The Syrian Crisis, the bloodiest front of the Arab uprisings and one of the main determinants of policies of regional and global powers, has been dominating international politics for the last five years. Having caused the death of more than 300 thousand civilians and forced relocation of more than 7 million Syrians, it is one of the direst international problems that the global powers must deal with. It began as a local issue, but after a very short period of time it morphed into a proxy war between regional and global powers. “Redlines” drawn by regional and global actors were crossed, yet there has been no tangible reaction to these violations. Among others, chemical weapons were used, crimes against humanity were committed, fundamental human rights were repeatedly violated. Over time, the crisis has revealed limitations and maladies of the actors involved.
It has revealed the futility and ineffectiveness of the UN system and as well as the deep crisis that the global system is in. Due to the lack of consensus between the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UN could not take any decisions to solve the crisis. The Assad regime has continued to kill thousands of innocent peoples without being held responsible. Similarly, the crisis demonstrated the incompetence of both NATO and the European Union (EU) as the main international organizations representing the Western world. NATO’s effective interferences in Kosovo and Libya increased expectations for another military intervention to secure political stability in Syria. However, NATO turned a blind eye to the Syrian crisis as did the EU, which was already preoccupied with its internal political, economic and social problems.
The Syrian crisis has uncovered the limitations of the United States’ constructive power, while enjoying destructive power. The U.S. tries to control the region by allowing the political disarray of the regional states such as Iraq. It is clear that the U.S. is unable to control the world by itself; it has to share the responsibilities as well as the benefits of being a world hegemon. Therefore, it has had to allow Russia to get involved in the Syrian crisis. The Obama Administration’s hesitation and non-engagement/selective engagement policy towards Syria is considered as one of the main reasons of the continuation of the crisis.
The crisis has demonstrated that despite being a part of the power game in the Middle East; internal and continental problems prevent European countries from pursuing an effective policy towards the region. Apparently, there is no common vision shared by key European powers towards the Middle East. They have been squeezed as a result of the power struggle between the U.S. and Russia. The Brexit referendum in particular helped in the elimination of any possibility of a common policy by the European countries. Many Europeans began questioning the EU values and losing their conviction and hope in the EU institutions. Nationalism and Xenophobia has begun to dominate European politics. The main concern of European countries has been the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe, not the humanitarian and political crisis inside Syria. They have already deferred remaining issues to the U.S. and Russia.
It has revealed both the limitations of Turkish hard power and region-wide soft power. On the one hand, Turkey opted not to take major hard power measures without cooperating with other regional or global powers. On the other hand, its soft power and its increasing popularity on the Arab streets make Turkey one of inevitable players of the regional power games. Moderate opposition groups supported by Turkey remained intact against the heavy attacks from the Assad regime and its supporters such as Russia and Iran. It is almost unanimously accepted that any solution excluding Turkey is destined to fail. Therefore, even though the continuation of the crisis damages its national interests, Turkey continues to be one of the key actors involved in the crisis.
It has demonstrated that Russia is still a global power challenging the influence of the West’s expansionist policies towards the Middle East. Russia began to reclaim global “responsibilities” after the fait accompli in Ukraine and the Syrian crisis consolidated Russia’s new strategic position in a wider region.
It has shown how China, whose priority is the regional stability, has been benefitting from the chaos created in the region. China insists on remaining a free rider in international politics; therefore, it has been one of the quietest global actors during the Syrian crisis. Unlike Russia, China does not want to claim global “responsibilities,” at least for now. Since the beginning of the crisis, China declared that it would veto any resolution against the Assad regime. Thus, it took sides with Russia and indirectly supported the Assad regime.
Israel has been one of the few beneficiaries of the Syrian crisis. After the fall of the Iraqi state structure and weakened Egyptian regime, Syria was the only significant regional Arab power in the region. Thanks to the crisis, Syria lost its regional position; divided into four de facto zones controlled by the regime, ISIS, the YPG and the opposition. At this moment in time, Syria cannot pose a threat against any regional country, including Israel. Israel seems to prefer the continuation of the Syrian crisis, which has changed the priorities of the regional actors and distracted from the atrocities of the Israeli state against the Palestinians.
The Syrian crisis has underlined disunity and paralysis in the Arab and the Islamic world. Although there are more than 20 Arab countries and more than 50 Muslim countries, with international organizations representing these countries, they have been unable to take initiatives towards international developments. Neither the Arab League nor the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has been able to mobilize their member states. Traditional Arab states such as Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Syria not only lost their power but also their state structures. The only remaining regional Arab state, Saudi Arabia, is far away from pursuing an independent regional policy. Saudis’ petro-dollar-dependent policy cannot appease internal and regional opposition movements and political actors anymore due to the increasing political awareness of regional peoples and foreign infiltration by different global actors. The Saudis could not create a cohesive and strategic game plan to address burning regional issues such as the crisis in Syria, and are bogged down in domestic issues such as Yemen.
The Syrian crisis has exposed the Iranian sectarian and expansionist regional policy. After the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian state’s discourse was mainly pan-Islamic, emphasizing the unity of the Islamic ummah. However, the Iraqi invasion by the U.S. and especially the Syrian crisis have revealed the Iranian intentions of creating a Shia Crescent in the Middle East. Iran has sponsored and supported the Assad regime against the Islamic opposition groups throughout the Syrian crisis. The fall of the Assad regime is unacceptable for Iran, because the Iranian state considers the survival of the Assad regime as a guarantee for maintaining its geographical link with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Lastly, the Syrian crisis has shown the world how “violent non-state actors” could become territorial actors and create state-like entities. Two such actors, ISIS and the YPG, have been controlling certain parts of the Syrian territory. While ISIS is considered as a terrorist organization by all international actors, the YPG is seen as a legitimate actor by most Western countries, especially the U.S., which provides them with all kinds of assistance. However the YPG is acknowledged as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and the EU.
This issue of Insight Turkey, entitled The Syrian Mayhem, Que Vadis?, offers a collection of articles and commentaries related to the Syrian civil war, which has now entered into its fifth year. By analyzing the Syrian crisis from different perspectives, this issue aspires to present aspects of the Syrian reality that many tend to ignore. There is also an insightful commentary and three interesting off-topic research articles on different issues in Turkish and Middle Eastern politics.
This issue is composed of four commentaries and three articles that elaborate on the past, present and the future of Syria. Azzam Tamimi in his commentary asserts that as long as the war of attrition among the various parties involved in Syria is set to continue, Syria will head towards more destruction. Nevertheless, according to Tamimi in the long term none of these parties will be decisive and only the will and power of the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria. Ammar Kahf focuses on the current power realignments in Syria and like Tamimi he concludes by saying that the future of Syria remains in the hands of local actors. Consequently, he states that the best scenario for regional actors would be supporting and empowering local transitional mechanisms that can re-establish peace and stability locally.
Christopher Anzalone and Ufuk Ulutaş, focus on the internal actors in Syria: al-Nusra and the political opposition respectively. Anzalone in his commentary analyzes the role of al-Nusra in the Syrian conflict and expounds that Jabhat Fath al-Sham as a major player in the country’s civil war will affect the other internal actors –including here the opposition– both positively and negatively. On the other hand, Ulutaş analyses the main shortcomings that have hindered the opposition from becoming a strong bloc and have a determinative role. According to him, representation deficit, dependency on outside actors, and the irrelevance of the political track have limited the role of the opposition internally as well as in the international arena.
Burak Kadercan brings yet another perspective to the debate of the Syrian conflict by stating that rather than a static “thing,” ISIS is a process. Accordingly, he states that the ISIS crisis is remaking the sectarian and ethnic dynamics in the region; moreover, Kadercan argues that the Kurdish forces in the region –especially YPG– are using this crisis to “whitewash” the PKK’s reputation as a terrorist organization. Focusing on a topic that has shaken the foundations of Europe, Radka Havlová and Kristýna Tamchynová discuss the response of the EU to the Syrian refugee problem and the failures of the EU to adopt a common approach towards this issue. Accordingly, the Syrian refugee issue has indirectly brought to light the European divergences.
In the last article related to the Syrian crisis, Veysel Kurt retrospectively focuses on the Syrian army and its role in politics. Kurt argues that Bashar al-Assad, following in the steps of his late father Hafez al-Assad, developed a symbiotic relationship between the army and the political power, which he calls ‘the power bloc’. As a conclusion, he emphasizes the fact that the sectarian polarization, followed by the external interventions have resulted in a crisis of the army; however, Kurt states that if the Assad rule continues a more authoritarian and more sectarian army structure will be formed to protect the regime rather than the country.
One off-topic commentary and three research articles focus on issues such as the Turkish and Western media, Turkey’s role in Latin America and the post-nuclear deal period in Iran. Fahrettin Altun and İsmail Çağlar analyze the Turkish media within the framework of democratization of both Turkey and its media sector. They discuss the idea that the freedom of media is limited by the official ideology surrounding the political institution, rather than the political institution itself. Oğuzhan Yanarışık focuses on the coverage of the Gezi Park protests in the mainstream Western media. This topic is relevant even after three years and requires special attention as the Gezi Park protests can be considered as a negative turning point when it comes to the Western coverage of the Turkish reality. Yanarışık in his article reveals the bias of the Western media which is an indicator of its worsening quality.
Erman Akıllı and Federico Donelli in their article examine Turkey’s approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean region. As they focus on Turkey-Cuba relations, Akıllı and Donelli state that Turkey has been able to increase its presence and influence in the region, due to a particular soft power-oriented policy. According to them, the main reasons behind this strategy change were the economic interests of a new entrepreneurial class. Lastly, Mohammed Nuruzzaman’s commentary through a comparison between the policies of Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors argues that while Khomeini pursued anti-imperialist policies, his successors have often attempted to compromise with the West by undertaking economic reforms; The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an example that proves this change of policies.
To summarize, this latest issue of Insight Turkey sheds light on different aspects and inner perspectives of the Syrian crisis. We are quite sure that it will help you to decipher the positions and actions of regional and global powers regarding Syria. This issue will continue to make a great contribution to your understanding of both Turkish and Middle Eastern politics.