It was obvious to almost anyone keeping an eye on Turkish politics that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) would emerge victorious from the June 12, 2011 elections in Turkey. The actual election results surprised many only because of the margin of the AKP’s victory, for few expected an increase in the AKP’s share of votes for a third consecutive term. The election results have shown that since the last elections in 2007, the AKP has increased its votes by 3% and reached the threshold of 50%, which in effect meant twice as much support as its closest follower, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Moreover, the AKP’s popularity for the first time since 2002 elections did not seem to involve reaction votes against the infringements of the military-led Kemalist establishment into the political sphere. To the contrary, the AKP seemed to owe a considerable part of its popularity to the electorate’s retrospective voting approving its past performance in engaging with the Kemalist establishment and delivering material improvements in the daily lives of people in Turkey. The 2011 elections, in this respect, marked the emergence of the AKP as a political brand that guarantees the electorate’s satisfaction, or at least, that is the most trustworthy, reliable and capable political party more likely than any of its competitors to satisfy the electorate’s demands. This was a huge success that firmly declared the AKP a predominant party, unusually free from the depleting impact of running the country and likely to win each and every free and fair election for the foreseeable future. The AKP’s election declaration entitled “Turkey is Ready, Target is 2023,” indicating a political horizon reaching as far as the centennial of the Republic, has therefore turned out to be not a pretentious assertion, but an acknowledgement of the fact that it is the most formidable political party planning and, all things being equal, likely to win at least three more elections until 2023.