Introduction
The Middle East is known as a conflict-ridden region. In such a highly tense environment, the spread of nuclear weapons is an expected result if non-proliferation measures and instruments fail. This is why, before the 12 Day War, the atmosphere in the region tended towards the worst-case scenario: proliferation of nuclear weapons. Before the October 7 attacks it is widely accepted that Iran had almost reached the level of nuclear threshold. According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran is the only country without a nuclear program to enrich uranium to 60 percent- close to the 90 percent level required for a bomb. It was thought that this status, being a nuclear threshold state, by itself generates deterrence. Tehran has also engaged in fierce security and power competition with Israel, a non-NPT nuclear weapon state, since the October 7 attacks. This security competition made Iran’s forward defense capabilities crippled, hence in terms of deterrence Iran appeared to thinking more seriously about weaponizing its nuclear program if its nuclear threshold position would not produce the intended bargaining power for Tehran.
Before the 12 Day War, there were also other nuclear hopeful states in the region. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of them. Saudi Arabia, as is well known, has been pushing for years to pursue its own uranium enrichment. Riyad has asked for U.S. approval of its civilian nuclear program that involves uranium enrichment, and for the ability to purchase sophisticated weaponry from Washington. In return, the Biden Administration has made this conditional upon accomplishing a normalization deal between Riyad and Israel.1 Nuclear hopeful states have been considered as swing states, capable of leading both stabilization and de-stabilization of the region and occasionally emerging as rivals of both Iran and Israel. Developments since the October 7 attack have led to a radical change in the normalization processes, which took place between those nuclear hopeful states, Iran, and Israel, and triggered a return to the security dilemma logic for the states of the region. As a result, for example, Qatar was hit by both Iran and Israel, though neither Tehran nor Tel Aviv directly targeted Doha itself. Strikes against Qatar have once more brought the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence into question. Within these circumstances, the U.S. must calculate the future preferences of regional actors, more specifically whether or not they are nuclear hopeful states. Regional actors may take radical decisions related to developing their own deterrence capabilities unless the U.S. either strengthens its security commitment to defend these actors or finds means of calming insecurities in the region, including ambiguities about the Iranian nuclear program.
