

US military aid in 2002-3 shows. In order to establish causality, however, an independent variable must occur prior to a dependent variable. Thus, there should be a time gap between a change in public opinion and a change in aid. Sadik's analysis violates an important criterion for causal explanation.

There are other factors that influence American image in Turkey, such as the motion to pass the Armenian Genocide bill in Congress, the US policy towards the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) in northern Iraq, and the overall condition of the Trans-Atlantic alliance. Although Sadik treats these as "intervening factors" in this book, it seems to the reviewer that these contextual factors have far more rigorous impacts on American image in Turkey than military assistance, economic aid, foreign direct investment, and bilateral trade. During the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, when socialism and anti-imperialism were widespread among urban intellectuals and university students, there was a negative, rather than positive, relationship between US policy toward Turkey and public opinion toward the United States: those leftists were against the development of a closer tie between Ankara and Washington. When there is a rising anti-Amer-

ican sentiment in a country, the increase of military aid and economic engagement with the recipient country can escalate anti-American public opinion rather than improve America's image as Sadik suggests. Thus, contextual factors can completely change the direction of the relationship between public opinion toward the United States and U.S. foreign policy.

In this short monograph, Sadik attends to an interesting and important question on the US-Turkey relationship. As he accurately claims, scholars should pay more attention to the American image held by ordinary citizens in Turkey because public opinion has become an important determinant of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. Sadik also touches upon a rarely examined relationship in the literature: US foreign policy and public opinions toward the United States in foreign countries. Thus, the implication of this book is relevant to US foreign policy making as well. Although Sadik's data analysis and causal explanation suffer from some problems, which this review describes above, *American Image in Turkey* is a timely contribution to the literature on the US-Turkey alliance.

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Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire

By Marlene Laruelle

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, 276 pages. ISBN 9780801890734, \$60

'Eurasianism' is a relatively new concept in Russian history, and not one that appeals beyond a fairly narrow circle. The argument goes back to the turn of

the last century, when, looking for a Russian identity, one or two scholars, headed by a Prince Trubetskoy, discovered their Asiatic roots. Here lay temptation. Was

Russia somehow a creation of Europe, of Germans especially? Peter the Great had famously set about the westernization of the place, and St Petersburg had been put up almost as a stage-set, “a combination of Wedgwood and cardboard”. By 1900, something of a nationalist reaction to such westernization set in, and the Eurasianists made much more of their Asiatic—for short, ‘Tatar’—side. They had had quite enough of hearing that the original Russians had been drunken buffoons whose civilization had to be planted upon them by Vikings or Poles or Baltic Germans. No, they said, we have a Tatar side, and we owe a great deal to the Asiatics. In this, they were quite right. Pushkin had said, of the Mongols who had crushed Russia for two and a half centuries, that they, unlike the Arabs who had taken so much of Spain at the same time, had not brought “Aristotle and algebra”. But in reality the Mongols brought a great deal, especially in styles of government. A third of the old Russian nobility had Tatar names (“Yusupov” from “Yusuf”, “Muraviev” from “Murad”, etc.) while Ivan the Terrible himself descended, through his mother, from Genghiz Khan, and through his grand-mother from the Byzantines. For a long time, under the Soviet Union, a sort of vehement and stupid nationalism was permitted to occlude the Tatar element in Russian history. Now, matters are rather different. In 2005 there were celebrations of it at Kazan; and there is an interesting aspect of Putin’s reign, that Tatars have been doing remarkably well.

There was a considerable scholar, Lev Gumilev, who devoted his life (despite periodic persecution) to the study of Russia’s Turkic roots (a substantial book, *Eski Türkler*, a translation, is kept in print by

Selence Yayınları, 2007). This is of course a difficult subject, given that the sources are mainly external—Chinese, Arab, Byzantine, etc.—and there is always a serious question to be asked: so what? Here, the Eurasianists seem to have been divided. Some were downright anti-religious, seeing Christianity as namby-pamby stuff; others cultivated old Slavonic stuff, and there are surely cultural roots to Eurasianism that Miss Laruelle might have noted: the Stravinsky of *Firebird*, for instance, is stating a variant of Eurasianism when he celebrates the old myths of Slavdom, from an era when Finns, Tatars and old Slavs intermingled in the forests of Muscovy and Novgorod (it is certainly curious to see Turkish place-names quite far to the north). There are today a few Turks, notably Mehmet Perinçek, who argue for an alliance with Russia in the name of Eurasian solidarity, and of course if there is a country where the concept makes sense, it is Turkey. However, beyond a few adepts, it is not a particularly popular cause; even, the lack of institutions for the study of Russia in Turkey is striking, and surely not a good thing: when Turks go to Russia, they become very popular. Mayor Luzhkov, who has made a remarkable job of turning grim old Moscow into a lively and attractive city, says he much prefers dealing with Turks because they do not arrive with platoons of lawyers and they get on with the job. That ENKA built the head-quarters of Gazprom (and rebuilt the Russian parliament after 1993) says much. Or perhaps it is just that the Turks can understand the local styles of corruption: they know how to bribe with dignity.

It is tempting to suppose that Russia’s (and Balkan countries’) crest, the dou-

ble-headed eagle, somehow reflects the division of the Roman Empire between western-looking Rome and eastern-looking Constantinople. Formally this is quite wrong: the bird has much longer origins (there is a Hittite original in the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara, dated 2000 BC). But it is a very good symbol of ‘Eurasianism’, the notion that Russia looks both ways, that her identity is not European at all. ‘Eurasianism’ was (and to

some extent still is) an intellectual current of some seriousness in Russia, and Marlene Laruelle, who has a distinguished academic pedigree in France and the USA, has done some hard work in sources that are not easy. The book, and particularly its references, are helpful if you need to consider Russian attitudes to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

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Exploring the Caucasus in the 21st Century: Essays on Culture, History and Politics in a Dynamic Context

Edited by Françoise Companjen, László Marácz and Lia Versteegh

Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, University of Amsterdam, 2010, 254 pages, ISBN 9789089641830.

According to the introduction of this book, it is the hope that this collection of essays “will enhance insight on the Caucasus and cogently encourage European Union citizens and civil servants to develop more policy towards the South Caucasus” (p. 22). Such is considered essential by the authors since the EU became a “Black Sea power” in 2007 with the memberships of Romania and Bulgaria and the impact of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, in which Russia was sending a message to the West that it regarded the region as its own “backyard. Interestingly some of the chapters deal with developments in the North Caucasus—a part of the region politically attached to the Russian Federation—that may affect or be affected by developments in the South Caucasus. Most of these essays, while diverse in subject matter, are brief in length, but

well-documented and clearly written; despite the title of the book, some chapters include extensive historical background especially regarding the 19th and 20th centuries when the entire Caucasus region was either under the control or being conquered by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. Recurrent themes in this book are: 1) the transition process through which the South Caucasus republics have been moving from autocratically-ruled to hopefully more democratic societies with greater political and economic freedom, and 2) the Russian Federation’s relations with the republics of both the North and South Caucasus.

The first essay by László Marácz deals with the expedition to the North Caucasus of Hungarian linguist Count Bálint de Szentkatolna (1844-1913) who studied and developed a dictionary for Kabard-