To sum up, creating an enemy image is a classical method of propaganda that is commonly used in politics as well as mass media, and journalism. The goal is to dehumanize an opponent by dramatizing and exaggerating a threat. *Russia and the Media* notably demonstrates only one side of the coin, i.e., how the Western mass media plays its role in establishing the negative image of Russia and its leader. But in such a game, actions are always reciprocal. Here it is worth quoting James Carroll from the *Boston Globe*: “When one side in a nuclear-armed contest is paranoid, the other side is, too. Madness is mutual, even the leaders seem sane” (p. 148). The book would thus have been strengthened by the inclusion of a glimpse of how the Russian media portrayed Western leaders during the same time period. Nonetheless, *Russia and the Media* is a well-rounded source of analysis. Referring to so many media sources through a wide time frame makes the study empirically strong and convincing. It is a useful resource for readers from different disciplines, such as international relations, political science, media studies, and journalism. Indeed, any reader curious about how the media can control people’s minds will find McLaughlin’s work interesting and thought-provoking.

**The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan: Between Conspiracy and Reality**

*By Ömer Aslan*  

*Reviewed by Anna Shakirova, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University*

Within the context of their bipolar rivalry, both the United States and the Soviet Union have supported or hindered coup d'états in various parts of the world. They built their policies taking into consideration their eclectic concerns, often with the aim of thwarting each other’s influence. Nevertheless, the role of external actors in military coup d'états has been overlooked for many years, creating a vast gap in academic literature. In *The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan: Between Conspiracy and Reality*, Ömer Aslan attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the role played by the U.S. in four successful coup d'états in Turkey and Pakistan throughout the Cold War. In his endeavor to provide an answer to how external factors helped shape the trajectory of these coups in each individual case, Aslan scrutinizes the role of the U.S. every step of the way: before, during, and after each of the four coup d'états he presents.

For the purpose of building a nexus between the coup d'états and the impact of an external dimension, Aslan bases his analyses upon the 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey, and the 1958 and 1977 coups in Pakistan. The similarities of the two countries’ geopolitical significance and the essential role played by their militaries in their establishment serve as a ground for the author’s decision to shed light on their domestic civil-military relations. Throughout the Cold War,
Turkey and Pakistan were of crucial importance to Washington as part of its policy of containment toward the Soviet Union. Both Turkey and Pakistan underwent transformation from Prussian and British to American military tactics and weaponry, respectively (p. 211). While Turkey enjoyed an institutional linkage with the West via NATO, Pakistan was institutionally allied with it via the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Thus, due to their geopolitical positions, both countries secured an idiosyncratic position for the U.S. Hence, the domestic atmosphere in Turkey and Pakistan directly correlated with the success of the American policy of Soviet containment in the region, which was significantly jeopardized after Qassim's coup in Iraq in 1958 (p. 113).

Aslan begins to present his rigorous research by describing a coup as a two-level game that revolves around both external and internal dimensions. Having underlined that the coups are usually triggered by domestic factors, such as weak politicians, a deteriorating economy, a neglected military, etc., Aslan emphasizes the essentiality of an external dimension, which is usually presented by an influential international actor such as the United States. The author argues that by providing military, political, and economic assistance, the U.S. may support or oppose an incumbent government or coup plotters, giving the latter an incentive to act or discouraging them from acting.

Having elaborated on the importance of external support in the success of any coup, Aslan proceeds with an analysis of the role of the U.S. in the May 27, 1960, and September 12, 1980, coups in Turkey. By expounding on these two particular coup d'états, the author provides readers with opportunity to observe two different scenarios: while the former was conducted in violation of the command chain and removed Menderes' pro-Western Democratic Party government from power, the latter was implemented by senior-ranking officers who overthrew Demirel's government and received American support of a much less ambivalent nature.

In the case of Pakistan, Aslan provides a laborious analysis of the successful October 1958 and July 1977 coup d'états, both of which occurred in line with the chain of command. However, American support for each of the two coups significantly differed. Whereas after the 1958 coup, when General Ayub Khan assumed power, the U.S. economic aid significantly increased, the U.S. economic aid, and political support amid the 1977 coup, in which Prime Minister Bhutto was deposed by General Zia, was sustained at a minimal level. Resembling the Turkish scenario, both of the coups were triggered by domestic unrest caused by weak politicians.

Finally, the author concludes his analysis by highlighting the American proximity to military entities in Turkey and Pakistan after the Cold War. Having lost the influence it once enjoyed over these countries’ militaries, the U.S. nonetheless continues to project a significant reach to the military entities of these two countries.

While elaborating on every particular example, Aslan meticulously enlarges the condition of Turkish-American and Turkish-Pakistani relations before each coup. Furthermore, he explores the ways in which the U.S. may have encouraged the coup plotters by providing various incentives. However, due to the lack of available resources capable of providing a researcher with a firm base on which to ground his argument, in many cases, the
The UK’s EU membership, which started in 1973 and ended in 2020, drew the attention of the whole world to the future steps and strategies to be followed by the UK with the announcement of Brexit. The end of the membership relationship between the EU and the UK has raised questions about how such areas as commercial relations, immigration policies, and security will work. Both during the Brexit process and after, the risks and dangers that the EU and the UK may encounter, especially the relationship of the UK with individual EU member states and the UK’s position in international relations, will be the subject of long negotiations. Thanks to Free Trade Agreement, trade relations between parties have not been severed. Nevertheless, the UK no longer has a say in the European Parliament, i.e., in the EU decision-making process, and the UK is now arguably alone vis-à-vis threats to its border security, internal security, and transnational security, and