Şafak Oğuz

This article analyzes the possible consequences of the F-35 fighter crisis between the U.S. and Türkiye, particularly in terms of its effect on the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) now deployed in Türkiye as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing program. It argues that the U.S. should respond to Ankara’s demands by either allowing Türkiye to rejoin the F-35 fighter project or by selling new F-16 fighters and modernization kits to Türkiye that will permit its continued deployment of TNWs. This move would, in turn, prevent the ‘brain death’ of the alliance; otherwise, negative attitudes emanating from the U.S. may lead Türkiye to search for alternative suppliers, a move that could include buying fighter aircraft from Russia or China and might lead Türkiye to question its membership in NATO. Anything that causes Türkiye to do this is a problem in the current security environment since competition between NATO and Russia has reached dangerous levels with the Russian invasion of Ukraine under the shadow of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

ABSTRACT This article debates the evolution, main purpose and real target of the missile defense system of NATO, entitled the EPAA, focusing on principal aspects of the project as well as political debate in and outside of the U.S. It argues that the EPAA, provided to NATO by the U.S., is one of the key regional missile defense projects of the global U.S. national missile defense system, which claims to protect Europe from the Iranian ballistic missile threat but actually is designed to protect the American homeland, and targets Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with nuclear warheads. It also asserts that the EPAA would result in a new and important arms race between NATO and Russia that will include offensive strategic and nuclear weapons.

The Ukrainian crisis altered the security paradigm in Europe by forcing NATO to revise its stance towards Russia, as it employed a wide array of military and non-military tools and tactics called “hybrid warfare.” To counter Russian hybrid warfare in future, the NATO Alliance implemented functional and structural changes known the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and endorsed the New Strategy on Hybrid Warfare. This paper will study Russian hybrid warfare activities and the preparedness of an Alliance shaped by the RAP and the New Strategy on Hybrid Warfare. It discusses whether this new NATO will be able to deter Russia from resorting to hybrid warfare against a NATO ally. While the Alliance has enhanced its military capabilities to a great extent, the Allies’ ability to achieve consensus on a response is the factor most likely to deter and dissuade Russia from engaging in hybrid warfare.