Introduction
There is no doubt that Türkiye’s relationship with Europe1 has been the most important issue in Turkish foreign policy in recent centuries. Just as the Ottoman Empire’s expansion primarily occurred in Europe, the Ottoman government in İstanbul dealt with European states more than others during the empire’s decline and disintegration. Due to the West’s economic and military superiority in recent centuries, European countries naturally played a crucial role in shaping Turkish foreign policy in the Republican period. It is important to recall that Türkiye was compelled to address its main foreign policy issues of the interwar period, the fate of Mosul and Hatay, with Britain and France as opposed to Iraq and Syria. During the same period, European nations remained Türkiye’s main trade partners.
Although Türkiye successfully refrained from joining the Second World War directly, Europeans mounted the most intense wartime pressure on Ankara. In the war’s aftermath, the country joined the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), which the U.S. originally formed with European nations, in response to threats from the Soviet Union, and adopted a Western-aligned security policy during the Cold War. At the same time, Türkiye became a member of the Council of Europe and applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC), an organization of Western European states, to remain close to Europe politically and economically.
The rise of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in global politics, followed by the rise of Asia, however, caused Europe’s centuries-long importance (especially over the last two centuries) in Turkish foreign policy to gradually decrease. Whereas the U.S. emerged as Türkiye’s chief security partner during the Cold War, Ankara continued to pursue economic integration with Europe during that period. In the wake of the AK Party rise to power, however, the Turkish government experienced tensions with the U.S. over the latter’s illegal 2003 invasion of Iraq and immediately took steps to more closely align itself with the European Union. Although the Turkish accession process consequently started in 2005, marking an important stage in the country’s membership bid, the opposition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which came to power in Germany the same year, to Türkiye’s admission as well as mounting pressure on Ankara over the Cyprus issue brought the talks to a standstill. It is important to recall that Europe’s right-wing conservative parties adopted an ideologically charged view on Türkiye –which factored into that standstill.2
It is important to note that the Turkish government stuck to its balancing act during the Second World War to successfully refrain from directly joining the fight despite mounting pressure from the Allies
Türkiye’s rejection of European impositions regarding Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean and adoption of a policy toward the Middle East and the Caucasus, which was occasionally not aligned with the European Union, also caused European governments and the U.S. to assume a more interventionist stance toward the AK Party government. At this point, the European Union remains Türkiye’s largest trading partner yet political tensions have taken a toll on economic relations. Whether the European Union’s leaders would rather keep Türkiye, a major economic and security partner, on their side or alienate it amid the intensifying global power struggle will shape the future of the Türkiye-European Union relations.3
Main Determinants of Türkiye-Europe Relations
Security: From Partnership to a Balance of Interests
Security has traditionally been a key factor in Türkiye’s relations with Europe. Between the Republic’s early years and the end of the Second World War, the heart of world politics was still beating in Europe. At the same time, European countries, starting with Britain, were among the world’s most influential global powers and played a defining role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Türkiye signed the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding document of its Republic, with the aforementioned countries adding to Europe’s importance vis-a-vis Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, Britain and France were Türkiye’s neighbors at the time because they controlled Iraq and Syria under the League of Nations’ mandate system –which made Europe all the more important for Turkish foreign policy. The recently-established Republic of Türkiye had waged its War of Independence against European states, yet it was keenly aware that it needed to strike a rather delicate balance in its relations with the relevant nations to remain independent and ensure its economic development. In other words, the slightest misstep in foreign policy might have dragged Türkiye into any European country’s sphere of influence. Thus seeking to perform a balancing act, the country took advantage of Europe’s fragmentation. The Soviet regime’s emergence in Russia during the First World War and the rise of Benito Mussolini’s fascist movement in Italy shortly afterward fueled security concerns in Europe. In the wake of the Great Depression, another fascist government came to power in Germany, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, and adopted revisionist policies that further deepened those concerns. That fragmentation made it easier for countries like Türkiye to perform a balancing act.
It is important to note that the Turkish government stuck to its balancing act during the Second World War to successfully refrain from directly joining the fight despite mounting pressure from the Allies. As a bipolar system emerged in the international arena after the war, however, it became impossible for Türkiye to continue its balancing act. The country was thus compelled to pick a side. In the face of the territorial demands of the Soviet Union, one of the new superpowers, Ankara concluded that it could not address these threats by itself and moved to establish a close security partnership with the other superpower, the U.S., and its Western European allies. That partnership, which emerged under the NATO umbrella, rendered Ankara safer against Moscow yet more vulnerable to U.S. and European influence and interventions.
Türkiye had increased its economic and military capacity in the initial years of AK Party rule and subsequently began to pursue a more independent foreign policy that strained its relations with the U.S. and European states
Considering Türkiye as a major Cold War forward operating base as part of their policy of containment against the Soviet Union, those nations stepped in whenever any development, which they believed would make it more difficult for Ankara to perform its task, occurred and ensured that Türkiye would continue to orbit the West.4 In other words, the security partnership between Türkiye and the West was never considered a partnership of equals by European nations and the U.S. Instead, they expected Ankara to endorse NATO’s policies and generally align its foreign policy with the U.S. and Europe in exchange for the support it received against the Soviet threat. Although that relationship essentially survived the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat’s disappearance caused the West to need Türkiye less and, by extension, decreased the importance attached to the country by the European Union in terms of security. Nonetheless, as the Yugoslav Wars revealed Europe’s vulnerabilities and shortcomings and Gerhard Schröder, an advocate of a uniquely European security architecture, came to power in Germany in 1998, a new opportunity emerged for Türkiye to move closer to Europe once again.
Türkiye’s decision to take major steps toward EU membership in the AK Party government’s initial years and the 2005 launch of membership talks were highly relevant to the security partnership between the country and Europe. Yet Angela Merkel, who became Germany’s new chancellor in 2005, and Nicolas Sarkozy, who won the 2007 presidential election in France, publicly opposed Turkish membership –which caused the Türkiye-EU relations to gradually deteriorate.5 Furthermore, Türkiye had increased its economic and military capacity in the initial years of AK Party rule and subsequently began to pursue a more independent foreign policy that strained its relations with the U.S. and European states. Unwilling to redefine their security partnership with Ankara by treating Türkiye as a sovereign and equal partner, the European Union and the U.S. increased their pressure and interventions in the 2010s to cause additional problems in Türkiye’s relations with the West. At the same time, some European nations continued to (in)directly support terrorist organizations like the PKK/YPG and FETÖ that posed a threat to Türkiye’s national security –which undermined the security partnership under the NATO umbrella. Some EU members, including France, became party to Türkiye’s dispute with the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean and forced the EU to impose severe sanctions on Türkiye. These developments as well escalated those tensions. In contrast, the European Union needs Türkiye to stop illegal migration toward the continent and to help balance the global competition against China and Russia –which is why European governments remain determined to continue their security partnership with Ankara despite problems. Meanwhile, Türkiye continues to view the European Union as an important player in its balancing act, which it began to perform anew under the AK Party and recognizes that Europe continues to account for a significant portion of its exports. Those factors encourage the Turkish government to continue its security partnership with Europe.6
Economy: The Diminishing Influence of Europe
Having much stronger economic bonds with Europe than its security partnership, Türkiye has traditionally enjoyed very close relations with Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in terms of external trade and foreign investments. The European states played an important role in the country’s external affairs as early as the Republic’s initial years. They maintained that level of importance after the Second World War and to date. Although the cumulative share of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France in Türkiye’s exports slightly decreased from 62 percent to 60 percent between 1924 and 1938, it is important to recognize that it remained quite high nonetheless. The aforementioned countries accounted for 59 percent of the nation’s imports in 1924 and 65 percent in 1938. Furthermore, Germany single-handedly accounted for 44 percent of Türkiye’s exports and 48 percent of its imports in 1938.7 In truth, the country essentially inherited its strong economic relations with Europe from the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Britain, France, Germany, and Austria accounted for 50 to 75 percent of that the Empire’s external trade between 1830 and 1911.8
During the early Republican period, Türkiye’s relations with the West focused on diplomatic efforts to resolve various problems, which had not been addressed in the Treaty of Lausanne, based on the principle of reciprocity
It is possible to argue that the European states continued to play a major role in Türkiye’s external trade following the conclusion of the 1963 Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community for the ultimate purpose of joining that organization. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), the European Union accounted for 54 percent of Türkiye’s exports and 66 percent of its imports in 1970.9 It is possible to observe, however, that those numbers gradually declined over the years. Especially under the AK Party governments, the country diversified its foreign policy to pursue closer relations with Russia, China, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. As foreign trade data came to reflect those developments, Europe became less significant in that regard. By 2022, the European Union’s share in Türkiye’s exports had dropped to 40 percent and in its imports to 25 percent. That the country’s imports from Russia ($57.4 billion) and China ($38.7 billion) exceeded the sum of its imports from 27 EU members that year, too, highlighted the major shifts in Türkiye’s economic relations with the European Union. Nonetheless, the organization continues to account for more than 40 percent of Türkiye’s exports –which Ankara must take into consideration as it shapes its relations with Brussels and other European capitals. It is important to note that taking any steps that would hurt those relationships could potentially inflict serious damage to the Turkish economy.
Table 1: The European Union’s Share in Türkiye’s External Trade (1970-2022)
Source: TURKSTAT
Although the European Union plays a significant role in Türkiye’s external trade, Türkiye’s share in Europe’s external trade remains quite low. According to the 2022 data, the country accounted for 3.87 percent of the EU’s exports and 3.29 percent of its imports. Keeping in mind that Türkiye’s share was respectively 2.44 percent and 2.23 percent in 2002, it is possible to conclude that the country came to play a more important role in the organization’s external trade.10 At this time, Türkiye ranks fifth among those countries, to which the European Union exports, and seventh among those nations from which it imports. Indeed, those numbers, too, suggest that the European Union must shape its policy toward Türkiye carefully. A closer look at Germany, which has the highest import and export volume with Türkiye among all EU members, reveals that the gap is actually deeper. According to the 2022 data, Germany remained the primary source of Türkiye’s exports whereas Türkiye ranked 15th among countries to which Germany exported. In terms of imports, Germany was third among Türkiye’s trading partners yet Türkiye ranked 18th among countries from which Germany imported.
It is possible to observe that European nations continue to play a very important role in terms of foreign direct investments to Türkiye, although their share has arguably decreased in recent years. Whereas EU members collectively accounted for 45 to 75 percent of foreign direct investments in Türkiye in the 1990s, their share remained stable (around 60 percent) during the first years of AK Party rule before gradually decreasing in the 2010s against the backdrop of strained relations between Türkiye and the EU. By 2021, EU members accounted for 24.6 percent of foreign direct investments in the country. Those numbers certainly demonstrate how political tensions influence economic relations and that European countries attempted to pressure Ankara by stemming the flow of capital to Türkiye. That European nations (including non-EU members) accounted for more than half of all foreign direct investments in Türkiye in 2021, however, was a factor that Turkish decision-makers need to take into account as they shape their country’s policy toward Europe.
Table 2: The Share of European Countries in Foreign Direct Investments from and to Türkiye (Million $, 1995-2021)
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics11
Türkiye-Europe Relations in Historical Perspective
The Interwar Period (1919-1939)
To make sense of the last century of the Türkiye-Europe relations, it would be useful to analyze the history of that relationship first. Throughout history, the Turks established states that were geared toward the West. It is possible to detect hints of that foreign policy today. The relations between the Republic of Türkiye, which was established with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and the West rested on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the Ottoman polity, which made an attempt at Westernization, collapsed following a conflict with Western states, its heir, the young Turkish republic, enacted reforms under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership to become Western and reach the level of contemporary civilization. At the same time, the newly established state aimed to become economically self-sufficient, end hostilities with the outside world as much as possible, and pursue a foreign policy designed to defend its borders under Misak-ı Milli, or the National Pact. Despite having waged a war of independence against the West, Türkiye did not refrain from forming alliances with Western nations and identified Westernization as a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
The emergence of a bipolar international order in the aftermath of the Second World War compelled many countries around the world to choose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
During the early Republican period, Türkiye’s relations with the West focused on diplomatic efforts to resolve various problems, which had not been addressed in the Treaty of Lausanne, based on the principle of reciprocity. In this context, one of the first issues that the Republic tackled was the question of foreign schools. Whereas Article 40 and Article 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne related to that matter and some regulations were subsequently made, Türkiye introduced several changes between 1924 and 1926 to require Turkish instructors to teach history and geography in the Turkish language –which caused tensions with Britain, France, and Italy. Specifically, the Turkish authorities were concerned by foreign schools providing false information to Turkish and minority children in history and geography classes. That is why the government in Ankara took steps to minimize the relevant problems by regulating the most controversial aspects of existing regulations, which were open to interpretation. Over time, the relevant countries came to accept those rules.12
The Mosul dispute between Türkiye and Britain, one of Europe’s most powerful nations at the time, represented a major foreign policy issue during Atatürk’s term. That issue had not been addressed in the Treaty of Lausanne and handing over Mosul, which was within the National Pact borders, to Iraq would have meant giving up on those goals. Nonetheless, the British government argued that Iraq could not remain militarily or economically independent without Mosul due to that city’s strategically important location and oil reserves. Having failed to reach an agreement with Türkiye, Britain referred the issue to the League of Nations, an international organization where it was a powerful member and which Ankara had not joined. The League of Nations thus decided to form a commission to look into the matter and concluded in a July 1925 report that the relevant territory ought to be handed over to Iraq –a decision that Türkiye disputed at the International Court of Justice, which ruled on November 21, 1925, that the Council’s decision was binding for both parties. Finally, the Council voted in favor of Iraq on December 16, 1925. Despite its frustration with that decision, Türkiye did not feel ready for yet another conflict after long years of fighting. As a result of negotiations, which restarted in April 1926, the country accepted the Council’s decision on the condition that it would receive 25 percent of the oil revenue from Mosul for a period of 25 years. Although tensions between Türkiye and Britain persisted for some time, the peaceful resolution of the Mosul dispute paved the way for warm relations with Western countries.13
During the same period, Türkiye experienced tensions with France, another powerful member of the League of Nations, over the Adana-Mersin railway, the status of French schools, the Bozkurt-Lotus case, and the question of Ottoman debt –which could be resolved with relative ease. In contrast, the Hatay question (just like the Mosul question) had been referred to the League of Nations. That dispute originated in France’s 1936 decision to grant independence to Syria and ended with Türkiye’s annexation of Hatay just a few months before the Second World War. Despite being located within the National Pact borders, the Sancak (Hatay) region ended up outside the Turkish territory under the Treaty of Ankara on October 20, 1921. In response to France’s 1936 announcement that it would grant independence to Syria, Türkiye began to pressure Paris within the context of preserving the autonomy of Sancak and, as talks with the French government proved futile, the issue was ultimately referred to the League of Nations. Thanks to efforts under the League of Nations umbrella, Türkiye secured the autonomy of the Sancak region as Ankara and Paris signed an agreement to jointly guarantee its territorial integrity. Appreciating that the French government was compelled to settle due to the growing risk of a new war in Europe, Türkiye seized the opportunity to leverage its status as a guarantor to ensure Sancak’s independence and, subsequently, facilitate its decision to join Türkiye in June 1939 as Hatay.14
Although Italy was among the victors of the First World War, it became secondary to Greece when it came to the allocation of conquered territories. That decision caused the Italian government’s policy toward Ankara to differ from the rest. Specifically, Italy ratified the Treaty of Lausanne before all others. Whereas the policies and statements of Benito Mussolini, who came to power in 1922 to pursue an imperialistic agenda, occasionally fueled tensions between the two nations, Türkiye successfully resorted to diplomacy to end such disputes. Accordingly, the Turkish and Italian governments signed a Treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation on May 30, 1928. In the 1930s, however, Italy perceived the Balkan Pact, whose establishment was spearheaded by Türkiye, as a threat. Furthermore, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia encouraged the Turkish government to more closely align itself with Britain, driving Ankara and Rome away from each other yet again before the Second World War.15
The initial years of AK Party rule represented an exceptionally good chapter in Türkiye’s relations with Europe in terms of economic and security partnerships as well as the country’s accession process
Greece was another country with which the Republic of Türkiye experienced problems after the Treaty of Lausanne. The first issue between the two nations related to the population exchange that covered the Greek Orthodox community in Türkiye and Muslim Turks in Greece. Under that agreement, the Greek community in İstanbul and Turks in the Western Thrace region were exempted from the aforementioned arrangement. Another problem, which the Treaty of Lausanne had not addressed, related to the continued existence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul. It is important to note that some uncertainties surrounding those two matters impacted Turkish-Greek relations until the 1930s. However, a series of agreements signed to resolve those disputes as well as Italian expansionism, border disputes in the Balkans, and economic challenges encouraged Ankara and Athens to improve their relations.16
The Cold War Era: Evolving Security Partnerships
The emergence of a bipolar international order in the aftermath of the Second World War compelled many countries around the world to choose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Türkiye opted to side with Western states and appeared inclined to integrate with the Western world. In this regard, the country held its first free and fair elections in 1950 which ended with Adnan Menderes’ victory. Thanks to the efforts of that government’s foreign minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Türkiye submitted its application to join the European Economic Community on July 31, 1959 –just 16 days after Greece.17 Although the process of economic integration with the EEC started in September 1959, it was interrupted by the May 27, 1960 military coup. Having come to power after the coup, the government of İsmet İnönü made certain commitments to the organization to facilitate the signing of the Ankara Agreement on September 12, 1963. That agreement created a framework for Türkiye’s relations with Europe by introducing three stages: the preparatory stage (which lasted until the Additional Protocol of 1973), the transitional stage (which continued until the Customs Union of 1995), and the final stage (which has continued to date).
Türkiye’s relations with the U.S. reached a low point with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s infamous 1964 letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü over the Cyprus dispute. That development also opened discussion regarding the pro-Western foreign policy that Türkiye had pursued since 1945. It is important to note that the Turkish military’s March 12, 1971 memorandum interrupted the country’s relations with the EEC once again, causing a delay in the implementation of the Additional Protocol, which they signed on November 13, 1970, until 1973. The first enlargement of the European Communities (EC) occurred during that period as the number of member states reached nine with the admission of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. Whereas the EC was coping with the negative impact of the oil crisis, which started after the Yom Kippur War, Türkiye, which was targeted by U.S. sanctions over its 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, was experiencing serious economic problems. Economic hardship was accompanied by political instability as a series of early general elections and weak coalition governments caused the situation to further deteriorate. Whereas Greece, whose association process had begun around the same time as Türkiye, applied for full membership in 1975, that development gave rise to a serious problem in Ankara’s relations with the EC over the following years. The Turkish government thus informed the EC on December 25, 1976, that it had suspended all its obligations and would not lower tariffs.
Türkiye entered a process of economic liberalization in the 1980s, within the framework of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, to replace its import substitution strategy with export-oriented industrialization with the Jan. 24 Resolutions –a milestone in the Turkish economy’s transformation. At the same time, the aforementioned decisions laid the groundwork for the Customs Union. Observers argue that the January 24 Resolutions represented Türkiye’s announcement that it would successfully compete with developed nations.18 Although that development was expected to reflect positively on the nation’s relations with the EC, political turmoil and the September 12, 1980, military coup undermined democracy yet again to crush all hopes. Whereas the coup interrupted the democratic process, Turgut Özal, the architect of the January 24 Resolutions, was appointed as a cabinet minister under the junta government –a signal to the West that economic liberalization would continue uninterrupted. Many European states welcomed that development, yet the EC eventually suspended financial aid to Türkiye due to the overdue transition to civilian rule, executions, and party closures. At the same time, the EC’s external trade with the country declined and all political relations were suspended in March 1982. Ankara reacted to that development by supporting the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 1983. It is also possible to view Greece’s 1981 admission into the EC as a diplomatic defeat for Türkiye. Upon becoming a full member, Athens subjected Ankara to frequent vetoes and political opposition.
Having aligned itself with the West due to the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War, the country made significant economic and military progress under the AK Party government
As Türkiye restored its democratic process with the 1983 elections, Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party received enough votes to form a single-party government. Seeking to attract foreign capital to revive the positive atmosphere generated by the January 24 Resolutions and to consolidate Turkish democracy, the prime minister submitted an application to join the EC on April 14, 1987. Responding to that request on December 18, 1989, the organization argued that neither Brussels nor Ankara was ready for Türkiye’s membership –despite conceding that the country qualified for admission. It is important to note that Brussels was motivated by the wider political conjuncture, including the imminent end of the Cold War. Having felt the need to keep Türkiye in its corner during the Cold War to address security concerns linked to the Soviet Union, the EC maintained that Ankara’s support was no longer necessary due to the absence of the Soviet threat. At the same time, the post-1990 stance of Eastern European nations proved more important for the organization. That approach made it impossible for Ankara to receive an answer to its liking, yet Prime Minister Turgut Özal highlighted Türkiye’s qualification for membership in an attempt to show the full half of the metaphorical glass to the Turkish people.
Another major development during Özal’s term was the Association Council, the most important body created by the Ankara Agreement, holding its first meeting after a long hiatus. It is important to recall that the absence of Council meetings had delayed the free movement of Turkish citizens within the EC’s borders per the Additional Protocol. Although the Council eventually gathered thanks to Turgut Özal’s efforts, the Greek veto stopped the organization from adopting a common policy on the free movement of Turkish citizens. As a matter of fact, some European countries made it more difficult for Turkish nationals to enter their territory.19 In other words, the ongoing problem of visa liberalization between Türkiye and the European Union dates back to that time.
The 1990s: From Customs Union to Candidacy
The Cold War had ended, the Soviet Union had disintegrated and the bipolar system had ceased to exist by the 1990s. Those developments coincided with intense efforts by Brussels to deepen European integration. Having added political integration to economic integration with the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, and renamed itself the European Union, the organization needed a new round of enlargement to adapt to changing circumstances. Accordingly, one of the main factors that shaped Türkiye’s relations with the EU throughout the 1990s was the organization’s eagerness to introduce a free market economy and liberal democracy to Central and Eastern Europe yet unwillingness to include Türkiye in those massive waves of enlargement. Secondly, European states did not agree on the limits of enlargement and the definition of European identity. That caused Europeans to question Türkiye’s Muslim identity –which made its mark on that decade. Yet another important development was that European institutions, starting with the European Parliament, criticized human rights violations that occurred in the aftermath of the postmodern coup on February 28, 1997. It is possible to argue that Türkiye’s economic problems and short-lived coalition governments in the 1990s fueled political instability and, in turn, took a toll on its relations with the European Union. Last but not least, the European Union adopted the Copenhagen Criteria at its 1993 summit in the Danish capital and applied them to Türkiye along with other candidate countries.
Having received a negative response to its 1987 membership application, Turgut Özal became president and was replaced by Süleyman Demirel as prime minister. Shifting its focus back to reviving the association process, Türkiye needed to establish a customs union with the European Union to complete the transitional stage identified in the Ankara Agreement. In this sense, the Turkish government aimed to breathe new life into its relations with the EU through the Customs Union, which the Association Council established in its March 6, 1995 meeting. That development marked the beginning of the final stage of the association process.20
Shortly after the Customs Union’s creation, a crisis erupted over the Kardak islets that negatively affected Türkiye’s relations with the European Union. A Turkish vessel, Figen Akat, ran aground off the Kardak islets (known as Imia in Greek) on January 25, 1996. Claiming the islets to be part of their sovereign territory, both nations deployed warships to the region, making a violent confrontation more likely. It is important to note that Greece successfully referred all of its disputes with Türkiye since the Kardak crisis to the European Union. At the time, the Greek government accused Türkiye of having violated the EU’s borders. The Council of the European Union subsequently forced Ankara, which the European Union condemned and described as an invader, to refer the case to the International Court of Justice.21
A postmodern coup interrupted Turkish democracy on February 28, 1997, forcing the country’s government to step down. It is important to recall that Türkiye’s relations with the European Union were particularly strained at the time due to Greece’s incessant vetoes, the European Parliament’s negative reports citing post-February 28 human rights violations, the EU’s focus on the deepening process and public discussions in Türkiye about the EU’s potential alternatives. In July 1997, the European Commission published a report titled Agenda 2000 to provide details about the EU’s relations with candidate countries, how it intended to strengthen those relationships, and the impact of enlargement. Türkiye was excluded from the ongoing process of enlargement and the report repeated the all-too-familiar political and economic arguments despite noting that the Customs Union functioned in a way that demonstrated Türkiye’s success vis-à-vis harmonization. That report was adopted at the Luxembourg Summit on December 12-13, 1997, as Türkiye was excluded from the enlargement process.22
It is possible to argue that the European Union’s influence over Türkiye began to weaken in the Luxembourg Summit’s aftermath. The government in Ankara, led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, announced its decision to maintain Türkiye’s association and Customs Union yet not to discuss any political matters not directly related to both parties with the European Union.23 That statement effectively amounted to the partial suspension of the country’s relations with the organization. That trend continued for two years, yet the European Union assumed a welcoming stance toward Türkiye ahead of the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Indeed, the country was mentioned in the Progress Report at the 1998 Cardiff Summit despite not having been officially recognized as a candidate country. Published in October 1999, the second Progress Report underlined that Türkiye had taken major steps for its customs union with the European Union and argued for its recognition as a candidate country. Subsequently, Türkiye became a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit on December 10-11, 1999 on equal terms with the others.24
The AK Party Years: Europe’s Waning Influence
The initial years of AK Party rule represented an exceptionally good chapter in Türkiye’s relations with Europe in terms of economic and security partnerships as well as the country’s accession process.25 Rapidly increasing its trade volume with the European Union, the country reached the final stage of its membership process in 2005 by starting accession talks. That quick improvement had three main reasons. Primarily, the AK Party had won the 2002 general election to form a single-party government whose foreign policy approach highlighted the importance of cooperation. In the aftermath of the devastating economic crisis in 2001, the new government maintained that foreign policy should promote economic development. Accordingly, it pursued stronger economic cooperation with Europe and other parts of the world. Many believed that strengthening Türkiye’s relations with the European Union and successfully completing the accession talks to join the organization would seriously benefit the Turkish economy. Thanks to that emphasis on economic cooperation, the country’s trade volume with the European Union skyrocketed from $40.7 billion to $124.8 billion between 2002 and 2008 –an 182 percent increase.26 Despite that notable uptick, however, the Turkish government’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy enabled the country to improve its economic relations with the Middle East, among other regions, more quickly than Europe. Hence the decline of the European Union’s share in Türkiye’s external trade from 46.5 percent to 37.5 percent during the same period.
Table 3: Türkiye-EU Trade’s Development in the Initial Years of AK Party Rule (Billion $, 2002-2008)
Source: TURKSTAT
Another reason why the AK Party government attached importance to Türkiye’s relations with European nations was its eagerness to enact democratic reforms that Brussels expected within the framework of Turkish accession. Despite having formed a single-party government, the movement was compelled to push back against the guardianship regime, which had traditionally meddled in elected governments’ affairs in an anti-democratic manner. Accordingly, the AK Party believed that any rapprochement with the European Union would strengthen its hand in that fight. It is important to note that a series of reform packages, which were geared toward EU membership, and steps toward democratization had made it more difficult for the Turkish Armed Forces to get involved in politics. Since bolstering Türkiye’s ties to the European Union contributed to the democratization process and strengthened the Turkish economy, the AK Party government pursued close relations with European states during that period.27
Although the European Union did not officially sanction Türkiye, European countries mounted additional pressure on the country due to its counter-PKK/YPG operations in northern Syria, exploration and drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and adoption of the presidential system of government with the 2017 constitutional referendum
The third reason behind the rapid improvement of Türkiye’s relations with the European Union in the early 2000s was Europe’s favorable approach to Turkish membership and its relations with Ankara. Among others, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the two most prominent figures in Germany’s post-1998 coalition government, supported Türkiye’s complete integration into Europe’s security and economic system through the prospect of EU membership. Indeed, the majority of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Greens believed that giving the green light to Turkish membership would encourage democratization in Türkiye. Keeping in mind Germany’s influence over the European Union, it did not prove difficult for Berlin’s endorsement to get the EU to take action. On October 3, 2005, Türkiye started accession talks with the European Union.
That positive atmosphere between Türkiye and the European Union, however, did not last. It is important to recall that the Greek Cypriot administration’s 2004 admission into the organization, in the absence of a solution in Cyprus, had begun to take a toll on Ankara’s relations with Brussels. The rise of political leaders and movements in Germany and France, which opposed Turkish membership, fueled tensions over Cyprus. Specifically, the Cyprus question’s resolution (or lack thereof) represented a useful excuse for the aforementioned governments, which already opposed Türkiye’s admission, to request concessions from Ankara. Whereas the Turkish Cypriots, who voted in favor of the Annan Plan in 2004, were forced to make additional concessions, the Greek Cypriots, who vetoed the plan and were emboldened by their EU membership, made unacceptable demands. With European politicians, the opponents of Turkish membership, endorsing those demands, the accession talks reached an impasse. By extension, Türkiye, whose path to EU membership was blocked, lost its motivation to take any steps. Yet another factor that weakened Ankara’s resolve was its decreasing need for Europe’s economic support as the Turkish economy rapidly grew between 2002 and 2008. Furthermore, the AK Party survived the so-called e-memorandum on April 27, 2007, and a 2008 closure case to consolidate its position in Turkish politics. Those developments made it possible for the movement to pursue a more independent foreign policy.
Türkiye’s pursuit of a more independent foreign policy, in turn, frustrated the U.S. and its European allies. Having aligned itself with the West due to the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War, the country made significant economic and military progress under the AK Party government. Consequently, it began to pursue a policy toward the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Caucasus that put its own interests first –which occasionally clashed with the interests of some Western countries. Having experienced tensions with Israel over the Davos and Mavi Marmara crises in 2009-2010, Türkiye strengthened its relations with Middle Eastern countries like Syria and Iraq as well as refused to join U.S. sanctions against Iran. Those developments caused Washington and some European capitals to claim that Turkish foreign policy was experiencing an “axis shift.”28 As a result, the U.S. policy of mounting pressure on Türkiye received support from European countries in the 2010s.
That European states (just like the U.S.) opted to support the terrorist organization FETÖ, which had infiltrated key public institutions including the security apparatus and the judiciary, instead of endorsing Türkiye’s efforts to counter that entity’s subversive efforts since 2013 sparked a crisis of confidence between Ankara and Western capitals. It is important to note that the aforementioned organization escalated its subversive activities to the level of a coup attempt in July 2016. Yet European nations, which never missed an opportunity to voice their support for Turkish democracy and express their opposition to coups, did not cease to support that group. Indeed, EU countries like Germany and Greece harbored FETÖ operatives that fled abroad following their coup attempt’s failure. At the same time, European countries refused to support Türkiye, their NATO ally, in its fight against the terrorist organization PKK/YPG. Despite recognizing the PKK as a terrorist organization, they supported the YPG, the PKK’s Syrian branch, together with the U.S. in the name of fighting ISIS. That policy of collaborating with terrorist entities caused serious problems between Türkiye and European nations, especially in the late 2010s.
The main reason why the Turkish government opted for a balancing act instead of becoming a party to the global power struggle was the policy of the U.S. and its European “allies” to pressure Türkiye
Another source of distrust between Türkiye and its European “allies” has been Brussels’ reluctance to support Ankara as it experienced tensions with Russia, which intervened in Syria’s civil war that erupted during the Arab revolts. Although Moscow staged a military intervention in Syria in 2015 to force millions of refugees to cross the Turkish border, European nations refused to answer Türkiye’s calls for the creation of a safe zone in northern Syria. In contrast, they attempted to reach an agreement with the Turkish government when they faced a massive refugee wave in 2015. Under a March 2016 deal, European governments offered to revitalize the EU accession process and provide financial aid for asylum seekers in Türkiye in exchange for Ankara stemming the influx of asylum seekers to Europe.29 Yet Türkiye’s relations with the European Union continued to deteriorate despite that agreement due to disagreements over the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe’s continued support for terrorist organizations posing a threat to Turkish national security.
Furthermore, France became a party to the dispute over the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Eastern Mediterranean by siding with Greece and the Greek Cypriots to use the European Union to pressure Türkiye –with which it experienced tensions due to a power struggle in Libya. Consequently, sanctions became a frequently discussed issue in the Türkiye-EU relations. Indeed, the possibility of imposing severe sanctions on Türkiye was on the agenda of the European Union’s December 2020 summit. Although Greece, the Greek Cypriots, Austria, and France favored sanctions that would compel Türkiye to take a step back in the power struggle over the Eastern Mediterranean,30 the German government led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who saw the country as an important partner in the global power struggle with Russia and China as well as the prevention of the influx of refugees to Europe, prevented the imposition of severe sanctions.31
Although the European Union did not officially sanction Türkiye, European countries mounted additional pressure on the country due to its counter-PKK/YPG operations in northern Syria, exploration and drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and adoption of the presidential system of government with the 2017 constitutional referendum. It is important to note that pro-PKK/YPG voices in European politics and media as well as Greek Cypriot and Greek lobbyists played an important role in that process.32 As some European companies suspended planned investments in Türkiye at the time,33 there was a significant drop in direct investments from EU members to the country. Whereas EU members accounted for 68.4 percent of all foreign direct investment in Türkiye in 2008, their share decreased to 24.6 percent by 2021. Likewise, the amount of foreign direct investment had reached $13.6 billion in 2007, before political tensions between Türkiye and the European Union reflected poorly on their economic relations, and plummeted to $1.4 billion in 2021.34
Graph 1: The EU’s Share in Foreign Direct Investments in Türkiye (2007-2021)
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics35
The serious decline in the EU’s direct investments in Türkiye attested to efforts by European nations, which experienced political problems with the country and found it more difficult to influence its domestic politics and foreign policy, to punish Türkiye. In this sense, they attempted to force Ankara to adopt a foreign policy, which was aligned with the West, by mounting pressure on the Turkish economy. By the same token, some politicians in Germany and Austria, who were influenced by anti-Türkiye lobbyists, called for a boycott of the Turkish tourism industry at the height of tensions between Ankara and Brussels to target Türkiye’s economy.36 In line with those negative developments, the trade volume between Türkiye and the European Union gradually declined, reducing the EU’s share in Türkiye’s external trade to 31.5 percent by 2022. Despite that setback, however, EU members account for 40.5 percent of Türkiye’s exports –which makes the EU an indispensable partner for the country.
Table 4: The Development of Türkiye-EU Trade Since the Global Economic Crisis (Billion $, 2009-2022)
Source: TURKSTAT
Conclusion: The Future of Türkiye-Europe Relations
The future of Türkiye’s relations with Europe will be determined by the outcome of the global power struggle and how European capitals and Ankara shall interpret that struggle. It is possible to observe that Türkiye aimed to perform a balancing act over the last 15 years of the AK Party rule due to negative feedback from the European Union and its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. The main reason why the Turkish government opted for a balancing act instead of becoming a party to the global power struggle was the policy of the U.S. and its European “allies” to pressure Türkiye. Viewing the country’s moves within the framework of its demand to be treated as a sovereign and equal partner as a threat to their influence over the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, Western countries resorted to pressure and sanctions in an attempt to force Ankara to abandon that policy. Yet that pressure, coupled with sanctions, drove Türkiye further away from its Western partners and caused the country to assume a neutral stance in the Russia-Ukraine war, among other manifestations of the global power struggle, instead of siding with the West. Furthermore, Türkiye took steps to defend its national interests in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh –risking a violent confrontation with its Western “allies” instead of collaborating with them.
In light of the most recent developments, it is possible to argue that Türkiye would not refrain from experiencing tensions with European states if they failed to recognize the country as a sovereign and equal partner. One could also observe that the Turkish economy and political establishment successfully withstood pressure and sanctions from Europe and the U.S. –and even became immune to them. Provided that Ankara will not give up on its independent foreign policy under the current circumstances, European countries’ attitude toward Türkiye will primarily shape the future of that country’s relations with Europe. Furthermore, it is necessary to underscore that European nations face a serious dilemma over their future policy toward Türkiye and cannot decide whether they will keep that country on their side as the global power struggle intensifies. Although they know that it would be irrational to lose Türkiye, which has been part of the European security system since the Cold War, they find it difficult to stomach the independent foreign policy that the AK Party government has designed for Türkiye and began to implement.
The political culture of governments in Türkiye and Europe as well as their leaders’ characters will play a defining role in the future of their relations
It is possible to argue that European countries will have three options regarding their future policy toward Türkiye. The most rational option would involve Europe coming to terms with the country’s democratically elected government and its independent foreign policy and, by extension, trying to keep it close to the Western alliance as an equal partner. That would enable Europe to keep an important ally in its corner as the global power struggle against China and Russia intensifies. The second option would be to draw a front line to the West of Türkiye, yet identifying the country as an adversary would represent a serious loss of Europe and the U.S. The final option for European countries would be to double down on their efforts to remove the AK Party government, which they do not believe to serve Western interests, from power. Some certainly believe that making such a move would ensure that Türkiye orbits the West and supports Europe and the U.S. in the global power struggle. Keeping in mind that such efforts have failed repeatedly over the years and only served to drive Türkiye further away from Europe, the majority seems to believe that walking down that path would be irrational.
Time will tell what kind of policy European nations will adopt toward Türkiye and if they will make a rational decision. Yet the existence of lobbyists in Europe, who are capable of pushing the European Union’s policy toward the irrational, has already been established. Furthermore, it is no secret that the U.S., too, influences the development of Europe’s policy toward Türkiye and occasionally plays a detrimental role. Indeed, one might argue that the European policy regarding FETÖ and the PKK/YPG, which deeply offends Türkiye, has been largely influenced by the attitude of the Obama and Biden Administrations.
The final point is that the political culture of governments in Türkiye and Europe as well as their leaders’ characters will play a defining role in the future of their relations. Until now, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Emmanuel Macron made their marks on the Türkiye-Europe relations with their idiosyncratic foreign policy approaches. Having won the most recent elections in Türkiye, Erdoğan is expected to craft his administration’s Europe policy with a familiar approach. The attitudes of future governments in Europe, especially Germany and France, and the position of far-right political parties, too, will be relevant to the future of Türkiye’s relations with Europe.
Endnotes
1. Since the article deals with Türkiye-Europe relations over a wide period of time, the article uses different concepts to describe bilateral relations. Depending on the context, the concepts of Europe (as continent), the European Union (EU), or the European Economic Community/European Community (EEC/EC) are preferred.
2. Muhittin Ataman, Veysel Ayhan, and Mehmet Dalar, “Avrupa’nın Türkiye Algılaması: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği İçin Anlamı,” Bilgi, Vol. 21, (Winter 2010), pp. 54-72.
3. Kemal İnat, “Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinin Geleceği,” Kriter, (May 2016).
4. Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran, “Bölgesel ve Küresel Meydan Okumalar Karşısında Türk Dış Politikası,” in Nebi Miş, Burhanettin Duran, and Abdurrahman Babacan (eds.), AK Parti ve Türkiye’nin Dönüşümü, (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2022), pp. 241-262.
5. Ali Resul Usul, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Politikası 2009,” in Burhanettin Duran, Kemal İnat, and Mesut Özcan (eds.), Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2009, (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2010), p. 227.
6. Murat Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s Strategic Conduct under the Changing International System,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2021).
7. Levent Özkardeş, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yılları ve 1929 Ekonomik Buhranında Dış Ticaretin Yönetimi,” Gümrük ve Ticaret Dergisi, No. 6 (2015), p. 31.
8. Burcu Kılınç Savrul, Hasan Alp Özel, and Cüneyt Kılıç, “Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminden Günümüze Türkiye’de Dış Ticaretin Gelişimi,” Girişimcilik ve Kalkınma Dergisi, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2013), pp. 58-59.
9. “Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri,” TÜİK, retrieved from https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disticaret.zul?param1=5¶m2=0&sitcrev=0&isicrev=0&sayac=5809.
10. “EU Trade Statistics,” European Commission, retrieved August 19, 2023, from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/de/statistics.
11. “OECD International Direct Investment Statistics,” OECD, retrieved August 20, 2023, from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/data/oecd-international-direct-investment-statistics_idi-data-en.
12. For a detailed study on this topic, see: Sezen Kılış, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Yabancı Okullar (1923-1938),” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. 21, No. 61 (2005), pp. 259-280.
13. William Hale, Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000, (İstanbul: Mozaik, 2000), pp. 50-51.
14. Kemal İnat, “Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikaları,” in Davut Dursun and Tayyar Arı (eds.), Orta Doğuda Siyaset, (Anadolu University, 2013), pp. 199-200.
15. Mahmut Bolat, “Genel Hatlarıyla Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye’nin İkili İlişkileri,” Gazi Üniversitesi Kırşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45-74, pp. 56-57.
16. Ali Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası, İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar, (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013), pp. 44-45.
17. Ferda Özer and Mehlika Özlem Ultan, “Avrupa Birliği’ne Aday Statüsündeki Ülkelerin Siyasi ve Ekonomik Açılardan Karşılaştırılması,” Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi, Vol. 19, (2021), pp. 29-56, p. 40.
18. Ahmet Can Bakkalcı, Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye İlişkileri Teorik Temeller-Uygulama-Tartışmalar, (Ankara: Seçkin, 2016), pp. 273-275.
19. Murat Ercan, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye İlişkileri, İlişkilerin Tarihi-Sorunları-Kurguları-Senaryoları ve Geleceği, (İstanbul, Efeakademi, 2018), p. 146.
20. Serpil Bardakçı Tosun, “Avrupa Birliği Türkiye İlişkilerinin Güncel Bilançosu,” in Filiz Cicioğlu and Hacı Mehmet Boyraz (eds.), Avrupa Birliği Üzerine Tartışmalar, Dış Politika ve Güvenlik, (İstanbul: Aktif, 2021), pp. 99-117, p. 105.
21. Harun Arıkan, “Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Yunanistan Faktörü,” İ.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, No. 28, (March 2003), pp. 116-140, pp. 129-132.
22. Rıdvan Karluk and Özgür Tonus, “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri Çıkmaz Sokakta,” Anadolu Üniversitesi İ.İ.B.F Dergisi, 15, No. 1 (1999), pp. 343-346, p. 349.
23. Çınar Özen and Hatice Yazgan, “Türkiye’nin AB’ye Tam Üyelik Süreci,” in Ertan Efegil and M. Seyfettin Erol (eds.), Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, Avrupa’nın Genişlemesi, Müzakere Süreci ve Batılılaşma Sorunsalı, (Ankara: Orion, 2007), pp. 233-280, p. 248.
24. Murat Aktaş, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye, (Bursa: Dora, 2019), p. 395.
25. For a comprehensive analysis of Türkiye-EU relations during the AK Party years, see: Filiz Cicioğlu and Hüsna Taş Yetim, “Uyumdan Güven Bunalımına Türkiye-AB İlişkileri,” in Kemal İnat, Burhanettin Duran, and Ali Aslan (eds.), Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti: Dış Politika, (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2018).
26. “Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri,” TÜİK.
27. Kemal İnat, “Türkiye’nin Dönüşümünde Avrupa Birliği’nin Etkisi,” in Davut Dursun, Burhanettin Duran, and Hamza Al (eds.), Dönüşüm Sürecindeki Türkiye, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2007), pp. 97-120.
28. For a literature review regarding this topic, see: Ali Balcı, Filiz Cicioğlu, and Dilek Küçükboz, “Türkiye’nin Ekseni Kayıyor mu? Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi,” Akademik Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi (AKAD), 11, No. 20 (2019), pp. 66-81.
29. Filiz Cicioğlu, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Politikası 2016,” in Burhanettin Duran, Kemal İnat, and Mustafa Caner (eds.), Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2016, (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2017).
30. “Fransa’dan Gelecek AB Zirvesinde Türkiye’ye Yaptırım Çağrısı,” Euronews, (October 27, 2020), retrieved from https://tr.euronews.com/2020/10/27/fransa-dan-gelecek-ab-zirvesinde-turkiye-ye-yapt-r-m-cagr-s; “AB’de Türkiye Bölünmesi,” Hürriyet, (December 8, 2020), retrieved from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/abde-turkiye-bolunmesi-41682542.
31. “AB Zirvesi’nde Türkiye’ye Yaptırım Çıkmadı,” NTV, (December 11, 2020), retrieved from https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/son-dakika-haberi-ab-liderler-zirvesinde-turkiyeye-yaptirim-karari-cikmadi,jvEdavyQrUCiwuN7sDN2xA; Murat Özgür Güvendik, “Uzmanlara Göre AB Türkiye’ye Sert Yaptırımlar Uygulayamayacak,” Anadolu Ajansı, (December 7, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/uzmanlara-gore-ab-turkiyeye-sert-yaptirimlar-uygulayamayacak/2068087.
32. Kemal İnat, “Anti-Turkey Sentiment in Europe during the Referendum Process,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2017), pp. 43-61.
33. “Weil Sieht Momentan Keine Chance Für Türkisches VW-Werk,” Der Spiegel, (October 15, 2019); “Volkswagen, Suriye Operasyonu Nedeniyle Türkiye Yatırımını Erteledi,” Euronews, (October 15, 2019), retrieved from https://tr.euronews.com/2019/10/15/volkswagen-suriye-operasyonu-nedeniyle-turkiye-yatirimini-erteledi.
34. “OECD International Direct Investment Statistics,” OECD, retrieved August 20, 2023, from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/data/oecd-international-direct-investment-statistics_idi-data-en.
35. “OECD International Direct Investment Statistics,”
36. “Almanya’dan Türkiye Turizmini Boykot Çağrısı,” Turizm Ajansı, (March 4, 2017), retrieved August 26, 2023, from https://www.turizmajansi.com/haber/almanya-dan-turkiye-turizmini-boykot-cagrisi-h14417; Kemal İnat, “Almanya’da Radikalizmin Zaferi mi?” Türkiye, (July 22, 2017), retrieved from https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/kose-yazilari/prof-dr-kemal-inat/almanyada-radikalizmin-zaferi-mi-597697.
