

Impact of Turmoil and Gas Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean on Jordanian Energy Security and Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT *The Mediterranean region has witnessed a lot of turbulence in the last decade. On the one hand, the Arab uprising changed the shape of the regional relations towards more rivalry. On the other hand, the discovery of natural gas resources has opened up a valuable chance for cooperation and settling the long-standing disputes. Jordan is affected by what happens in the Mediterranean region in more than one aspect. The recently discovered Eastern Mediterranean gas is an attractive energy resource for Jordan. Nonetheless, a fear of its influence on the Jordanian foreign policy in the Palestinian context has grown. This article discusses the impact of the recent turmoil in the Mediterranean region on Jordan energy security, as well as the potential implications of Jordan's decision to import the Mediterranean gas through Israel on Jordanian energy security using the proposed energy security framework.*

Keywords: Energy Security, Energy Politics, Eastern Mediterranean Gas, Arab Uprising, Refugee Crisis, Foreign Policy, Palestinian Cause, Jordan

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Introduction

The relationship between energy and politics has been gaining more interest in the last 50 years. Realizing the uneven distribution of the hydrocarbon energy resources among the world states, and recognizing that the majority of the states in the world cannot fulfill their energy demands from their domestic resources alone cements energy as a central issue of contemporary international relations.¹ International energy relations must be handled efficiently by the higher authorities in order to negotiate the benefits and costs distributions between mutual parties.² This leads to politicizing the energy market and raises the question of whether this energy interdependence acts as a source of cooperation or conflict. Realists and neoliberals have different answers to this question.

The realist geopolitical approach views energy as a source of conflict. For it, the states continuously engage in a zero-sum competition for access to the world energy reserves, which are considered as a fixed declining asset.³ On the one hand, it considers energy as a source of threat for energy importer states in terms of the implications of supply interruptions and price fluctuation on the state's survival and development.⁴ On the other hand, it views energy as an important coercive tool to reach the exporter's foreign policy goals.⁵ Based on this approach, conflict is an inherent feature of the energy politics although its frequency and intensity varies.

In contrast, the neoliberal institutionalist global energy governance approach argues that energy is a "potential cooperative international domain."⁶ It views conflict as a result of market failure more than an intrinsic feature. Markets can depoliticize the energy relations by enhancing the trade and investment interdependency between the energy importers and exporters.⁷ Both importers and exporters have incentives to support the energy market since the market fluctuation will harm all parties; importer in terms of prices and supply continuity, and exporter in terms of the economic implications resulting from market uncertainties. Based on that, it is in the interests of all states in energy globalization to introduce an international energy market with certain rules that encourage a positive sum-cooperation.⁸


The 1973 Arab oil embargo drew global attention to energy security.⁹ The concept of securitization is usually related to the writings of Buzan, Wæver and other researchers who follow the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.¹⁰ Securitization of something classifies this thing as an issue of supreme priority and gives the state the right to take any extraordinary measures by raising the issue above the constraints of regular political procedures in a frame of the radical realists of '*ragione di Stato*.'¹¹ Based on this it is stated that, "energy securitization is a process where governments frame energy as an existential threat to the state's interests."¹²

The concept of energy security is highly contested. According to a survey conducted by Ang, *et al.* in 2015, there are more than 80 different published definitions for energy security between the period 2001 and 2014.¹³ Almost all of them consider the theme of energy availability in the definition. The other dominating themes in the definitions are energy prices and infrastructure with more than 70 percent of the definitions incorporating these parameters, (Graph 1). Ang, *et al.* have also shown that energy security is a dynamic concept.¹⁴ It changes with time and circumstances, new themes and sub-concepts appear while others lose their significance over time.

For example, the environmental and energy efficiency aspects became more significant in energy security post 2010, while there was no mention for them in energy security definitions prior to 2006.

The sharp turnaround in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, following the announcement of Prince Mohammad Bin Salman as crown prince, changed the coalitions in the region and redrew the political map in the Mediterranean

Graph 1: Main Energy Security Themes and the Share of Published Energy Security Definitions



Source: Ang, *et al.*¹⁵

The definition of energy security is highly contextual. It differs according to the status of the state (energy importer or exporter), the policies followed by the state and its economic development.¹⁶ Moreover, the perception of risk differs from one state to another based on the geopolitics. The definition is highly dependent on the definer and their position in the society.¹⁷ For example, for the government, energy security is related to the economic development and

Jordan has faced serious economic difficulties related to energy problems associated with the refugee crises and the interruption of Egyptian gas

the survival of the state, whereas for industries, it is related to the profitable continuity of the production cycle, and for end consumers, the definition becomes more relevant to the continuity and affordability of a certain product or service.

Many examples show that even with the existence of agreements and treaties that create the legal basis for cooperation in the energy sector, there is still no guarantee for the continuity of supply. This can be related to interstate conflict like the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute that led to problems with Russian gas supply to the EU in the first decade of this century,¹⁸ or intrastate conflict like the Jordan gas crises — a consequence of the instability and turmoil in Egypt.¹⁹ This proves that developing an efficient, rational and adaptive energy sector in the midst of a multipolar world with an anarchic nature is a core challenge for all states.

The Mediterranean region has witnessed a lot of turbulence in the last decade. The first wave of Arab uprisings, which was identified as one of the ‘big four’ democratic diffusions,²⁰ was associated with turmoil and bloody conflicts.²¹ The proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya have increased the rivalry among the Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the election of the hard-core conservative Donald Trump, and the shale revolution in the U.S. have changed the global perception towards the Middle East.²² Furthermore, the sharp turnaround in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, following the announcement of Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) as crown prince, changed the coalitions in the region and redrew the political map in the Mediterranean.

In the middle of this, a cooperation opportunity arose with the discovery of offshore natural gas reserves in the East Mediterranean.²³ Many expect that this gas will strengthen the economic integration between allies and build confidence among disputants, which in turn will lead to greater stability in one of the most active political hot spots in the world.²⁴ However, others downgraded the idea of ‘economic peace’ since the approved discovered reserves cannot be considered seductive enough for all the parties to overcome their deep protracted conflicts.²⁵ They even assume that this gas will lead to more rivalry over the control of the reserves in the unclear offshore borders.²⁶

Jordan cannot be isolated from what is happening in the Mediterranean region. Jordan has faced serious economic difficulties related to energy problems associated with the refugee crises and the interruption of Egyptian gas.²⁷ Due to its high dependency on imported energy, the Jordanian energy sector is extremely sensitive to the regional and International context.²⁸ The recently


discovered Eastern Mediterranean gas can be an attractive energy resource for Jordan. Nonetheless, a fear of its influence on the Jordanian foreign policies in the Palestinian context has grown.

This article aims to investigate the impact of the recent developments in the Mediterranean region on the Jordanian energy sector. Moreover, it will discuss the potential consequences of signing a gas deal with Israel, on its energy security and foreign policy, especially its historic commitments towards the Palestinian cause. Initially, the study will compare the level of energy security in Jordan before and after the Arab uprising (the period 2010-2018) based on a proposed energy security framework. The results of the framework will be used to assess the potential impact of the Israeli gas deal on Jordanian energy security. Lastly, a semi-systematic literature review methodology will be used to discuss the potential ramifications of the gas deal on Jordanian foreign policy.

Energy in Jordan


Jordan is a Middle Eastern country with scarce fossil fuel resources.²⁹ When discussing energy in Jordan, four key points should be kept in mind. The first is that Jordan is a heavy energy importer.³⁰ The energy mix in Jordan is crucially dependent on fossil fuels (Graph 2).³¹ Due to their scarce energy resources, Jordan imports almost all of its energy demands with the share of local resources in the total energy mix being very small.³² Graph 3 shows the development of the share of domestic energy resources as a percentage of Jordan's total consumed energy from 2004 to 2018. Even with its recent increase, the domestic share is still less than 10 percent of the total energy demands.

Graph 2: Jordan's Primary Energy Demand (2018)



Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Jordan³³


Graph 3: The Share of Domestic Energy Resources in Jordan's Primary Energy Demand



Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Jordan³⁴

The second is the high growth rate in energy demands, which reached 10 percent in recent years.³⁵ This growth rate is not accompanied by equivalent economic growth and the majority of this growth rate between 2011 and 2017 can be related to the large numbers of refugees, especially from Syria.³⁶ Graph 4 illustrates the primary energy demands in Jordan, which jumped by 30 percent between 2010 and 2016, with a maximum growth rate of 10 percent in 2012.³⁷ Additionally, Table 1 shows the development in some significant figures for the electricity sector between 2010 and 2018 according to the reports of National Electrical Power Company (NEPCO).

Graph 4: Primary Energy Demand in Jordan (2004-2018)



Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Jordan³⁸

Table 1: Comparison of Jordan's Electricity Sector between 2010 and 2018

	2010	2018
Available Capacity (MW)	3273	5236
Generated Electricity (GWh)	14777	20502
Consumed Electricity (GWh)	12843	17495
Imported Electricity (GWh)	670	188
Exported Electricity (GWh)	57	93.5
No. of Consumers (million)	1.496	2.253

Source: National Electric Power Company³⁹

The third is Jordan's geographic proximity to energy exporters, mainly crude oil and natural gas. This gives Jordan easy access to energy sources and reduces the transportation costs. Jordan imports about 90 percent of crude oil and petroleum products from Saudi Arabia through the Aqaba oil port on Jordan's Red Sea coast.⁴⁰ The relatively short distance between Aqaba and Yanbu makes the transfer cheap and quick. The rest of the crude oil demands are imported from Iraq using oil tankers.⁴¹ Additionally, this shared border with Saudi Arabia and Iraq makes the construction of an oil pipeline possible. An example of this is the TAPLINE and the planned crude oil pipeline between Jordan and Iraq. For natural gas, Jordan imported all of its demands from Egypt through the Arab gas pipeline in the period 2004 to 2011.⁴²

The fourth is Jordan's location in the middle of a conflict hot spot, which makes the dependency on imported energy riskier.⁴³ Alshwawra and Almuhtady presented an interesting study about the impact of regional conflicts on Jordanian energy security.⁴⁴ They showed that the Jordanian energy sector has suffered many times due to regional conflicts. For example, the six days war in 1967, followed by the bombing of the TAPLINE, the only source for oil in Jordan at that time. The Lebanese civil war in 1975 increased the energy demands in Jordan due to the associated refugee wave accompanied by a decrease in the economic integration between Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the energy sector. Saudi Arabia used the TAPLINE as a political weapon against Jordan in the first Gulf war in 1990. The Iraqi war in 2003 had catastrophic consequences on the Jordanian economy since it left Jordan without its only energy provider at that time. However, some conflicts have enhanced the Jordanian energy security, like the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, which made Iraq a secured source for cheap energy.

Energy Security Framework

The proposed energy security framework will be based on the main themes considered in the energy security definition found by the survey conducted

Starting with the energy availability, the diversity of energy suppliers and resources (fuels) is considered by many as the main pillar of energy security

by Ang, *et al.*⁴⁵ As shown in Graph 1 above, they are energy availability, infrastructure, energy prices, social effects, environment, governance, and efficiency. Energy prices will not be considered because they are highly impacted by the different taxation policies adopted by the respective governments, while a lack of knowledge overshadows the primary energy costs paid by the government for political and security justifications.

Starting with the energy availability, the diversity of energy suppliers and resources (fuels) is considered by many as the main pillar of energy security.⁴⁶ This will be measured using five indicators which are: The number of oil suppliers, the number of natural gas suppliers, the share of domestic resources in total energy mix, the number of fuels used for electricity generation and the number of fuels in the primary energy mix.

For the energy infrastructure, the stability and the resilience of the sector shall be considered. This requires the protection of the electricity supply chain and integration through interconnection transmission lines with other countries.⁴⁷ The resilience is also extended by an adequate fuel safety margin that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates recovery after disruptions, as well as the capability of using multiple types of fuels in the same power plant.⁴⁸ Four indicators will be used in this theme, which are: number of main fuel supply chain elements related to turmoil areas, number of countries interconnected by the electrical grid, the number of days that the strategic storage is sufficient to meet the country's energy demands in case of fuel interruption, and the number of fuels that can be used in the main power plants.

The environmental and efficiency themes include the use of renewable energy and enhancing the energy efficiency and conservation.⁴⁹ Two indicators will be used which are: energy intensity and the percentage of renewables in the installed electricity generation capacities. The social effects theme is measured using the percentage of population connected to the grid and the energy consumption per capita. Finally, the governance theme is related to the partnership with the private sector since it increases the competitiveness and efficiency of the energy market.⁵⁰ It will be measured by the number of private sector companies involved in the petroleum products distribution as well as those involved in electricity generation and distribution stages.

Therefore the number of indicators used in this framework is fifteen. According to Ang, *et al.*, nearly 60 percent of the energy security frameworks published in the period 2001-2014 used fifteen indicators or less.⁵¹ Based on that, it

is assumed that the number of indicators in the current framework is sufficient to measure Jordan's energy security. Table 2 shows the indicators of the framework with a comparison between the values for 2010 and 2018.

Table 2: Comparison between Energy Security Indicators for 2010 and 2018

Theme	Indicator	2010	2018
Energy Availability	Number of Oil suppliers	2	2
	Number of Gas suppliers	1	Gas Market
	Share of Domestic Resources	3	8
	No. of fuels used in Elec. generation	3	5
	Number of fuels in the primary energy mix	4	4
Energy Infrastructure	Main fuel supply chain related to turmoil areas	1	0
	Number of countries interconnected by the electrical grid	4	8
	Adequacy of strategic storage (Oil and petroleum products)	14 days	60 days (2019)
	Number of fuels that can be used in Power plant	3	3
Environment and Efficiency	Energy Intensity (TOE/1000 USD)	0.210	0.287
	Percentage of Renewables in the installed generation capacity	0%	11%
Social Effects	Percentage of population connected to the grid	99.9%	99.9%
	Energy consumption per capita (TOE)	1.204	0.942
Governance	No. of private sector companies involved in electricity sector	7	46
	No. of private sector companies involved in petroleum product sector	5	8

Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Jordan⁵² and National Electric Power Company⁵³

In 2010, Jordan imported 90 percent of its oil demands from Saudi Arabia and 10 percent from Iraq. Although it lost the quantities imported from Iraq in



Jordanians gather in the capital Amman for a protest against the government agreement to import natural gas from Israel, September 30, 2016.

AHMAD ALAMEEN / AFP via Getty Images

2013 due to turmoil in the region, in 2018 Jordan re-established the importing agreement from Iraq at preferable prices and the Iraqi oil supplies returned again in the next year. For natural gas, Jordan depended on Egyptian gas only in 2010. The supplies were interrupted in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. At the end of 2015 Jordan commissioned the liquified natural gas (LNG) port in Aqaba with a maximum operating capacity of 715 million cubic feet per day. Consequently, Jordan opened up to the international gas market (Jordan imports LNG from Gas producers like Qatar) in addition to the Egyptian gas. The LNG terminal met 82 percent of Jordan’s electrical generation capacity in 2016.⁵⁴

The share of domestic resources in the total Jordanian energy mix in 2010 was 3 percent. This percentage increased to 8 percent in 2018 due to the installation of renewable energy electrical generation capacity that represents 11 percent of the total installed capacity. This increases the number of fuels used in electricity generation from three (gas, heavy fuel and diesel) in 2010 to five (gas, heavy fuel, diesel, wind and solar energy) in 2018. This installed capacity is mainly owned by the private sector, which in turn reflected positively to an increase in the number of private sector companies involved in the electrical sector to forty-six. The network of electrically interconnected countries in 2010 included Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Libya. In 2016, Sudan,

Lebanon, Palestine and Turkey were also connected.⁵⁵

The number of fuels in the primary energy mix, the number of fuels that can be used in the main electricity generation power plant and the percentage of the population connected to the grid did not change between 2010 and 2018. The Arab gas pipeline in Egypt can be considered to be related to a turmoil area, since it is connected to the gas pipeline going to Israel, considered as an enemy and a target for the Egyptian population.

However, the pipeline was the main supply-line for Egyptian gas to Jordan in 2010, despite its importance reducing significantly in 2018 due to the building of an LNG port in Aqaba. The resilience of the energy sector was increased by commissioning new oil and gas storages in the central region of Jordan and in Aqaba. This increased the capacity of the kingdom's strategic storage to 60 days requirements in 2018 compared to only 14 in 2010. Furthermore, Jordan restructured the oil sector by enhancing the partnership with the private sector by signing agreements with three petroleum product marketing companies in 2013.

Energy intensity increased and the energy consumption per capita decreased in 2018 compared with 2010 as a consequence of the large wave of refugees that entered Jordan in the intervening years (the refugee camps were not supplied by electricity 24 hours per day, therefore the total electricity consumption per capita decreased). Nonetheless, one can say that Jordanian energy security was increased in 2018 when compared with 2010. This can be explained by enhancing the durability, stability, robustness and resilience of the energy sector through diversifying the fuels and the suppliers, increasing the share of local resources, increasing the share of renewable energy and increasing the partnership with the private sector. Based on all these indicators it can be stated that the policies and the energy projects introduced by the Jordanian government have minimized the sensitivity of the energy sector to the regional conflicts.

The 'Stolen Gas' Deal

Israel discovered gas in the Leviathan (2010) and Tamar (2009) gas fields with quantities exceeding their domestic requirements, but still not enough to make

Trump Administration also forced some Arab leaders to abandon their usual support for Palestinian national rights in exchange for helping them to get international legitimacy, supporting them against Iran, or turning a blind eye to the human rights violations in their countries

it feasible to export to Europe using a pipeline or establishing an expensive liquefying terminal.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical complexity made it difficult for the Israeli gas to feed the regional market.⁵⁷ Based on that, the developers for the Leviathan gas field failed to find a customer to make the exploitation of the gas field economically feasible, and those quantities have currently become trapped wealth for Israel.⁵⁸ President Obama's Administration at that time supported a gas deal between Jordan and Israel on the neoliberal perspective that such a deal would increase the economic integration in the Middle East, and eventually lead to more stability in the region.⁵⁹ The then U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, vigorously pushed towards the deal and the U.S. ambassador in Amman, Stuart Jones, was present in most of the negotiation meetings, with the signing ceremony itself being conducted in the U.S. embassy in Jordan.⁶⁰ The negotiation was ended by signing two Memorandum of Understandings, one with Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine Company, worth \$500 million over 15 years, and the other with NEPCO, worth \$15 billion over 15 years.

Some Jordanians justifiably worry this deal will decrease Jordanian energy security. Based on the above energy security framework, the Mediterranean gas deal will have two major disadvantages that can affect the energy security in Jordan. The first is that it will be against the diversifying concept.⁶¹ According to the announced contractual quantities, Jordan plans to use the Mediterranean gas for the base demands generation, while the imported gas from other resources will be dedicated to handle peak demands and for the renewable energy backup systems. This means that most of the electricity in Jordan will be generated using one type of fuel from one supplier, which is counterintuitive to the diversifying policies followed by the Jordanian government in recent years. The Jordanian government justifies this deal by claiming that Mediterranean gas is significantly cheaper than other resources.⁶² However, due to the lack of transparency regarding this deal, this claim is highly contested.⁶³

The second disadvantage is that it is decreasing the protection of the supply chain. Palestine is a region with on-going conflict between the original inhabitants (Palestinians) and the Zionistic immigrants (Israelis).⁶⁴ By depending on the Mediterranean gas for the majority of its electricity supply, Jordan will again have one of its major supply network elements in an unstable region. This threatens the electricity generation in Jordan and makes this pipeline a target of attack for nationalist groups.⁶⁵

Another major fear is the possibility of this gas being used as a coercive tool to manipulate the Jordanian foreign policy away from supporting the Palestinian cause,⁶⁶ which is an existential issue for Jordan.⁶⁷ The geographical, demographical, and historical relations make what happens in Palestine affect directly both internal and foreign policies of Jordan.⁶⁸ The Jordanian mon-

archy connected itself to al-Quds (Jerusalem) and insisted that the holy places in al-Quds remain under the Hashemite custody in the peace treaty it signed with Israel. Following the election of Donald Trump, his administration has continuously and systematically worked towards obliteration of the Palestinians rights and ending the Palestinian cause through an Israeli regional plan they call “the deal of the century.”⁶⁹ Trump Administration also forced some Arab leaders to abandon their usual support for Palestinian national rights in exchange for helping them to get international legitimacy, supporting them against Iran, or turning a blind eye to the human rights violations in their countries.⁷⁰ This put more pressure on Jordanian foreign policy which lost the support, cooperation and the coordination it usually gets from the Arab world. Under these circumstances, making the Jordanian economy vulnerable to the Israeli ‘gas weapon’ is not the wisest decision for Jordan, since it will put more pressure on their already stressed foreign policy.

The Jordanian energy sector is characterized by its high dependency on imported energy, high growth rate in demand, close proximity to oil and gas exporters and location in a conflict hot spot

Furthermore, the claim that this gas deal would bring peace to the region was challenged by many incidents that increased the tension between Israel and Jordan. First was Israel’s decision in July 2017 to place metal detectors and security cameras at the entrance of al-Aqsa holy mosque which is officially under Jordanian custody.⁷¹ The second was the murder of two Jordanians by an Israeli guard stationed at the Israeli embassy in Amman. The guard escaped punishment using diplomatic immunity and the Israeli prime minister strongly backed the murderer to the extent that the King of Jordan rebuked the Israeli prime minister publicly.⁷² The third was the Trump Administration’s recognition of al-Quds (Jerusalem) as the capital of Israel. This recognition was condemned widely by the international community.⁷³ Lastly, the Israeli proposed annexation of the West Bank was declared as an existential threat for Palestinians and increased the tension between Jordan and Israel to a high level.

At the national level, the signing of the gas deal received a huge rejection in the Jordanian street, increasing the frustration among Jordanians with the already unpopular government.⁷⁴ The Jordanian Coordination Committee against Importing Gas from Israel was established. Many demonstrations and protesting campaigns, for example ‘turning off the lights,’ took place. On social media the deal was denoted as the “enemy gas deal,” “surrender deal,” “occupation gas deal” and most noticeably “stolen gas deal,” referring to the fact that Palestinians were the first to discover the gas in the Mediterranean

in the 1990's.⁷⁵ Based on the above, going for such a politically risky deal with the lack of popular support could have serious consequences for Jordanian authorities.

Conclusion

Energy is a central issue in the contemporary international relations. Developing an efficient, rational, and adaptive energy sector in the midst of a multipolar world with an anarchic nature is a core challenge for all states. Securitizing energy is a process of framing energy as an existential threat to the state's interests. The concept of energy security is highly contested, contextual and dynamic. However, its definition is usually connected to energy availability, prices, infrastructure and recently the environmental themes. The Mediterranean region has witnessed a lot of turbulence in the last decade. On the

The unpopular decision to make the Jordanian economy subject and vulnerable to the Israeli 'gas weapon' is not the wisest decision for Jordan, since it will put more pressure on their already stressed foreign policy

one hand, the turmoil, conflicts and political changes have increased the rivalry between states. On the other hand, the discovery of natural gas resources has opened up a valuable chance for cooperation and settling long-standing disputes; at least from the neoliberal perspective.

The Jordanian energy sector is characterized by its high dependency on imported energy, high growth rate in demand, close proximity to oil and gas exporters and location in a conflict hot spot. This article investigates the impact of the recent developments in the Mediterranean region on the Jordanian energy sector by tracking the change in energy security in Jordan using a sufficiently inclusive energy security framework. The framework consists of fifteen measurable indicators that cover the main themes used in published energy security definitions. The results show that Jordanian energy security in 2018 has increased compared with 2010. The policies and the energy projects introduced by the Jordanian government enhanced the durability, stability, robustness and resilience of the energy sector through diversifying the fuels and the suppliers, increasing the share in local resources, increasing the share in renewable energy and increasing the partnership with the private sector. This has currently minimized the sensitivity of the energy sector to the regional conflicts.

The article discussed the potential ramifications for Jordan's decision to import the newly discovered Mediterranean gas through Israel for Jordanian energy needs. The deal was supported by the U.S. President Obama's Administration at

the time, to promote peace through economic integration under the neoliberal perspective, which is now inapplicable in the confrontational administration of the radical conservative U.S. President Trump. The deal could decrease the energy security in Jordan through altering the principle of diversifying sources and decreasing the protection of energy infrastructure since the gas pipeline passes through a conflict region. Furthermore, it has created a justifiable fear of the possibility that this gas could be used as a coercive tool to manipulate Jordan's foreign policy away from its historic commitment to the Palestinian cause. Current developments in the international and regional context are also not in Jordan's favor. Moreover, many incidents in the recent years have increased the tension between Jordan and Israel. Therefore, the unpopular decision to make the Jordanian economy subject and vulnerable to the Israeli 'gas weapon' is not the wisest decision for Jordan, since it will put more pressure on their already stressed foreign policy. ■

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

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