

eventually changes without the Syrian regime having to change its stance. This is important as it helps to explain Bashar al-Assad's current strategy in the face of international condemnation of his treatment of the uprising. That said,

as Scheller herself shows, there was more to Hafez al-Assad's strategy than waiting. Moreover, some chapters, particularly on Syrian-Israeli relations, are overly simplistic and ignore the history and law surrounding the conflict.


Turkey and the Arab Spring Leadership in the Middle East

By Graham E. Fuller

Lexington, KY: Bozorg Press, 2014, 408 pages, ISBN 9780993751400.

Reviewed by Andrew A. Szarejko

SOME 15 TO 20 YEARS from today, it will be illuminating to examine how academic and policy circles read the period from early 2013 to late 2014 in Turkey. There are many competing narratives about the future of the country. One pessimistic reading that is currently popular with many American observers of Turkey goes as follows: the so-called "Turkish model" was all the rage just a couple years ago. Turkey was prospering and democratizing under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which was hailed for its successful fusion of Islamic values and democratic governance. Its leaders were widely respected abroad and were even named on *Foreign Policy's* list of the "Top 100 Global Thinkers" three years in a row.¹ With the Turkish Republic's centennial anniversary approaching, the AK Party had grand plans to make Turkey a major player on the international stage. Then a small protest by environmentalists turned into something more. From Taksim to Tunceli, Turkey convulsed for weeks as the Gezi Park protests unfolded. The Turkish model was finished—if the wave of protests was not enough, surely the corruption scan-



dal that erupted in December 2013 put an end to it.²

Fuller's *Turkey and the Arab Spring* adds an optimistic postscript to that narrative. The Turkish model may have fallen out of favor for the time being, the former CIA official concedes, but it ultimately represents

the best model of governance for predominantly Muslim states in the Middle East. In a region "hungry for leaders of genuine vision" and models of "competent governance," Turkey is the state best equipped to offer both (pp. 372-374). The AK Party has proven that a democratic government can reflect the piety of its citizenry, while also providing economic growth and playing a constructive role abroad. Recent protests and scandals have called the durability of the model into question. Fuller is pessimistic about the AK Party's near-term electoral prospects, but in his opinion the party does not have to continue winning elections for the Turkish model to survive.

After using Part One and Part Two to briefly examine the current state of global politics and the meaning of leadership in the Middle

East, Fuller examines the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish model. This forms the lengthiest section of the book, Part Three. He concludes that there are a number of reasons to remain optimistic about the Turkish model, chief among them its economic success, its establishment of civilian control of the military, its growing ability to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, and its clear success at the ballot box. Ultimately, however, the key for Fuller is the lack of any other attractive options in the Middle East—other possible claimants like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are surveyed in Part Four and Part Five and are found wanting. Compared to the competitors, “Turkey represents the only forward-looking, advanced and democratic model that has successfully integrated a form of moderate Islam” (p. 263). Turkey may provide an imperfect model, but it provides a much more attractive option than any other state in the region.

Of course, Turkey may not remain such an attractive option for long. Fuller completed his manuscript in early 2014, and he acknowledges from the start that rapid political developments may overtake his argument. Indeed, he finished writing this book before the June 2014 local elections bolstered the AK Party, before Erdoğan declared his run for president, and before Erdoğan announced that the Gülen Movement (or Hizmet) would be added to a classified list of domestic and external threats.³ For Fuller and many skeptics, “He is in danger of dismantling his own remarkable legacy and engineering his own political defeat” (p. 347). If he continues down that path, the Turkish model may well lose its reputation for good. The Muslim populations of the Middle East have seen enough of authoritarianism and will not be inclined to take up a Turkish variant—the revolts of the Arab Spring would suggest as much. Nonetheless,

Fuller offers a hopeful view of Turkish politics and seems to believe that any missteps now will be only fleeting bumps in the road.

Surely, change in Turkish politics will continue unabated as this review awaits publication. It will be easier to evaluate Fuller’s claims several years from now. Nonetheless, the book is insightful, though it sometimes makes too much effort to find those insights. Fuller brings many factors to bear, and the transitions from one to another are often jarring. For example, Part Six (the final portion of the book) leaps from discussions on Israel to the Kurds and then to the Gülen Movement before finally returning to the broader question of Turkey’s role in an evolving Middle East. For those familiar with Fuller’s previous books, this will come as a surprise as his writing has always been parsimonious. Perhaps his most impactful work is a tight, 196-page appraisal of Turkey’s role in the Muslim world that culminated in a powerful argument for “letting Turkey be Turkey.”⁴ *Turkey and the Arab Spring* takes 408 pages to make a similar point. This time, however, letting Turkey be Turkey means accepting it as a major influence in the Middle East.

The hallmark of Fuller’s books, *Turkey and the Arab Spring* included, is a long-term view that eschews the standard U.S.-centric analyses of Turkish politics and foreign policy. That quality is displayed again and shines through an occasionally uneven text. Fuller makes a compelling case that rumors of the Turkish model’s death are greatly exaggerated. The skeptics, however, will want to have an obituary drafted.

Endnotes

1. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was seventh on the 2010 list. Davutoğlu and Erdoğan appeared together at

number 16 in 2011, then again at 28 in 2012. Neither has appeared in the list since then.

See Andrew Swift, "The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers," *Foreign Policy* (November 29, 2010), retrieved July 25, 2014, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers; Kedar Pavgi, "The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers," *Foreign Policy* (November 28, 2011), retrieved July 25, 2014, from <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2011globalthinkers>; Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, "The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers," *Foreign Policy* (November 26, 2012), retrieved July 25, 2014, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/26/the_fp_100_global_thinkers?page=0,2.

2. Suzy Hansen, "Whose Turkey Is It?," *New York Times*, February 5, 2014.

3. "Gülen movement to be added to top-secret national security 'Red Book,'" *Hürriyet Daily News* (July 20, 2014), retrieved July 26, 2014, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gulen-movement-to-be-added-to-top-secret-national-security-red-book.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69370&NewsCatID=338>.

4. Graham E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), p. 177.


The EU's Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors Orientation, Ownership and Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey

By Ann-Kristin Jonasson

Oxon: Routledge, 2013, 234 pages, ISBN 9780415630061.

Reviewed by Suna Gülfer İhlamur-Öner

THE EU HAS BEEN involved in democracy promotion in the Mediterranean for many years. However, it is facing criticism from its members and partners for prioritizing security and stability over democracy. Particularly following the Arab uprisings, the effectiveness of the EU's efforts have increasingly been called into question and demands for a new approach towards democratization in the Mediterranean are growing. Ann-Kristin Jonasson's book, *The EU's Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors: Orientation, Ownership and Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey*, systematically evaluates the EU's democratization efforts by focusing on democracy promotion in two Mediterranean countries, Jordan and Turkey, and effectively addresses the major pitfalls in the EU's strategy. Therefore, it is a timely contribution as the Arab revolutions have forced us to reconsider the prospects for democratization in the region.



The book consists of four chapters. The first chapter, which comprises an introduction to the study and a conceptual and theoretical framework, discusses the essential elements of democracy promotion. The chapter starts with a rich conceptual discussion and a thorough review of the literature on democratization based on an extensive bibliography. The theoretical framework seeks to identify the prerequisites for democracy promotion and compare them to the EU's policies. Three distinct but interrelated concepts stand out in the conceptual and theoretical discussions: orientation, ownership and dialogue – stated in the title of the book. These constitute the three most important pillars in the analytical framework on democracy promotion. The book primarily argues that democracy promotion is likely to be successful if there is a genuine local orientation towards democracy in the partner country.