Introduction
When the historical development of the European integration process is analyzed, it may be observed that the United Kingdom (UK) has long maintained a skeptical and anxious political attitude and behavior toward the issue of transnationalism. While Germany was in ‘year zero’ in 1945 following the Second World War (WWII), France and the three Benelux countries, aiming for economic modernization to overcome their distrust of Germany, focused on attempts to fix the continent’s ill-fortune. The UK preferred to remain indifferent to the integration proposals with which it was presented, as it prioritized its relations with the United States and the Commonwealth of Nations, and considered itself a global power. One of the reasons for this isolationism is that the UK, which was at the peak of its power and prestige following WWII, is well above European standards in economic and military terms. In other words, according to England, the sharing of sovereignty is not for the victorious British, but it is a policy behavior according to the lost Continents.1 European integration, which many British politicians considered unlikely to succeed, was only of symbolic significance outside of free trade issues. As a matter of fact, such a federation requiring the sacrifice of independence was considered a project in which the British could never be involved.2
