Israel’s aid diplomacy efforts extend back to the early 1950s, when the newly established state, striving to diversify its diplomatic relations and gain support in intergovernmental organizations, launched various aid initiatives. In terms of humanitarian and development aid, the most important initiative of the Israeli government was the establishment of the Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV) in 1958. Since then, alongside providing humanitarian assistance to over 140 nations, MASHAV has engaged in hundreds of joint development projects and directly trained more than 300,000 individuals in areas in which Israel has accumulated experience, particularly in public health, education, and agriculture.1 Combined with bilateral trade and weapons sales, these development and humanitarian assistance efforts facilitated the establishment of sound bilateral relations with many nations. Therefore, MASHAV has been one of the backbones of Israeli diplomacy, particularly vis-a-vis the developing world. However, in recent years, the near paralyzation of government ministries due to consecutive elections and the slashing of overseas aid budgets amid financial hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, significantly reduced Israeli development assistance through MASHAV. According to Gil Haskel, director of the agency for the last eight years, the lack of budget for MASHAV’s consultancies and training courses constitutes a “strategic hit to Israel’s presence and international reputation.”2 Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be an opportunity for Israel to achieve diplomatic gains. From the early stages of the pandemic, the Israeli leadership has embarked on the so-called “COVID-19 diplomacy.” COVID-19 diplomacy is a novel term that began to appear in media outlets circa mid-2020. Lacking an exact definition in the scientific discourse, “COVID-19 diplomacy” was initially used to refer to China’s extensive personal protective equipment (PPE) donations and deployment of Chinese medical teams3 to countries that faced increasing infection rates amid severe equipment and manpower shortages,4 to shore up China’s international image and strengthen its bilateral relations.5 The term later gained substantial popularity in academia as well as global media, as other high and medium-level income countries, particularly, inter-alia, Russia, Türkiye, and India, began to undertake similar aid initiatives. By the end of the first year of the pandemic, vaccines have emerged as the linchpin of the global struggle against COVID-19. In this context, overtaking the donations of PPE, test kits, and ventilators, vaccines have become the most important element of COVID-19 diplomacy initiatives. Many vaccine-producing countries, especially China6 and Russia,7 have pledged to donate large quantities of vaccines, mainly to middle and low-income countries, and have signed agreements for local vaccine production. In addition, some non-producer countries have also donated their surplus stock of acquired vaccines to countries that experience difficulties in acquiring enough doses to immunize their frontline medical workers or general populations.