Introduction
Examining the Israeli response to the uprisings in Syria, this article argues that Israel regarded the outbreak of the popular riots therein as a golden opportunity for the removal of the Ba’ath regime, a primary link in the Iranian ‘axis of evil.’ The strategies the Israeli government has adopted toward Syria have been heavily influenced by the view prevalent among ruling circles and academics alike –namely, that the country serves as a stronghold against Israel, buttressed by its alliance with Iran. Israel’s readiness to intervene in Syria has nonetheless been mitigated by what is referred to herein as the ‘Lebanese syndrome’ –the fear of further entanglement à la the First Lebanese War. In order to evince the association between the Lebanese syndrome and the non-involvement strategy, the present contribution briefly reviews the Israeli perspective on the ‘Arab Spring.’ The following three sections then analyze the features of the Lebanese syndrome, Syria’s conceptualization as a hostile entity and the Israeli plan for the country’s dismantlement, and Israeli strategy with regard to the uprisings and the civil war in Syria in light of the link between the historical enmity between the two states and the ongoing effects of the Lebanese syndrome. Demonstrating that, despite the belief that Syria is a bastion of resistance to Israel and the Israeli commitment to dissolving the ‘axis of evil,’ Israel has chosen not to become involved, this article contends that this restraint derives first and foremost from the deterrent weight of the Lebanese syndrome.
