Introduction
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted regional and global attention since its inception in 2013. Though China has presented the BRI in essentially economic terms, it has been viewed strategically by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India.1 Turkey, however, has maintained a cautious policy as far as the nature and character of the BRI is concerned. Indeed, as a connector of Asia with Europe, Ankara has, on the one hand, showing interest in the Chinese initiative for rational reasons and, on the other hand, come up with its own initiative commonly known as the Middle Corridor –which, while overlapping with the BRI in infrastructural terms, carries the potential to act as a bridge among Turkey, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.2 Moreover, as part of its Asian foreign policy, Turkey has projected the Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) as means as well as ends in pursuing commercial, military, and strategic objectives in a geopolitical environment that is undergoing regional realignments.3
