

on the subject of the Turkish race in the 1930s), brought a blonde child from a nearby village for the foreign delegates to take a look at (p. 170). And in other cases, they busied themselves with activity such as digging up the great architect Sinan's grave to measure his head with the intent of proving his Turkishness (p. 171). However, the work of the linguistic society was slightly more refined. It sought to purge foreign loanwords, mostly of Persian or Arabic origin, from the Turkish language. However this was also not without difficulty, and "by the time of the second language congress of 1934, linguistic chaos reigned, official declarations had become incomprehensible and even the educated public could not follow many newspaper articles" (p. 175).

The book itself relies largely on primary sources, particularly Ottoman, and the marginalia that Atatürk made on own his own books. Ample use is made of the recollections and memoirs of Atatürk's contemporaries, in addition to the use of material in its original language where applicable, mostly French and German. On the downside this book doesn't give

sufficient space to the ideological debates which took place within the Kemalist movement itself in the 1930s, particularly those of the left and right centered around the *Kadro* and *Ülkü* publications. While the author states that the Folk Houses were the regime's "main agent of indoctrination" (p. 190), it is a rather dubious point given that the Folk Houses were highly influenced by those seen to be on the right of the Kemalist movement and their ideas were in no way representative of the movement as a whole. Furthermore, the book's conclusion is rather thin. Hanioglu mentions, among other things, that today all university undergraduate students must take a course on the reforms of Atatürk and refers to the abandonment of the Hittite sun as the emblem of Ankara in the 1990s. However, he doesn't place these statements in any sort of context. The author may be justified in doing so, to avoid being pulled into present day political debates, but this could potentially leave those readers who are unfamiliar with the subject matter slightly confused.

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Hoca: Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: The Davutoğlu Effect in Turkish Foreign Policy)

By Gürkan Zengin

İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi: 2010, 488 pages, ISBN 9751030573.

In recent years, not only have the changes in Turkish foreign policy been discussed but also the key factors and actors behind the change. This book deals with both the professional and academic life of the foreign minister of Turkey,

Ahmet Davutoğlu, and provides information on him and on developments in Turkish foreign policy. The author, Gürkan Zengin, is a journalist with an interest in foreign relations. His book includes a number of important stories of Davutoğlu

from when he was a university professor and advisor up to today as a diplomat and minister. It seems that the author reached his conclusions and got information for the book from colleagues of Davutoğlu, his writings, and from other media. At first sight, this book is very beneficial for those who are interested in Davutoğlu and Turkish foreign policy in general.

In the prologue Zengin starts his book by using the comparison of “the man who pushes the car”, likening cars to Turkish foreign policy and Davutoğlu to the man who pushes Turkish foreign policy. It is a very successful comparison. Actually after Davutoğlu’s work as an advisor and minister, Turkey has started to play a very important role in world politics. And importantly for Turkey, Davutoğlu has changed the direction of foreign policy with his “zero problem with neighbors” policy. Davutoğlu explains the aim of his zero problem policy by saying “if we think about that Turkey is exactly surrounded with enemies, then we cannot make expansion, just show defensive reaction. When we achieve zero problems with our neighbors, we will also gain extraordinary space of movement in foreign policy” (p. 88). Davutoğlu believes in minimizing the possibility of conflict, and argues that countries have to increase economic cooperation. The book contributes to a better understanding of this policy.

The author makes strong connections and gives a good background for Davutoğlu’s interest in Bosnia in the 1990s and today’s Turkish foreign policy in Balkans. When Davutoğlu was a professor in Malaysia, Alija Izzetbegovic requested that Davutoğlu become an honorary consul to Bosnia, a position he accepted. When Davutoğlu saw Bosnian students,

who wanted to study academic areas apart from international relations and politics, he said that “in your country, there will be war, your country will not need economists or businessmen but diplomats and international law experts” (p. 442). Zengin also examines Davutoğlu’s efforts to help Bosnia within NATO. When Davutoğlu convinced NATO that Bosnia was a potential member, Zengin says that in Bosnia it was declared almost a national holiday and Bosnian newspapers paid a lot of attention to it. This information is very important for those who want to see the connection between Turkey’s Balkan policy and the existing support for it in the Balkans.

The other most important part of the book is about the *Mavi Marmara* issue, which was when nine Turkish citizens were killed in international waters by Israeli commandos that were stopping the ship taking humanitarian aid to Gaza. The book portrays Turkish diplomacy during and after this historical event. When Davutoğlu received the news, he was in Rio de Janeiro. Immediately, he called the Turkish permanent representative in the UN and asked him to immediately convene the UN Security Council. When Davutoğlu reached New York, the meeting started and he used very harsh words toward Israel. The author provides a lot of information about the *Mavi Marmara* issue in the book, as well as the role of Davutoğlu and his diplomacy.

The author also touches on Davutoğlu’s now-classic book, *Strategic Depth*, one of the most important contributions to international relations literature in Turkey. Although it is in its 60th edition, the lack of clear language, which would allow for a wider readership, is considered an is-

sue. Zengin not only contextualizes this book, he also gives a very simplified summary of the book and its main ideas. In that sense, Zengin's book can be seen as a public interpretation of *Strategic Depth*.

Despite the book's simplicity, there are some issues. For example, the book has no systematic structure and it is writ-

ten in a journalistic style rather than with a careful analysis. But its simple language is an advantage in getting a wider readership to provide a popular analysis of Davutoğlu and his ideas.

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The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising

By Jean-Pierre Filiu

London: Hurst & Co., 2011, 195 pages, ISBN 9781894041591.

The Arab world has been making a new history since January 2011 when the uprisings against President Ben Ali resulted in his fleeing from Tunisia. Throughout 2011, the decades-old rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Moammar Qaddafi in Libya ended. Political change came to Yemen and the status quo has been strongly challenged in other Arab countries. Jean-Pierre Filiu, in his *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising*, takes stock of the revolutionary movements in the Arab world, briefly summarizes the events in key countries and comes up with ten lessons that we can learn from the uprisings.

The book, which comprises ten brief chapters, gives a concise history of what happened in the Arab world since the protests first started in Tunisia in December 2010. The book is organized around the lessons that can be learned from the revolutions. In the first two chapters, Filiu argues that the uprisings have challenged the widely held beliefs about Arabs and Muslims in the West. First, the recent events have shown that Arabs are not an

exception, and like others they also seek liberty and freedom. As he writes, "Arabs are no exception, but the resilience of their ruling cliques has been exceptional" (p. 16). Second, the recent events have challenged the view that Muslims are associated with authoritarianism and violence but not freedom and peace. In the next three chapters, Filiu makes conclusions about social movements and mobilization. In chapter three, he shows how youths, with their resentment for the regimes, can be influential in revolutions. As opposed to those theories of mobilization that reference the necessity of material resources for social action, the Arab youth have showed that their anger was their power. In the following chapters, he demonstrates how social networks without charismatic leaders worked in the Arab countries in mobilizing the youth and marginalized groups.

In chapter six, Filiu examines the conventional assumption that "the alternative to authoritarianism in the Arab world is chaos." To him, the recent uprisings have showed the opposite and taught us that