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The Rise of Radical Liberal Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy

Articles | Insight Turkey Summer 2014 / Volume 16, Number 3

Change is a central concept in Turkish and global politics. It forms the basis of liberal ideology, alongside freedom, democracy, and equality. In this spirit of change, radical liberal thinkers question the state of contemporary international relations with a focus on justice and fairness. Ahmet Davutoğlu appreciates the importance of these liberal considerations, and he claims the global order is in a period of transformation, in which Turkey and the rest of the world will come into new political roles. In order to facilitate the formation of a fair, cooperative world order, Davutoğlu promotes a global consensus based on cosmopolitanism and multilateralism. These ideas for international reform are consistent with radical liberalism. However, he also considers the formation of a new global order according to his conservative and Islamic ideas—a position inconsistent with liberalism. This contradiction demands a better understanding of Davutoğlu’s stance in domestic politics and international relations, and a consideration of implications for Turkey’s global identity.

The Rise of Radical Liberal Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy
Ahmet Davutoglu and US Secretary of State John Kerry they shake hands prior to a NATO meeting focused on the Ukrainian crisis during a Foreign Affairs ministers’ meeting at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on June 25, 2014. AFP / Brendan Smialowski
 

Introduction

Since Since the end of the Cold War, reform and change have been two key concepts in Turkish foreign policy, as it has claimed a greater role in world politics. The reconstruction of the global political system offers an opportunity to small and middling powers in world politics. In fact, it is difficult to make a comprehensive road map of change in the international order in years following the Cold War. In wake of 9/11, the current world order and the liberal ideology have been criticized, and literature espousing alternative views about world order emerged. Writers from different theoretical schools proposed different ideas for transforming the system into an ideal model. One such view is radical liberalism that seeks a more liberal liberalism and reform in international relations to facilitate better inclusion of the current world order’s victims. This form of liberalism prefers reform to the dismantlement of the current global political system. 

Ahmet Davutoğlu, a prominent name in Turkish foreign policy since 2002, currently the Prime Minister of Turkey, offered a comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s place in world politics in his masterpiece, Strategic Depth, published in 2001. Davutoğlu’s book underlines the need for reform and change not only in Turkey, but also in the current system of world politics. Emerging global and regional actors have started to ask for larger roles in global governance and reforms in international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF. From his position in Turkey, a rising power of the 2000’s, Davutoğlu questions the current UN system and its efforts for justice, equality and peace. He argues that the world system is in a transitional period, which offers a chance to reconstruct an improved world order in terms of not only organization, but also justice. This kind of reform would offer Turkey new opportunities to become a more effective player in world politics.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, a prominent name in Turkish foreign policy, offered a comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s place in world politics in his masterpiece, Strategic Depth

Davutoğlu fits the description of a liberal scholar in the current system, in view of his focus on the need for change, reform, and improved justice, in a humanitarian context. On the other hand, some people perceive his affinity to Islam and his critics against modernity as threatening. Especially his career in Turkish government and his sympathy to Islamic groups have placed him at odds with the secular liberals. In the traditional sense, conservatism and religious loyalties are in opposition with liberalism. Therefore, Davutoğlu seems an ideological contradiction. This example sparks a discussion of liberalism in the post-modern world. How can we understand Davutoğlu’s stance? Is he a liberal or radical Islamist leader? In the context of liberalism, Turkish opposition groups view Davutoğlu’s theories on international relations as idealistic to a degree of irrationality. As a scholar of international relations, Davutoğlu views foreign policy in a manner different from the traditional conceptions of Turkish politics. In the context of a changing liberal order, his views offer a unique view of the future for the world, and for the Turkey. Still, it is important to answer the question, “Is he a radical liberal or not?” The answer will indicate the likelihood of his theories’ influencing foreign policy, and it will illuminate the degrees of continuity and change in foreign policy of the post-modern era. 

Therefore, we should begin our analysis with the evolution of the liberal world order and the rise of radical liberalism. By looking at Davutoğlu’s principle ideas and concepts, we may solidify an understanding of his stance. This will require a close analysis of his books, articles, and speeches, archived on the foreign ministry website. This analysis will run from his advisory position in 2002 to the present, in order to form a comprehensive understanding of his ideology, and to understand his status in terms of liberalism.

 

 

The Rise of Radical Liberalism as Liberalism 3.0

Liberalism and Versions of Liberal Institutionalism

Liberalism has evolved as a theory of government, and encompasses social, economic, and international theory. Its central goal is the happiness and well-being of the individual. In order to achieve this goal, liberal philosophy operates on the assumptions of modernity—that history is discontinuous, and there are distinct shifts in the linear progression of history, such as the transformation from the feudalist age to the capitalist, industrial age. This idea of modernity also prioritizes individual and social freedoms before traditional, national boundaries. In classical liberalism, liberty is the focal point, and it is tied directly to the freedom, happiness, and well-being of the individual. Classical liberalism regards the status quo with an inclination for reform, in order to eliminate all threats to individual freedoms, such as monarchies and authoritarian governments. Thus, liberals’ proposal for freedom hinges on republicanism, constitutionalism, and the right to hold property under the rule of law. According to its definition, the core tenants of liberalism are the equality of citizens, the basic human rights of individuals, the belief in a market-driven economy, and the right to private property. Accordingly, liberals regard shortcomings in existing global and national structures as obstacles, which are to be solved with positivist strategy, as used in the material sciences: find the problem, and then find its solution.

In the context of international relations, liberalism promotes cooperation as a method for the prevention of war. Philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that humanity can achieve freedom and justice by reason. He promoted individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a continuous international peace contract between all states as the ingredients for international peace and prosperity. Similarly, another 18th-century thinker, Jeremy Bentham called for an international law system to facilitate peace and prosperity.1 In the 19th century, Richard Cobden introduced the idea of natural harmony of interest, based on individual freedoms and free trade. By this theory, if all states look out for their own well-being, there will emerge a natural harmony that will benefit all parties, without any need for outside intervention. Cobden saw the natural harmony of interest as an ideal formula for the global economic system and international relations. Each of these liberal theories maintained that the nurture of constitutionalism, individualism, republicanism, human rights, private property, the free market, and a network of growing interdependence would produce global peace. 

In practice, however, these liberal principles did not always facilitate the well-being of the people, especially in the case of colonies under imperial power. Free trade and the open-market economy did not result in the natural harmony described by Cobden, and people across the world did not experience the contentment liberalism promised. As the global liberal order developed, the system favored the rich and the powerful, at the expense of the poor and the weak. In view of the ruling liberal ideology’s effects on international affairs, thinkers began to question the promises of classical liberalism. In the 20th century, liberal institutionalism emerged with the goal of peace and prosperity by promoting national self-determination and international institutions based on democratic principles. This new liberal ideology placed a special emphasis on international cooperation in dealing with belligerents. Thus, with the end of World War I, liberal internationalism 1.0 came into being by 1919. 

Liberal institutionalism has commonalities with modern liberalism—a theory based on the freedom of the individual in social relations. Modern liberals, including John Stuard Mill and Leonard Hobhouse, espoused a communitarian type of liberalism.2 They criticized classical liberals’ understanding of freedom, which centers on freedom of contracts and property rights. Modern liberal J.S. Mill described “man as a progressive being,” and he argued that individuals should be allowed to develop in all their “manifold diversity.”3 This form of liberalism can be seen as distinct from the rest of liberal thought, as its “aim is to emancipate individuals from the fear of hunger, unemployment, ill health, and a miserable old age, and, positively, to attempt to help members of modern industrial societies…”4 According to John Rawls, modern liberals are liberal because they share the traditional moral view of freedom, and they accept the right to personal property as a necessary element of individual self-expression.5 The modern liberal ideology also argues for a welfare state, and after the First World War, it promoted an interwar idealism in an effort to improve existing global structures. In view of these commonalities and contrasts, it is intellectually useless to discuss a form of liberalism as static. Liberalism’s most distinctive feature is its commitment to progress, and its belief in the human capacity for progress through rationality.6 In wake of the First World War, peace proved not to be the natural condition, and as Leonard Woolf argued, peace and prosperity are “consciously devised machinery,” in need of rational construction.7

Despite this acknowledged need for a consciously devised system for international peace and order, Woodrow Wilson reverted to a belief in natural harmony in his economic liberalism. In a familiar way, he argued that if all states acted in their own interests, the whole world would benefit. This form of liberalism promoted a rational approach to socio-economic issues as integral to world order. Wilson and his supporters also argued that global progress was the natural result of liberal economic policies, such as economic non-interventionism. 

Davutoğlu fits the description of a liberal scholar in the current system, in view of his focus on the need for change, reform, and improved justice, in a humanitarian context

However, the Great Depression in 1929 and the mercantilist policies that followed proved the need for a mechanism to regulate the global economy. This international mechanism was needed to facilitate cooperation between states and to ensure every state’s observance of liberal economic rules. This glaring need motivated the USA to intervene on the international stage during the interwar years, and to facilitate the formation of a global order respecting liberal values and the well-being of people around the world. 

The Second World War added motivation for increased international regulation, and shortly following the war, states came together to form stabilizing mechanisms according to liberal ideology. These states agreed to reform their individual national economic structures, and they created international organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank, to promote liberal economic conduct in international economy. The British international hegemony gave way to American supremacy, but the liberal post-war world order remained a system based on Western domination. Yet, in keeping with Westphalian ideology, this world order maintained the importance of national sovereignty and equality. The new UN system designated the world’s 198 states as equal, but it fell short in translating equality and democracy to the international level. This system constitutes liberal internationalism 2.0. 

Version 2.0 was a pragmatic liberalism, as World War II had proven that states must carefully evaluate obstacles to the formation of a stable international liberal order. The war had illuminated economic and political inequalities barring the way to a purely liberal international order. Powerful countries had been benefitting from the existing global political dynamic, whose inequities had masked by the word “liberal.” In post-war years, the growing technological capacity of the Western world intensified these global inequalities in prosperity. Improving telecommunication and transportation capabilities granted the West even greater influence across the world. Soon, thinkers began to question this Western supremacy. Antonio Gramsci’s description of this hegemony was especially critical. He attributed American hegemony to both coercion capacity of the US and consent of the victims of American dominance by accepting dominance of the US. Channeling this sentiment, powers outside of the Western world began to question their subjugation to the system of Western values. This unrest bred backlash movements against the liberal world order, including the post-colonial subaltern studies, the new left, and the religious nationalist reactions. The new perspectives of post-structuralism and post-colonialism mounted a normative criticism of globalization.8 G. John Ikenberry defined this liberal internationalism 3.0 as “a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain.”9

 

The Rise of Radical Liberalism in World Politics

Once liberalism was solidified as the guiding economic ideology, critics of the existing order discussed alternatives within the liberal ideology, and intellectuals began to seek a more liberal form of liberalism. Intellectuals from the left had become active in criticizing the liberal global order for states’ unequal participation in international affairs and for the marginalization of certain people and countries. Critics viewed the liberal international system as a malfunctioning mechanism that widened gaps between developed and underdeveloped countries. They perceived the current system as a mean to perpetuate inequality and injustice. Thus, since the 1960’s, the New Left and “radical liberals” have launched harsh critiques and protests against mainstream liberalism. The Frankfurt School of the 1920’s and 1930’s first introduced “radical democracy,” an influential, new vision for procuring justice, equality, and support for the marginalized. Instead of staging a full-blown revolution, they sought to reform the existing international liberal ideology. 

Radical liberalism owes its intellectual roots to 19th-century European political philosophy. Peter Lichtenstein offers commentary on the heritage of radical liberalism:

[It] shares not only the heritage of classical (laissez-faire) and modern (etatist) liberalism but also the heritage of left wing revolutionary thought. Both of these orientations originate, after all, in a common ideological base supplied by Enlightenment Liberalism. Radical liberalism is therefore an association of two divergent philosophical perspectives, one a “liberal” perspective which seeks to liberate individuals from political and/or economic power, the other a “radical” perspective which seeks to overturn a social order based on privilege and property.10

However, radical liberalism emerged as a modern concept during the American civil rights movement in the 1960’s and 1970’s. New Left thinkers supported the African Americans in their struggle for equal rights, and they promoted a more inclusive liberalism. One of the most influential names in radical liberalism is Arnold Kaufman. He argues that New Left radicalism and modern liberalism were not necessarily in conflict with one another.11 The New Left had to divide its efforts between the promotion of participatory democracy and the formation of a wide coalition, in order to be more effective in its campaign for political equality. Kaufman asserted, “Democratic theorists had to find ways to balance two different demands on a political system: the demand for order and stability, and the demand for participation and spontaneity.”12 The New Left sought to overcome potential threats to stability as it extended civil rights and equal political participation to the full population. At the same time, active citizens might work for the transformation of representative political institutions at the local level. According to Kaufman, “this balanced vision stemmed from the liberal tradition, but a liberal tradition of his own making.”13 

In the interest of upholding the legacy of Islamic civilization, Turkey will take on a significant role in the new world order

In unfolding his argument, Kaufman focuses on John Stuart Mill, Leonard Hobhouse, and John Dewey—all liberal theorists who remained distinct from Karl Marx; J.S. Mill, L. Hobhouse and J. Dewey. He prefers them because they appreciate the damage of capitalist inequalities on democratic values and institutions. Each of them believes in individual rights, the common good, state intervention to protect the public interest, and political participation as a means of educating citizens on the responsibilities of a democracy.14 

As described by Kaufman, radical liberals criticize mainstream liberalism for its theoretical base centered on the individual. He defines that base as “the protection and promotion of each person’s equal opportunity to develop his potentialities as fully as possible,” within the “constraints of civility.”15 Liberals seek to create a “society in which each individual has a roughly equal opportunity to carve out a destiny in conformity with his own nature and deliberative choice.”16 Radical liberals share a number of goals in common with mainstream liberals. They seek to eliminate poverty and racism, to guarantee full employment, to provide adequate housing and medical care, to preserve the environment, and to ensure equal access to higher education. However, radical liberals do not work for these surface goals alone. They aim to reform the entire government system by supporting participatory democracy instead of indirect representative democracy. Thus, they attempt to keep the government in check with direct influence in government decisions for all citizens.17

Kaufman also noted that radical liberals emphasize the need to reevaluate the key concepts of liberalism—individualism, private property, and political democracy. They object to the “contradiction between political democracy which extends human rights, and private property, which abridges human rights.”18 In order to find a solution of this contradictions they emphasize some key concepts to reevaluate. 

 

According to Peter Lichtenstein, radical liberals espouse six propositions that challenge traditional liberal concepts: 

 

1. Pluralism:19 The autonomous and voluntary associations of people, “in which political and economic power are equally shared; a society made up multiple centers of power and coalition of peoples with diverse interests.”20

2. Developmental Individualism: Individualism distinct from possessive individualism, based on the argument for “human essence not as a consumption of utilities but as the active exertion and development of individual potentialities.”21

3. Solidarity: A concept similar to the “fraternity” slogan of the French Revolution, and “it implies that we are all in the same boat and must travel in the same direction without leaving anyone behind. It contains sentiments of anti authoritarianism, and is fundamentally opposed to systems of meritocracy and hierarchy… If everybody is to be free, everybody must be equally free. My liberty must be consistent with the liberty of others. If some are less privileged, they are also unfree to that extent. Without human solidarity, inequality and unfreedom would immediately reappear… solidarity nukes freedom and equality possible”22.

4. Egalitarianism: Opposition to all social privilege and social oppression, and the search for a future in which all individuals are “equally free.”

5. Participatory Democracy: The direct participation of individuals in decision making in all spheres of social life, not by representative mechanisms.

6. Social Transformation: A belief in both the goal of modern liberalism and the need for change in itself. For radical liberals, emancipating people from the bondages of tradition and liberating their creative potential is of the upmost importance. Egalitarianism, solidarity, democracy, and developmentalism are all necessary pieces for this emancipation.23 These principles frame freedom, equality, democracy, and justice in a pluralist understanding, developed in the context of post-modernity instead of modernist explanations for social happenings in a single way. According to Anthony Giddens, “The post-modern outlook has a different ontological perspective and sees a plurality of heterogeneous claims to knowledge.”24 Post-modern outlook seeks to use science to define single explanations for occurrences in life.

 

The significance of the post-modern perspective is its discussion of various subjects and its contributions to their evolution. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, postmodernists began to debate cultural and religious values in the context of political equality and freedom, and they revitalized human rights discussions. Even more so after the Cold War’s end, post-modernity mounted a serious challenge to traditional liberalism. Their emphasis on cultural values and religious beliefs lent to further evolution of liberal values. 

In addition, alternative models of economic success and development, as seen in China and Brazil, challenged the internationally preeminent Western liberal values. This challenge introduced new considerations for the formation of a post-Cold War world order. In the 2000’s, emergent global powers became increasingly vocal in their demands for a stronger position in international system. In view of this tension, the US sought reform to the global order that would appease subjugated countries without diminishing its power. A clear example of this American perspective, John Ikenberry warned of a mounting crisis to the liberal world order—the very order responsible for America’s international supremacy.25

In this effort to integrate Turkish values with those of the international community, Ahmet Davutoğlu played a major role as a leading thinker in Turkish foreign policy

The argument for significant change to the international order continued under these tense conditions. Political scientist Robert Cox evaluated the possibility of an overhaul of the world’s current political order, asserting, “The contradictions and conflicts that arise within any established structure create the opportunity for its transformation into a new structure. This is the simplest model of historical change.”26 The victims of the current liberal order express these contradictions and conflicts between the international reality and liberalism’s core values. For example, at the World Social Forum in 2001, the global justice movement aired its frustration with these inconsistencies, and emphasized with a rallying cry, “Another world is possible.” 

In search of “another world,” the United Nation’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released its report in December 2004, addressing international problems in an intellectual framework. The report appealed for reformation to the liberal world order, and it had three complementary themes: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and the right to live in dignity through the rule of law, the concept of Responsibility to Protect, and full respect for human rights. To achieve this vision a program of reform was prepared for the management processes and institutions of the United Nations.27 This suggestion for international reform opened a “battle ground,” and the 2005 UN Summit produced few results satisfactory for anyone. 

This was not the first attempt for reform to the UN. Kofi Annan himself, he then UN Secretary-General, promoted reform and supported the agenda prepared by Maurice Strong in his 1997 paper, “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform.” However, this ambitious project was unsuccessful in producing real change. Maurice Strong explained the impediments to his project, saying, “[T]he concept of national sovereignty has been immutable, indeed a sacred principle of international relations… What is needed is recognition of the reality that … it is simply not feasible for sovereignty to be exercised unilaterally by individual nation-states, however powerful.”28 Reform attempts to the UN’s institutional structure, especially to the UN Security Council, have also experienced serious difficulties. In discussion, UN representatives argued over two reformed institutional models. Model A offered increases in both the permanent and non-permanent membership categories, and Model B suggested an increase in only non-permanent members. India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and other countries –“Uniting for Consensus”– had long opposed preferential permanent membership category created by the post-World War II order. Thus, they supported variations of Model B, in hopes of counteracting the UN hierarchy.29 During discussions, these countries’ did not hide their hostility towards the US, arguably the current structure’s greatest beneficiary.30 

Davutoğlu suggests that the US, as leader of the current global system, should rally other countries around new philosophical reform

Critics harp on the UN’s policies on impunity, disarmament, and the International Criminal Court, but they regard its stance on nations’ responsibility to protect as especially weak. However, the international community does appear able to agree upon a normative framework to correct this problem. Countries have designed global institutions in a centralized, nation-state style, with the protection of their national interests in mind. However, these institutions must operate with a global mindset in order to confront global challenges. The UN must establish a consensus for a normative framework favoring comprehensive global governance that works more than the individual nation interest. 

New liberal ideas about domestic order are critical in considering justice in a system of global governance. Left-wing radical democracy and post-colonial subaltern studies offer a nuanced, comprehensive view of a cosmopolitan world. According to these approaches, development is a matter for global security, and the international community -namely globality- is responsible for finding a solution. As development has become a priority in the global agenda, liberalism has transformed to account for it. Radical liberalism emerged from this adaptation of liberal values to a new set of ideas and problems. For example, radical liberals have questioned the role of the state in the domestic market according to liberal principles of fairness. They argue that the government may not intervene in the distribution of the wealth, but they must find a way to help poor. Tangentially, radical liberals think that global institutions should exist to improve human security and to protect human rights.

Klaus Schwab, the chairman and founder of the World Economic Forum in 2006, provides insightful analysis of the current challenge to the liberal order. He argues that the world urgently needs a better understanding of global interdependence. In his view, reform efforts have only solidified the current order and protected the national interests of powerful countries. Schwab argues reforms must instead foster a true global trusteeship.31 He promotes “planetization,” defined as the mobilization of universal cooperation in the service of world governance.32 However, the ineffectiveness of UN reforms impedes the realization of this idealistic perspective. 

The entrenched focus of all states on national interests also stands in the way of such cosmopolitan ideas. As Hellena de Bress asserts, the cosmopolitan understanding emphasizes the need for a single set of fundamental norms of justice applies to all individuals, regardless of citizenship. 33 “Cosmopolitans generally conclude that we should be concerned about inequality, fairness and poverty as a matter of justice internationally, just as we have traditionally been concerned about such things as a matter of justice domestically. The statist, by contrast, denies that any norms of distributive justice apply across the borders of states or nations.”34 Cosmopolitanism centers on democracy and legitimacy, and to this end, cosmopolitan reformers of the international system seek to create of “concert of democracies”35 instead of alliance system against security challenges arose with globalization. They hope nations will rally around democratic values and provide a representation of individuals. Thus people work for solutions to global problems. 

These efforts to create a political consensus on global norms of politics reflect efforts by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas to form a rational consensus in place of the problematic modus vivendi. Both philosophers promote international cooperation and consensus as the guarantee of liberal democratic institutions. While Rawls viewed justice as the cornerstone for such a consensus, Habermas emphasized the legitimacy. Rawls espoused the concept of justice as fairness, based upon stability and citizens’ approval of established institutions. On the other hand, Habermas asserted that a consensus could be built upon the legitimacy of an impartial democratic system that values the interests of all citizens equally. The success of the institutions of complex democratic societies hinges upon free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern. In this vein, deliberative democracies operate on a rationale based on communication and free popular reason, not on the promotion of self interest. 36 

The manipulation of knowledge and language plays a significant role in this theoretical conversation. Public discourse is central to the construction of reality. Belgian theorist Chantal Mouffe criticizes the manipulation of language and ethics, claiming that deliberative democracy focuses too heavily on morality and does not recognize the realities of politics. She asserts, “If we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic values.”37 

All of these arguments contribute to the formation of a new phase in human history, governed by pluralistic perspectives for a cosmopolitan world. Proponents of this new world order promote respect to differences instead of international recognition of a universally unified principles to protect individual freedoms. There are many threads of this movement. For example, Robert W. Cox explains the current state of world politics as post-hegemony, post-globalization and post-Westphalia. According to Cox, the developing world order has departed from traditional Western values for a new political agenda concerned with humanity as a whole. Under this new agenda, individual states have changing roles in view of a developing political solidarities and eroding sovereignty understanding.38 Cox founds his analysis on an assumption of historical change in world politics. The post-hegemonic dynamic forces the West to understand the “Rest” in their own term and to reevaluate its relations with them. Reformers seek to establish not only mutual recognition between all actors, but alsoto develop a supra-inter-subjectivity “that would provide a bridge among the distinct separate subjectivities of the different coexisting traditions of civilization”39

 

 

Consistencies and Contradictions between Davutoğlu and Radical Liberalism

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) emerged the majority party in the general elections. For an Islamist, conservative right-wing party, JDP has many liberal qualities and has served as a continuation of previous liberal movements, including that of Turgut Özal. Former President Özal is well known for his liberal economic reforms in Turkey. Carrying on this legacy, the JDP discourse in politics has been dominated by the concepts such as equality, republicanism, and parliamentarianism. JDP leaders attribute a relationship between governing elites and Western hegemony. They protest the entrenched top-down style of government, which subjects the Turkish masses to the will of a small political elite, and often to foreign influence. 

In its campaign against the supremacy of the secular elites, the party has organized a framework of values, similar to those of opposition groups in the world politics. The JDP has pushed for increased political representation for Turkey’s religious masses, arguing the importance of religious values and respect to for democracy. The JDP has sought to reform national political values according to the beliefs of the Turkish masses—strong beliefs in Islam and a different definition of Turkish identity. In this spirit, these political reformers introduced a new vision for Turkey as a representative Islamic civilization with secular democratic framework. 

NATO attendees hold a meeting on the second day of the NATO 2014 Summit, on September 5, 2014. NATO leaders are expected to announce a raft of fresh sanctions against Russia on Friday over its actions in Ukraine, although hopes remain that a ceasefire can be forged at peace talks in Minsk on the same day. AFP / Saul LoebNATO attendees hold a meeting on the second day of the NATO 2014 Summit, on September 5, 2014. NATO leaders are expected to announce a raft of fresh sanctions against Russia on Friday over its actions in Ukraine, although hopes remain that a ceasefire can be forged at peace talks in Minsk on the same day. | AFP / Saul Loeb

Under this new definition, Turkey no longer serves as a bridge between Western countries and Middle Eastern and Asiatic countries, and instead acts as center in itself. The country aims to play a significant role in the construction of the new world order, according to justice, freedom, and human rights. In order to promote these qualities, the JDP fixates on promoting great reforms. In the definition of the Turkey’s new identity and new global role, the party reflects on history of Turkey as it considers reform to international standards. 

The JDP unifies Islamic values and Turkish national culture in its vision of a new country.40 Party leaders describe the Ottoman Empire as the highest form of Islamic civilization in history, and they bestow upon Turkey the duty of upholding this legacy. In the interest of upholding the legacy of Islamic civilization, Turkey will take on a significant role in the new world order. The JDP has developed a foreign policy stance criticizing the modern view of world affairs, which describes a global system based on a diversity of interests and opinions between higher and lower sources of solidarities. Their ideas have sparked intellectual discussions in the international community, and they have found parallels with radical liberal discourse. For example, Abdullah Gül states, “Turkey is in a position to be an intermediary that can promote universal values shared with the West, such as democracy, human rights, the supremacy of the law and a market economy in the region.” 41

In this effort to integrate Turkish values with those of the international community, Ahmet Davutoğlu played a major role as a leading thinker in Turkish foreign policy. Beginning in 2002, Davutoğlu began serving as a foreign policy advisor, until he became Turkish Foreign Minister in 2009. Due to his background in academia, his terminology when discussing international relations varies from that of the average politician. He often receives criticism for being overly theoretical. Yet, he has a deep knowledge of the subject matter, and he applies academic concepts to form policy for real world situations. In view of his education and insight, Davutoğlu offers discourse more thought-provoking than any other Turkish politician in recent history. 

From one point of view, Davutoğlu’s ideas about world politics fit the mold of radical liberalism. He frequently references central liberal principles, including multilateralism, human rights, and pluralism. Davutoğlu observes a transforming system of world politics, and he has reorganized the Turkish Foreign Ministry with respect to this new dynamic.42 He also reflects the liberal agenda in his attention to global threats and to opportunities for global humanitarianism. 

On the other hand, Davutoğlu’s references to Ottoman legacy and its Islamic affiliations do not promote liberal attitudes. He links Turkey’s identity to its distinctive history and geographical location, and he attributes the country’s potential as a dynamic regional and global actor to these two factors.43 He criticizes Turkey’s traditional foreign policy stance as having barred the country from claiming a stronger international position. Davutoğlu frequently discusses world politics in terms of paradigmatic shifts, and he focuses especially on the crises of the post-WWII liberal world order and the resulting challenges for other civilizations including the Islam.44 

 

Davutoğlu has set the new agenda for Turkish foreign policy:

 

…in nine years Turkey has experienced a revolution in foreign policy mindset.… even the university youth of 60’s 70’s in Turkey had different ideological perspectives, all we had a dream to have a much different Turkey and much different world. What lies at the root of search of a different Turkey was independent, dignified country which pays its way. Both leftists or Islamists had such a dream…some called the dream as Great East, some says fully independent Turkey and the other called as Great Turkey as a part of their conceptualization. And for Turkey, our dream was creation of an order based on equality and justice and against repression, exploitation, imposition. Now we try to make these two dreams real.45 

 

His explanations about Turkish foreign policy underline the need for another role and identity for Turkey different than the role during the Cold War years. In addition, he defines his reformative perspective in harmony with intellectual accumulation of Turkish political life. Additionally, he defines he mentions universal moral framework by underlining importance of equality and justice that are important in radical liberal literature, too.

As discussed earlier, Peter Lichtenstein has identified the six key principles of radical liberals with relation to globalized world politics. An analysis of each of his principles helps to illuminate Davutoğlu’s relationship to radical liberalism.

 

Pluralism: From Davutoğlu’s viewpoint, pluralism is essential for the recognition of different beliefs and respectful coexistence. The international community must embrace pluralism in order to create global solidarity for the common good of humanity. In this vein, Davutoğlu argues, “Over time, the presentation of the Muslim world as a potential enemy has also resulted in encouraging oppressive political tendencies in Muslim countries for the sake of preserving Western interests and thus exempting the Muslim world from enjoying the universality of democratic values.”46 This observation demonstrates Davutoğlu’s desire for equality throughout the world, and his emphasis on pluralism in order to elevate the victims of the global order. According to the Frankfurt School, radical democracy seeks participation and representation at every level of administration, in order to improve the world order and to rectify the problems of disadvantaged groups. Radical democracy supporters call for the UN to promote reforms for equal representation between nations, in the manner of a global parliament. In this way, underprivileged countries would achieve an international voice with which to improve their well-being. This line of thinking embodies the search for a more liberal liberalism, and Davutoğlu frequently expresses his support for similar reforms to the UN system. In addition, Prime Minister Erdoğan regularly criticizes the organization of the UN Security Council as violating democratic ideals.

Davutoğlu blames nationalism with the destruction of unity between different ethnicities, and he criticizes artificiality of national barriers

Supporters of pluralism demands respect for different cultures and different ideologies, and they seek to restructure the world order according to this principle. This new order would also operate on a more cosmopolitan set of values. It would support equal representation and radical democracy in order to permit disadvantaged groups to express their views in the formation of new global humanitarian values. From a similar viewpoint, Davutoğlu criticizes the current world order, centered on modernity and Western values, as a crisis.47 An ideology preferential of the West, modernity emerged as a European phenomenon, and continued to prosper in America. However, as the concept spread to other parts of the world, especially the new economic centers of Hong Kong and Singapore, it began to lose its Western meaning. Thus, globalization overturned the traditional ideology of modernity, and brought about a search for a new definition. Post-modernism emerged in this vacuum, assuming the existence of opinions at a local level as the base of pluralism. However, Davutoğlu argues that post-modernity is a cynical reaction, incapable of producing a productive world order. He suggests the new world order must go further than pluralism, and he believes that a post-modern new world order would lead only to despotism. 

Despite the conservative reputation of pan-Ottomanism, Davutoğlu expresses his desire for a broad, cosmopolitan cultural framework based on multilateralism

Davutoğlu believes the creation of a common normative framework will establish improved global trusteeship, communication, and the resulting collaboration with multilateralism will bring about solutions to world problems. In this way, Davutoğlu’s perspective appears highly similar to Habermas’ consensus concept. Like Habermas, he supports the creation of global norms to promote consensus between different civilizations and value systems. They both view multilateralism as the solution to global disorder. 

Davutoğlu suggests that the US, as leader of the current global system, should rally other countries around new philosophical reform. He argues that the traditionally Western order is no longer Western, but cosmopolitan. In view of this transition, the world order faces the issue of internalization of cosmopolitan values by all actors. Assuming that the US cooperates with reform and supports the representation of all countries, the global system will survive with necessary changes. 

According to Davutoğlu, the new global norms should be universal and respectful of the values of all civilizations, and not only the West. This perspective is related with feeling as a part of either of the Eastern and Islamic world. In many of their speeches, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu have mentioned civilization as an essential part of Turkish political identity. In the definition of this particular civilization they have emphasized the importance of Islamic values. 

For this purpose, Davutoğlu espouses a cosmopolitan understanding from pluralist perspective of Islam. He argues that Muslims must play an important role in the recreation of the world consensus, and that Islamic values should be represented in the new around a common normative framework. He asserts, “It is not important to create concepts which are meaningful only in their own world, but it is important to create reflection of these concepts outside of it.”48 The United Nations Alliance of Civilization (UNAOC) initiative serves as a good example of this sentiment. Turkey and Spain serve as co-chairs of the UNAOC, and Davutoğlu welcomes this responsibility as a way to raise the level of international tolerance and mutual understanding.49

Although these foreign policy ideas might be circuitous for Turkey’s national interests, Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of these reforms for Turkey’s global position for the future. He argues that the upheaval of the entrenched world order brought a historical change and inevitably improvements. As an example, the ruling nationalist ideology of nations across the globe stands out to him as an issue requiring major reform because it is unable to solve new domestic and global sociopolitical problems. From an ontological perspective, Davutoğlu questions the international standard of the nation-state and its social structures. Therefore, his perspective is similar with new medievalism notion of Hedley Bull with references to rising overlapping authorities, multiple loyalties and universalistic claims as challenges of globalization. 50 Davutoğlu blames nationalism with the destruction of unity between different ethnicities, and he criticizes artificiality of national barriers.51 He believes in a natural togetherness of the people in Turkey’s region, and he sees the current disorder under nationalism as unnatural, and thus temporary. He predicts departure from the current nationalist dynamic in the near future.

As mentioned earlier, Davutoğlu frequently references the Ottoman past as an essential piece of Turkey’s identity. For this reason, he receives criticism for having a retrospective view of historical change and an unrealistic vision for pax ottomanica. In actuality, in order to explain the current search for a new world order, he refers to Arab Muslim historiographer Ibn Haldun’s idea of cyclical historical change of civilizations, an alternative to the linear understanding of history. From this angle, Davutoğlu argues that Western civilization has begun another decline, while the East has entered an upswing. He believes that over time the world changes for the benefit of less powerful people, as Ibn Haldun asserts in his assabiyya concept. Davutoğlu refers to the ex-Ottoman territories as belonging to a common culture on the rise, with Turkey as its center. These beliefs fall under the so called neo-Ottomanism. In defense of his beliefs, Davutoğlu responds to his critics with explanations of expanded identity in terms of regional realities: 

I have dreamed to bring Bosniac and Serbian Ministers together in the Balkans; to bring the groups in conflict together who are the members of the same cultural basin; to help oppressed people of the underdeveloped countries who live in problem of hunger and many difficulties.….when we realized Summit of the Least Developed Countries last year, when we went to Somalia and Arakan to embrace with the victims, we were acting for the same dream of justice for all humanity. When we opened Embassies in Central and South Africa, Latin America and East Asia which have never been under the Ottoman rule we neglected them as missing link for realizing our dreams for our country. If they describe all these ideals as Neo-Ottomanism, this is their opinion, not mine.52

Despite the conservative reputation of pan-Ottomanism, Davutoğlu expresses his desire for a broad, cosmopolitan cultural framework based on multilateralism. This sentiment aligns him with radical liberalism. He solidifies his liberal ties in his efforts to engage with the global order by encouraging reform and transformation. He also espouses a cosmopolitan view more than pluralistic one that encouraging only respect and coexistence with respect to cultural and ideological differences. He refers also need to promote global normative understanding as a common set of values of all humanity. Thus, despite his references to Islam, Davutoğlu does not fit the mold of conservatism and radical Islamism, because he underline need to communicate and collaborate for cosmopolitan future.

 

Developmental Individualism: “Human” is the central word to Davutoğlu’s explanation of world politics in the context of Islam. In his eyes, human dignity has the upmost importance, and the individual cannot be regarded only as a subject to global and national administration. Davutoğlu has described the culture of individualistic consumption as a disgrace to humanity. He believes that social mechanisms should have a foundation in an accepted set of values representative of nature of the human being.53 He once said, “human nature is not based on the consumption of utilities, but on the development of personal potential.”54 Intellectuals and political actors must arrange a global framework with recognition of these qualities of humanity. Just like modern liberals, Davutoğlu views the human mind and capacity as the cornerstone for designing the world’s political future. In view of these liberal ideas, he appears to align with Richard Falk and those behind World Orders Model Project (WOMP), who work to design a model of world governance for a fair world in order. Similarly to Davutoğlu, Falk promotes bottom-up globalization and global reforms for world governance fora just world order—ideas central to developmental individualism.55 

 

Solidarity: Since the globalization in world politics, international threats and exchanges have proven that a country’s isolation from the rest of the world is impossible. In view of this reality, all people face the same uncertainty, and 
they must work with one another for the benefit of the others, and themselves. As Peter Singer asserts, well-being and welfare of everyone is a crucial matter for the peace and security on the earth. This perspective encourages a global community based on the values of freedom, equality, justice/fairness. In Turkey, references to solidarity as a concept differs from that of radical liberalism, as Turkish officials frequently uses solidarity term in the context of cooperation and collaboration in bilateral relations for specific purposes. However, without using the term of solidarity, they refer equality, justice, human rights and freedom as crucial elements for global cooperation especially about Palestinian question. In their considerations of this instance of global division, Turkish officials regularly refer to inequality and injustice in Palestine as a major impediment to peace in the Middle East.56

Turkish foreign policy officials frequently blame the liberal establishment for rising global economic inequality and inability of the liberal institutions to find a solution

However, Turkish foreign policy officials frequently blame the liberal establishment for rising global economic inequality and inability of the liberal institutions to find a solution. As it is in the case of starvation in Somalia, international community could not be organized to help starving children. In one effort to counteract this inability, the Turkish government intervened in the Somali crisis, in keeping with Kantian ethics, help just because they are human. In addition, prominent JDP leaders have frequently accused the Western world of not adopting the Rawlsian view of justice as fairness. Turkish officials assert that helping the victims of poverty is an obligation, promoting subaltern and post-colonial perspectives, and fairness at a very basic level. From this view, there is need for a global governance work to balance the inequalities resulting from Rawls’ ideas. 

The Platform of the Least Developed Countries offers another view of these issues of inequality.57 Although the platform does not stress the same concept of solidarity verbatim, it considers international problems of stagnated development and economic inequality as related to global disunity. The Turkish Foreign Ministry takes the issue of terrorism very seriously, and it views terrorism as an extension of this polarization and inequality of development.58 The Turkish government considers the concept of human security a matter of upmost importance for international attention. Specifically, Turkish officials urge coordinated, international action in response to terrorism, poverty, climate change, internet freedom, and nuclear proliferation.59 In order to find solutions to such issues, and to promote sustainable development, the international community must sustain a dialogue on peace, security, democracy, human rights, multilateralism, and diplomacy. Therefore, Davutoğlu urges the international community to work together on a basis of solidarity.60 He and other Turkish officials call for a system of international and regional multilateralism, based on an established set of values, in order to encourage common action. As such, Turkey adopted the Charter of the Organization, which seeks to establish solidarity and cooperation among Islamic States in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and social spheres.61 

 

Egalitarianism: Egalitarianism is essential for freedom and equality. In this spirit, Davutoğlu says, “For me, an egalitarian, participatory, and synthesizing world order is the only viable answer in overcoming the current global challenges.”62 He emphasizes his faith in the power of egalitarianism between different states and cultures. 

 

The Muslim peoples have experienced many difficulties, and the JDP views egalitarianism as the natural step to counteract the human rights violations against them, which were most prevalent immediately following 9/11. Davutoğlu believes that Turkey has the greatest potential to represent Islamic civilization and values on the world stage. He frequently refers to Islamic literature in terms of human rights and equality, and he sees the existing definition of human rights as consistent with, and essential to, Islamic values. Thus, the JDP relies on law-governed regimes and liberties, just as radical liberals do. Davutoğlu goes further to analyze Turkey as a country egalitarian in its legislative order, but falling short in its stance of women rights.63 

In search of a consensus, JDP leaders have promoted the establishment of a global value system, combining the Western values with the values of other groups, such as the Muslims

The Turkish judicial system has run into many problems of equality and justice. Even leading political figures have noted Turkish law’s troubling inequality with reference to political and ideological affiliations. Turkish law is also lacking in its protection of individual rights, especially those of minorities. The JDP takes issue with these shortcomings in egalitarianism. Party members accept individualism as a liberal way of promoting liberty, and they view it as an important Islamic value, especially in the promotion of solidarity. However, they have problems about egalitarianism for minority opposition groups. 

Leaders of the JDP frequently speak out against the minority’s domination of the majority in Turkey. In this spirit, they characterize their party as a transformative political movement for the common people of Turkey, who by and large support the JDP. The JDP calls for a resurgence of the social majority’s conscience and respect for social values, in order to form a foundation for improved democracy within the country. In this way, the party supports the individual rights of the majority. Additionally, the JDP government enacted changes in the property rights of religious minorities as in took away during the previous governments. On the other hand the toleration of opposition groups can be problematic, as they sometimes pose a threat to national order and well-being according to the JDP. In Turkish political culture, there exists a negative connotation to opposition groups, and the Turkish conservative tradition prefers the protection of the majority to that of the individual. Radical democrats would not view this tendency as egalitarian, and even classical liberalism would find objection. 

 

Participatory democracy: Supporters of participatory democracy call for direct participation of individuals in decision-making mechanisms at all levels. They see the existence of parliamentary government and universal suffrage as insufficient. These radical democrats believe in participation beyond the classical democratic representation mechanisms, and they place an emphasis on local government and civil society initiatives. They promote a more developed form of representation with expanded political rights and freedoms. 

 

In the case of JDP and Davutoğlu, free parliamentary elections and people’s representation through political parties are the core of democracy. While radical democracy asks something more, in the JDP view, the stability and order of democracy depends upon the representation of the majority as the source of legitimacy. In discussions about the Arab Spring, the Turkish government emphasizes that freedom and democracy depend on the establishment of free elections and representative government, in place of elitist systems. According to Davutoğlu, Arab states have shown that stability is meaningless in the absence of a social legitimacy based on the rule of law, human rights, transparency, accountability, and equality.64 He asserts the need for reform in Arab governments to accommodate the aspirations of its citizens, in order to promote regional security and stability. In view of these ideas, JDP sympathizers view the party as a government for the masses, instead of select elites. The party also emphasizes the need to incorporate popular Islamic groups and structures as part of a government’s democratic system. Still, Davutoğlu maintains his support for an improved liberal order based on equality and liberty. For this reason, he labeled the Arab Spring as a time of true “spring” and “change.” However, he cautions against formulaic solutions, “Change and dynamics differ from one country to the other. Therefore, a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot be applied to the countries in transition.”65

These ideas promote the freedom of the masses and protection from authoritarianism. Radical liberals differ from Davutoğlu and the JDP in their insistence on the representation of all individuals, even minority opposition groups. 

 

Social transformation: Every human being has the potential to change himself and his environment—a belief at the core of social constructivism. In order to have such an effect, people must have the benefit of freedom, based on egalitarianism, solidarity, democracy, and developmentalism. In this context, Davutoğlu and the Foreign Ministry emphasize the issue of underdevelopment in the third world and the need for reform in effected countries. He asserts the responsibility of developed countries to find solutions to the localized problems of underprivileged countries. He claims that these local difficulties pose threats to peace for the entire world. In this spirit, President Abdullah Gül promoted social transformation as an essential concept for confronting problems in Africa. The president claimed, “The international community has a responsibility to contribute to the democratic, economic and social transformation processes of African countries, and Turkey has made a great effort to provide such support.”66

 

 

Conclusion

In the new millennium, change and reform have emerged as two preeminent concepts in Turkish political discourse. Turkish thinkers have emphasized the importance of democracy and human rights as the foundation of legitimate political activities. For a long time, left-wing movements have referred to equality and justice as two critical concepts for the promotion of a comprehensive democratic consensus. These two concepts have a central role in neo-liberal discourse about the future liberal order. 

Liberal ideas progressed with the communication revolution that emphasized by the Frankfurt School raised important questions about reform for a more just world order through more participation and negotiation. These consideration of the world order have dominated the discourse of both radical liberalism and Davutoğlu’s Islamic view. Both perspectives include this focus on the world stage in hopes of establishing an improved power distribution and global justice, on the basis of human rights. Although total equality is a very ambitious goal, global cooperation should be able to establish fairness as a central part of the political order. This fervor for freedom, democracy, and justice has been at the core of radical liberalism’s emergence in world politics. Assistance to underdeveloped countries has become an especially important idea for the protection of global order and security. 

Taking part in this effort, Turkey has pushed for an improved world order through diplomacy and multilateralism. Diverging from radical liberalism, Turkish leaders imagine a world order based on an ideological perspective including Islamist and conservative ideas. Turkey speaks for the interests of Muslim people, especially those who have been victimized. In search of a consensus, JDP leaders have promoted the establishment of a global value system, combining the Western values with the values of other groups, such as the Muslims. 

Davutoğlu’s foreign policy ideology has both consistencies and contradictions with radical liberalism, and he does not qualify as a pure radical liberal. On one hand, he has starkly liberal tendencies. He promotes reform in world politics, and he questions the current global order for its concert of democracies, in place of true liberalism. His foreign policy perspective includes new ideas belonging to Liberal Internationalism 3.0, and he has introduced several radical liberal ideas into international discussion. Thus, his ideas for change differ from the views of Turgut Özal with parallels to radical liberalism. As a representative of Turkey, Davutoğlu aspires to play a prominent role in the formation of a new global order and consensus. While there remain continuities with the previous Turkish foreign policy stance, including the attention to national interests and rationalism, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has redefined Turkish olicy with a complex blend of radical liberalism and conservative Islamism. 

 

 

Endnotes

  1. Bentham’s utilitarianism resulted in the liberal idea of a law-governed order. For more information, please see Alan Wolfe, Future of Liberalism, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), p.49. 
  2. Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 94.
  3. Ibid. 25.
  4. Ibid. 
  5. Ibid.
  6. Especially, modern liberals such as John Stuard Mill says that, “man as a progressive being” has capacity to develop itself. Ibid.
  7. Tim Dunne, “Liberalism”, John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (Ed.), The Globalization of World Politics, (New York: Oxford, 2011), p. 105.
  8. It is important to explain briefly the relationship of post-structuralism and radical liberalism. Post-structuralism is more related with ontological discussions and the shift to post-positivist way of thinking. On the other hand, radical liberal principles are updated versions of liberal principles with a post-structuralist basis.
  9. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of the Liberal World Order”, Perspectives on Politics vol. 7 issue 1 (March 2009), p.71. 
  10. Peter L. Lichtenstein, “Some Theoretical Coordinates of Radical Liberalism”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology vol 43 no.3, (July, 1984), p. 334
  11. Kevin Matson, Intellectuals in Action- The Origins of New Left and Radical Liberalism (1945-1970), (Pensylvania: The Pensylvania State University, 2002), p. 211.
  12. Ibid. 
  13. Ibid. p.212.
  14. Ibid. 
  15. Ibid, p.213.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Peter L. Lichtenstein, op.cit.. p. 333.
  19. Macpherson defines pluralism as “individualism writ large.”, P.L.Lichtenstein’s reference to Crawford Brought Macpherson, Ibid. p.337.
  20. Ibid.
  21. Ibid. 
  22. P.L.Lichtenstein’s reference to Horvat. Ibid. p. 338.
  23. Ibid. p. 339
  24. Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p.2.
  25. John Ikenberry, “Crisis of the Old Order”, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Tramsformation of the American World Order, Princeton University Press, 2012, http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9410.pdf , p. 11.
  26. Robert W. Cox, “Toward a Post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Haldun”, Approaches to World Order, (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 146. 
  27. Ferry de Kerckhove, “Multilateralism on Trial: From the 2005 UN Summit to Today’s Reality”, Alan S. Alexandroff (Ed.), Can the World be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism, (Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), p.199.
  28. Ibid. Please see Maurice Strong’s website, http://www.mauricestrong.net/index.php/renewing-the-
    united-nations 
  29. Ibid., p.200.
  30. Ibid., p. 202.
  31. Ibid., pp. 235-236. 
  32. Ibid.
  33. Hellena de Bress, “The Many not the Few: Pluralism about Global Distributive Justice”, The Journal of Political Philosophy vol.20 no.3 (2012), p. 314. 
  34. Ibid.
  35. For more information about the “concert of democracies,” see Ikenberry and Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, “Democracies of the World Unite,” The American Interest (January-February 2007).
  36. Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism”, Political Science Series 72, December 2000, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, pp.9-10. http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf 
  37. Ibid. p.14.
  38. Robert W. Cox, op.cit., p. 
  39. Ibid., p. 152.
  40. It is tightly connected to Turkish-Islam Synthesis which is defined by Mustafa Şen, as “the idea of return to the Turkish ‘national culture’ which is seen as a product of the synthesis between Turkishness and Islam” , Mustafa Şen,“Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of Justice and Development Party”, Turkish Studies Vol.11 no.1, (March 2010) p.62.
  41. Martina Warning and Tuncay Kardaş, “The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, Alternatives vol.10 no.2 (summer-fall 2011), p.151.
  42. His explanations at UN summits and his argumentations in his master peace Strategic Depth are full of expressions about this sort of historical change. 
  43. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. 
  44. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım, pp. 6-7.
  45. An interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2012. http://www.haber7.com/dis-politika/haber/925601-
    Davutoğlu-ulusculukla-hesaplasma-zamani 
  46. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
  47. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım– 11 Eylül Konuşmaları, (Istanbul: Kure, 2002), p. 49-51.
  48. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım., p. 129.
  49. http://www.unaoc.org/about/group-of-friends; http://www.mfa.gov.tr/medeniyetler-ittifaki-bakanlar-toplantisi-new-york_ta-duzenlendi.tr.mfa 
  50. For more information please see Jörg Friedrichs, “The Meaning of New Medievalism”, European Journal of International Relations, December 2001 vol.7 no.4, pp 475-501. 
  51. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/medeniyetler-ittifaki-bakanlar-toplantisi-new-york_ta-duzenlendi.tr.mfa 
  52. Ibid.
  53. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım…, s. 8.
  54. Ibid. 
  55. For more information please look at Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward A Global Politics, (Pensylvania State University, 1995). 
  56. “Turkey is determined to continue to support the Palestinian cause and to stand in solidarity with the brotherly Palestinian people”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/international-day-of-solidarity-with-the-palestinian-people.en.mfa. Another example is during the 2014 international year of solidarity with Palestine , http://www.chicago.cg.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=201659
  57. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa
  58. http://cakarta.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=116379 and http://www.mfa.gov.tr/building-up-of-international-solidarity.en.mfa 
  59. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-entitled-_trilateral-solidarity-for.en.mfa
  60. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/addressing-the-un-general-assembly-foreign-minister-Davutoğlu-urged-the-international-community-to-act-in-unity-and-solidarity.en.mfa 
  61. For example, “Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), held in Jeddah on 29 February-4 March 1972 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-islamic-conference--_oic_.en.mfa 
  62. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa 
  63. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/un-millennium-development-goals-_mdgs_-andthe-performance-of-turkey.tr.mfa 
  64. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
  65. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa
  66. http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/somalicmbbasin.en.mfa

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