attack a specific Christian problem... of sin and faith" (p. 108). Rawls is particularly concerned with naturalism in the sense that it reduces spiritual life to the level of desire and appetite. However, he proceeds by assuming that God exists and that persons exist as spiritual and communal beings. Rawls emphasizes that the realm of persons and community is qualitatively different from the realm of nature—and it is precisely the realm of persons and community that is central to ethics. From the religious perspective, this claim coheres with the idea of a community as the very purpose of God's creation (pp. 107-114).

Rawls regards Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas all as basically naturalists. Here he is inspired by Anders Nygren's distinction between *eros* and *agape*. Rawls interprets the above classical authors as representatives of an *eros*-type of love—of self-love rather than an *agape*-type of altruistic love. (Adams (pp. 42-43) notes that Rawls misinterprets Augustine here. Augustine did not depict God merely as an "object" of our love.)

Rawls does not regard self-love, or *egoism*, as evil in its moderate forms. Relying on Philip Leon's philosophy, Rawls particularly identifies evil as *egotism*. While egoists can usually live ethically in a community, egotists are inherently destructive to it. The latter seek after honor, distinction, and glory, and they tend to go to all sorts of extremes. The consequence of sin, that is, egotism, exaggerated egoism, and despair, is aloneness (pp. 122-123, 206).

Faith, finally, means to young Rawls "the integration into and the reconstruction of community" (p. 214). God established his community by election. Man's merits here are beside the point; they are not counted in a true community (pp. 230, 241-246).

The Second World War shook humanity to its core. After completing his thesis, Rawls joined up: he served as an infantryman in the Pacific from 1943 to 1945. There, among other things, he had to deeply rethink his view on evil, one of the major themes of his thesis. By June 1945, he had abandoned his orthodox Episcopal Christianity (p. 261).

In his late work "On My Religion," Rawls recalls certain experiences that occurred during his military service that led him to reject the kind of orthodoxy represented in his master's thesis. They culminate in hearing the Army information service reports from the concentration camps and watching the first film footages from the Holocaust. Rawls had faced an impasse with theodicy: how could God allow such terrible evil and suffering to occur? (p. 263)

Henceforth, Rawls turned his main attention to the ethics of peace and justice in terms of human reason. He did not reject his faith in God entirely: perhaps there is a God whose reason greatly surpasses our own. Nevertheless, Rawls highlighted that—in the sphere of theory and practice alike—"the basic judgments of reasonableness must be the same, whether made by God's reason or ours" (p. 268). This view does not resolve theodicy, but it allows reasonable political theology.

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International Migration and Citizenship Today

By *Niklaus Steiner*

London: Routledge, 2009, 149 pp., ISBN 9780415772990.

This book is a coherent and informative study of international migration with a specific focus on the reception of migrants in the West, in the words of the author “the wealthier” countries, particularly in the United States. Niklaus Steiner introduces two questions that constitute the focus of the study. First is regarding the selection process in the immigrants’ admission to the country, followed by a second concern over the criteria for citizenship of those admitted. The author uses the term “we” when stating “what criteria should we use to admit migrants who want to come to our country?” and explains that the goal of the book is to “to help citizens engage thoughtfully in discussions over admission and citizenship”. The uses of the terms like “we citizens of democracies” and “our country” distances the study from a scientific language and jargon is not used. Furthermore, it reflects a stance point of insiders (citizens) and outsiders (immigrants). The book is primarily targeting undergraduate students for their courses on international migration at North American universities; therefore, one might think of an author’s attempt for building up a sincere tone that would encourage learning. Yet, the same jargon/language preference that puts the Western university students as the noun subject at the center might distance those readers who do not belong to this category of the “citizens of democracies” or the “wealthier countries”. Still, students from everywhere might understand the complexity of admis-

sion, reception and naturalization in international migration and learn about different factors involved in these processes.

The author limits the scope of the study to international migration by excluding the topics of internal migration and human trafficking. This distinction is justified by setting forth internal migration as a population movement within a given country that would not “be debated by others in another country”. With regards to human trafficking, the author identifies human trafficking as a criminal act and argues that the debates revolving around human trafficking are usually on preventing people from being moved across borders for exploitative purposes. Neither of the arguments or justifications is sufficient for explaining the limitation of the study’s scope. The author puts ‘debates’ as the norm of the study and if issues are debated then they are relevant for international migration and if they are not debated then they are not included in the book. What these debates are, who makes these debates, and the actors and the institutions involved are a total ambiguity. Furthermore, what about those voices of the silenced? Or those opinions or positions of people who do not talk? The book centers on a discursive categorical presumption of “citizens’ voices” which sounds like the voice of the holder of single citizenship status. It is evident that some countries and some citizens hold dual citizenship; the status of citizenship might not provide a satisfying criterion for getting

involved in debates as there might be various other people affected by international migration such as the “denizens” who are not citizens but have settlement rights and participation rights in local elections; and internal movement, in some cases, might have relevance for people outside the borders such as some countries in the past. For example, some eastern European and Balkan countries applied settlement restrictions to mobile populations such as the Roma that would affect the Roma nomads moving across borders.

The author treats international migration as a movement across borders. Theoretically, such a definition is correct. Yet, it is also reflective of a political position that puts the state and its boundaries as the norm. The categorization of who passes the boundaries of a state is an international immigrant and who is not passing is not an international migrant is a simplistic approach. There might be complex cases that would alter the states’ presence. The literature on nationalism, the configuration of a nation state and the development of the modern state all point to the fact that boundaries of a state are fictive in the sense that it divides one state from another but it does not refer to a division between villages, communities or societies. There is circle migration, short-term seasonal migration or even undocumented irregular migration back and forth between two different places and regions. The existence of a legal border between these two places would not necessitate a reserved place to the states instead of the human collectivities. The cover picture of the book which has a straight line dividing the US and Mexico symbolizes not only the legal boundary but also the worlds

apart between the countries. Yet, society wise, one might argue that in North America there are several societies which are integrated with one another, sometimes with overlapping minorities, ethnicities and/or cultures. One might also think of the continent as a habitus with a human population circulating over it.

The author, successfully in a considerably short book, makes an overview of the phenomenon of international migration with its various aspects. The admission criteria for different types of immigrants, to motives for migration and family reunification among economic migrants, the restrictions and discouragements on incoming immigration flows and the efforts for establishing asylum seeking and refugee protection systems are some topics that are discussed in the book. In the last two chapters the discussion is centered around the processes after reception which are merely citizenship and naturalization. The book is designed for university education most probably in the United States or Canada and can easily be used as course material at the undergraduate level. The use of a simplified and plain language and style of expression rightly targets university students. Prof. Steiner, who has been teaching international migration in American universities, seems to gather all his expertise in teaching that he attained over years in this textbook. The book is highly recommended for educational purposes. Yet, the book has certain aspects which are quiet troublesome in terms of a subject or opinion free language which is necessary for a neutral approach to citizenship and international migration matters.

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Die Tükei, die Juden und der Holocaust

By *Corry Guttstadt*

Berlin/Hamburg: Assoziation A., 2008, 516 pp., ISBN 9783935936491.

Within a larger trend of critically re-writing the history of the early Turkish Republic, the history of the Jews in 20th century Turkey has received a lot of attention lately. In Turkey, there is now a growing body of literature somewhat dominated by the work of Rifat N. Bali.¹ And in Germany as well, there have been some interesting additions to the existing research. Many focus on the *Haymatloz* topic, i.e. the German emigrants who worked in Turkish universities and other institutions in the time of the Third Reich. But there are others who focus on topics more internal to the politics of the early Republic. One example is Hatice Bayraktar's *Salamon und Rabeka* on the image of the Jews in Turkish journals.² Another is Corry Guttstadt's book, where the author attempts nothing less than to revise two dominant historiographic images at the same time. The first is that of Turkey as a country of refuge for Jews during the Third Reich – as propagated by the body of literature on the *Haymatloz émigrés*. The second is Stanford Shaw's claim that Turkish diplomats all over Europe did their utmost to rescue Jews from Nazi persecution. (7-8)³

In seven intensive chapters, Guttstadt discusses and contextualises various aspects of this topic. In the first chapter, "Jews in the Ottoman Empire – 500 years of tolerance and prosperity?" (13-47), the author attempts to overview the history of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Here, Guttstadt critically re-examines what she calls the "myth of Ottoman multicultur-

alism." Her second chapter, "The Turkish national state and the Jews," (49-108) discusses the history of the early Turkish Republic and the fate of the Jewish population in this new nationalising state. Her third chapter, "Turkish Jews in Europe", (109-156) provides an overview of the various Turkish/Ottoman Jewish groups in Europe. She focuses mainly on Western and Central Europe, where the Jewish population with an Ottoman background was about around 30.000 to 50.000. (109) She discusses each community and country, thus offering great detail on this almost forgotten Diaspora while entertaining the reader with many interesting facts. One example is the history of the Turkish-Jewish community in Vienna. As the Habsburg monarchy was intent on getting its own capitulations within the Ottoman Empire, it respected the rights of Ottoman citizens as set out in the bilateral treaties of 1718 and 1739. Certain clauses contained in these treaties also protected the small number of Ottoman Jews in Vienna. As the Jewish communities in Europe were heavily discriminated against in the 18th century, Jews of other nationalities and even Austrian Ashkenazi Jews took up Ottoman citizenship in order to live more freely in Vienna. (136-138). Another detail highlighted by Guttstadt is that the Ottoman and Turkish Jews in Western Europe were in fact the first larger Turkish immigrant group there, thus, she claims, they were the historical precursors to post-war guest worker immigrants.

We finally reach the core topic of the study with her fourth chapter, "Turkey in the years between 1933 and 1945," (157-167). Here, while exploring the political history of Turkey, she mentions the strong entanglement of Turkey with Nazi Germany. Guttstadt does not fail to point out that Germany's acts of aggression such as the invasion of Poland altered Turkey's attitude towards Germany, at least temporarily. (158-9). She discusses various anti-Jewish/anti-minority measures and incidents such as the *Varlık Vergisi* and the *Trakya Olayları* as well as the image of the Jews as portrayed in the Turkish press. In this context, she also highlights the fact that Turkey was, in total numbers, not an important country of refuge for German Jews. Guttstadt further analyses the role of Turkey as a crucial country of transit for Jews on their way to Palestine and concludes that Turkey actually blocked their way. From 1940 to 1944, of approximately 13,000 Jews who passed almost 5,000 were in possession of so-called Palestine certificates issued before the war, most of the others were only able to pass through in 1944. (256) She claims that already three years before the war, these restrictions on Jewish immigration or transit were in place, thus making them part of "an original Turkish policy," and not one arrived at by direct German influence. (257) Based on these discussions she seems to have laid the foundations to refute Shaw's claims before she even discusses the Turkish government's actions abroad and those of individual diplomats.

In her brief fifth chapter, "Turkish Jews under National Socialism 1933-1939," (259-269) she summarizes the fate of foreign Jews in Nazi Germany in general and that

of Turkish Jews in particular. She claims that there were comparably few interventions by the Turkish embassy on behalf of Jewish citizens of the Turkish Republic. In the sixth chapter, "The revocation of citizenship by Turkey," (271-282) it becomes clear that the German administrative system closely collaborated with the Turkish consular service in ridding Jews of their Turkish citizenship. Finally, her last and by far largest chapter, "The Turkish Jews and the Holocaust," (283-485) deals with the Holocaust itself. She claims here that when the need for protection was at its greatest for Turkish Jews, the Turkish government stripped them of their citizenship. Furthermore, most of those living in Germany and Austria, she claims, had already lost their citizenship in the 1930s. (307) Guttstadt then discusses the fate of the Turkish Jews in each country or relevant spatial category (country, city or region): Germany (311-320), Austria (320-327), Prague (327-332), France (333-410), Belgium (410-428), the Netherlands (428-438), Italy (438-454), and Southeastern Europe (454-467).

Although her criticism of the treatment of the Jews by the early Republic is harsh, she also compares it to that of other South-east European authoritarian states and societies and comes to a rather favourable conclusion: The situation of the Jews in Turkey was comparably much better and modern Anti-Semitism was a fringe phenomenon. Racial Anti-Semitism, as it was propagated by Nazi Germany, was not transported to and internalised by Turkish society. However, the picture that emerges is, like a reviewer in a leading German newspaper has stated, a depressing one: The Turkish government as well as individual diplomats

could have saved many more former Ottoman and Turkish subjects from the fate of the Holocaust than they actually did.⁴

There are two major difficulties with the text. At times, some may find Guttstadt's judgements regarding Turkey overly harsh and not completely balanced. And at other times, the text offers excessive detail, making it less flowing and not a very smooth read. But both aspects are counterbalanced by the sheer vastness and depth of analysis. Guttstadt successfully attempts a deep contextualisation of the topic; weaving threads back to Ottoman history, making use of comparative European history and the history of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. As she states in her preface, she does not reduce the Turkish Jews to their role as victims of the Holocaust, but documents and discusses various aspects of Turkish Jewish life in Europe. Guttstadt's book is almost a handbook on the Turkish Jews and any researcher working on 20th century

Turkish-Jewish history will benefit and do well to consult it. Until the relevant Turkish archives are open to historians, this will remain the definitive account of the topic.

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Endnotes

1. Cf. only some of the latest: Bali, Rifat N.: 1934 *Trakya Olayları*. İstanbul 2008; Bali, Rifat N.: *Sarayın ve Cumhuriyetin Dışçibaşısı Sami Günzberg*. İstanbul 2007; Bali, Rifat N.: *The "Varlık Vergisi" Affair – A Study of its Legacy*. Selected Documents. İstanbul 2005.

2. Bayraktar, Hatice: *Salamon und Rabeka – Judenstereotype in Karikaturen der türkischen Zeitschriften Akbaba, Karikatür und Milli Inkilap 1933-1945*. Berlin 2005.

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Türkiye'de Siyasal Katılım, Tek Partiden AK Parti'ye Siyasal İslam ve Demokrasi Tartışmaları (*Political Participation in Turkey: Debates on Political Islam and Democracy from Single Party Rule to AK Party*)

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There are many institutions playing a role in weaving the ideals of democracy into Turkey's social fabric. Many political actors in Turkish politics, which include the leftists, rightists, liberals, and statistes along with those who established the Republic with their military identity, all contributed

to society's participation in the execution of the state affairs. They all had a stake in implementing universal democratic standards in Turkey in general, and within certain strata of Turkish society in particular. The reasons behind these actors' support for democratic ideals vary; some groups were

motivated by purely conjectural reasons, some wore the cloak of democracy as a survival strategy, and many were sincere in their political commitment. However, none of these actors and institutions could ensure society's participation to the degree that the political establishment, who regards democracy as a *sine qua non* of its existence, has done. A democratic structure best fosters the type of political competition vital for the survival of Turkey's diverse political groups and politicians. Of particular interest is the political Islamists, more than any other political group in Turkey, who have significantly contributed to and espoused democracy in Turkey. Generally, Islam is portrayed as incompatible with democracy and even as a primary enemy against democratic principles by mass media channels, which are often under the influence of an Orientalist perspective.

Looking at Turkey's experience, Islam has had an immense impact on all sectors of society in Turkey. Islam can be a way of life, an eschatology, or a subject of folklore and culture. Consciously or not, all segments of Turkey's social fabric, from the believer to the atheist, have had to confront Islam in one way or another. The reason why the Republic's most vehement advocates of Westernization saw Islam as an obstacle on the way to Turkey's progress and advancement and held radical secular views regarding Islam is because they have never been able to exclude religion from society and politics. This is true even at times when the most rigid secular political actors were in power. It is precisely because Islam has always played a role in politics in Turkey that it can now assume a major role in introducing democracy to Turkish society. Moreover,

it can also play a role in persuading different religious segments of the society to accept democracy. Here, democracy can be perceived as a solution to many of Turkey's current problems, ranging from poverty to social injustices. Movements, such as the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası), and Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti), have been instrumental in the consolidation of democracy as opposed to the authoritarian political system, which predominated the single party era of the Republic.

Groups traditionally at the periphery of Turkey's mainstream political system have found an opportunity to participate in the process of governance through conservative political parties like DP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi). Islamist movements like the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and finally the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which merged these two ideologies. Although discussions on the relationship between Islam and democracy currently seem to have resurfaced it should be noted that this debate intensified greatly in the aftermath of February 28, 1997. Evidently, with the political success of the Justice and Development Party's synthesis, the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy is no longer being debated.

Given that no democracy could survive without strong public participation, democracy in Turkey can only be possible with the involvement of the masses. For this reason, conservatives, religious people, Islamists, and political movements

emphasizing Islam's socio-political dimension have contributed to expanding societal representation by ensuring a broader participation in the country's administration. This success cannot be attributed to the Republican doctrine of a 'classless, unprivileged, and coherent nation,' as it fails to explain why the same success could not be achieved in incorporating fully the Kurdish ethnic movement into the political system.

Concentrating mainly on traditions of "National Vision" (Milli Görüş), the study, 'socialization of democracy in Turkey and the role of political Islam,' proposes that political Islam should be taken seriously as a 'political opportunity' for Turkey. It argues that the understanding of democracy in Turkey has come a long way through the interaction of democracy with political Islam. This work also demonstrates that Turkey would prove its maturity by reducing the power and influence of the bureaucracy. The first chapter, Political Islam and Democracy, places the focus on the legitimiza-

tion of Democratic Islam and the relationship between democracy and the 'National Vision' Movement. The second chapter, The Throes of Democratization in Turkish Political Life, investigates the democratization process from the Progressive Republican Party known as 'Junction of Leaders' through Free Republican Party up to the Democratic Party. In the third chapter, the author discusses the issue of socialization of democracy in Turkey by covering political movements, such as National Vision Movement, National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party which the author describes as 'Reluctant Democrat Coming from the Periphery.' Drawing attention to the similarities between Turkey's previous mass parties and the Justice and Development Party, the last chapter presents this Party as a 'political opportunity' in terms of Turkey's democratization. It argues that Turkey is going through a kind of systematic integration process in the form of an Islam-Democracy marriage.

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